Sigismund of Luxemburg and the Imperial Response to the Ottoman Turkish Threat, c. 1410-1437 by Whelan, Mark
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Sigismund of Luxemburg and the 
Imperial Response to the Ottoman 
Turkish Threat, c. 1410-1437 
 
Mark Whelan 
 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Supervised by: Professor Jonathan Harris 
 
2014 
 
 
2 
 
Declaration of Authorship 
 
I, Mark Whelan, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my 
own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
While much has been written on Sigismund of Luxemburg’s response to the Ottoman 
threat, one aspect has almost been entirely overlooked; his use of the Reich to counter 
the Turkish danger after his election as King of the Romans in 1410. The central point 
of this thesis is to consider how Sigismund drew upon and used the newfound status 
and resources that came with holding the Imperial office in order to support his 
struggle against the Ottomans.  
With the exception of the first chapter, this thesis is structured on a thematic 
basis. Chapter 1 provides the historical background required in order to contextualise 
Sigismund’s response to the Ottoman Turkish threat.  By drawing upon a range of 
unpublished archival material, it also seeks to bring new perspectives to the nature of 
the Turkish threat which he faced and how he conceived of his struggle against the 
Ottomans. Chapter 2 highlights Sigismund’s use of the ‘status’ that came with Roman 
King in order to heighten awareness of the Turkish threat throughout Christendom. It 
does so through examining his letter writing, courtly ceremony and orations. Whereas 
chapter 2 underlines the more abstract ideological and cultural resources which 
Sigismund could draw upon as Roman King, the next three chapters explore how he 
attempted to draw upon concrete military resources. Chapter 3 explores how 
Sigismund drew upon naval and riverine expertise from his subjects as Roman King in 
order to support his warfare against the Ottoman Turks on the waters of the Danube. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the fortification of Sigismund’s frontier with the Turks, and the 
manners in which he sourced expertise and resources from his subjects in the Reich in 
support of this. Lastly, chapter 5 underlines how Sigismund drew upon the logistical 
and fiscal knowledge present in the Reich in order to support his campaigns and 
diplomatic manoeuvres against the Ottomans.  
In contrast to current arguments, this thesis argues throughout that Sigismund’s 
Roman Kingship enhanced his ability to resist the Ottomans rather than hinder it, and 
enabled him to draw upon concrete military, political and economic in support of his 
struggle. 
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Introduction 
Sigismund of Luxemburg was a man of many crowns. When he died in 1437 he had been the 
King of Hungary for over half a century, the King of the Romans for 27 years, King of 
Bohemia for 18 years, King of the Lombards for 6 years and Holy Roman Emperor for 4. 
Sigismund’s position as the secular head of Christendom, added to the responsibility of ruling 
vast tracts of central and eastern Europe presented him with numerous challenges throughout 
his reign. However, perhaps the greatest challenge with which Sigismund struggled, a 
challenge which first dominated his life in his late teens and which still preoccupied him on 
his deathbed over half a century later, was the Ottoman Turkish threat. This thesis seeks to 
offer a new interpretation of how Sigismund responded to the Turkish threat. 
While much has been written on Sigismund’s response to the Ottoman threat, one 
aspect has almost been entirely overlooked: his use of the Reich to counter the Turkish 
danger after his election as King of the Romans in 1410. The central point of this thesis is to 
consider how Sigismund drew upon and used the newfound status and resources that came 
with holding the Imperial office in order to support his struggle against the Ottomans. 
 Sigismund’s response to the Ottoman threat has been covered in detail by scholars. 
Historians such as Jószef Deér, Elemér Mályusz and Joseph Held, among others, have in a 
series of monographs and articles underlined how Sigismund reformed various aspects of the 
Hungarian kingdom in order to ensure that it could withstand attack from its powerful enemy 
to the south.
1
 From efficiency drives in the salt mines to the creation of a peasant militia, 
Sigismund and his leading barons tried various methods to raise the resources and military 
forces required with varying degrees of success.
2
 
                                                          
1
 Elemér Mályusz, Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn, 1387-1437 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990), esp. pp. 128-
66, which draws upon Jószef Deér, Zsigmond király honvédelmi politikája (Pécs: Egyetemi Könyvkiadó, 1936); 
Joseph Held, ‘Military Reform in Early Fifteenth Century Hungary’, East European Quarterly, 11 (1977), 129-
139. See also, István Bársony, ‘Sigismund in der ungarischen Geschichtsschreibung’, in Das Zeitalter König 
Sigmunds in Ungarn und im Deutschen Reich, ed. Tilmann Schmidt und Péter Gunst (Debrecen: Debrecen 
University Press, 2000), p. 36. 
2
 For a summary of Sigismund’s defensive policies after defeat at Nicopolis, see Mark Whelan, ‘Catastrophe or 
Consolidation? Sigismund’s Response to Defeat after the Crusade of Nicopolis (1396)’, in Between Worlds: The 
Age of the Jagiellonians , ed. Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, Christopher Nicholson and Florin Ardelean (Vienna: 
Peter Lang, 2013) pp. 215-228. See also, János M. Bak, ‘Sigismund and the Ottoman Advance’, in Sigismund 
von Luxemburg: Ein Kaiser in Europa, ed. Michel Pauly and Francois Reinert (Mainz am Rhein: Philip von 
Zabern, (2006), pp. 89-94; Pál Engel, ‘Ungarn und die Türkengefahr zur Zeit Sigismunds (1387-1437)’, in Das 
Zeitalter König Sigmunds in Ungarn und im Deutschen Reich, ed. Tilmann Schmidt und Péter Gunst (Debrecen: 
Debrecen University Press, 2000), pp. 55-72; Martyn Rady, Nobility, Land and Service (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2010), pp. 149-56. 
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Sigismund’s attempts to elicit aid from his fellow Christian rulers and princes have 
also received significant attention. Historians such as Aziz Atiya, Norman Housley and 
László Veszprémy, have underlined how Sigismund used diplomacy and the crusade to 
defend Hungary.
3
 The vast majority of the literature produced in this area focuses on 
Sigismund’s diplomatic activity during the 1390s, which ultimately culminated in the 
Crusade of Nicopolis and the defeat of the joint Franco-Burgundian and Hungarian force 
outside the Danubian citadel of the same name in September 1396. 
 Similarly, historians such as Gustav Beckmann, Wilhelm Baum and Martin 
Kintzinger have commented more broadly on the significance which the Turkish threat 
played within Sigismund’s foreign relations throughout his reign.4 They have argued that 
many of his great diplomatic manoeuvres, such as the healing of the Papal Schism at the 
Council of Constance, were driven by Sigismund’s desire to unite Christendom to make a 
united effort against the Turks a possibility.
5
 
However, Sigismund’s use of the Reich to counter the Ottoman threat has received 
hardly any attention. Sigismund’s election as King of the Romans in 1410 not only gave him 
far more prestige and esteem, but as King of the Romans he now had possible access to a 
whole series of financial, political and military resources, spread throughout the many 
principalities, duchies, counties and free imperial cities that constituted the Holy Roman 
Empire. This thesis will demonstrate how Sigismund put to direct use the connections, 
privileges and authority which he enjoyed as King of the Romans and, after 1433, as Kaiser, 
in order to combat the Ottomans and buttress his other kingdom, that of Hungary. 
It is worth considering why Sigismund’s response to the Turkish threat specifically as 
King of the Romans has not been previously explored in detail. In many respects, 
Sigismund’s diplomatic manoeuvres in the west and his involvement in English, French and 
German affairs have been seen as detrimental to the defence of Hungary against the Turks. 
                                                          
3
 Norman Housley, The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar (Oxford: OUP, 1992), pp. 73-85; 
Aziz Atiya, The Crusade of Nicopolis (London: Methuen, 1934); László Veszprémy, ‘Some Remarks on Recent 
Hungarian Historiography of the Crusade of Nicopolis (1396), in The Crusades and the Military Orders: 
Expanding the Frontiers of Medieval Latin Christianity, ed. Zsolt Hunyadi and József Laszlovszky (Budapest: 
CEU, 2001), pp. 223-30. 
4
 Gustav Beckmann, Der Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds gegen die werdende Weltmacht der Osmanen, 1392-1437 
(Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1902); Wilhelm Baum, Kaiser Sigismund: Hus, Konstanz und Türkenkriege 
(Graz: Styria, 1993); Martin Kintzinger, Westbindungen im Spätmittelalterlichen Europa: Auswärtige Politik 
zwischen dem Reich, Frankreich, Burgund und England in der Regierungszeit Kaiser Sigmunds (Stuttgart: Jan 
Thorbecke, 2000). 
5
 F. R. H. Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages (London: Athlone Press, 1983), p. 50. 
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His Roman Kingship, if anything, has been seen as hindering him from effectively tackling 
the Ottoman threat. Contemporary commentators, such as the Hungarian chronicler Johannes 
Thuróczy (c. 1435-1490) and Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (1405-1464 and as Pope Pius II, 
1458-1464) certainly saw it that way.
6
 This perception has found its way into modern 
historiography. Historians, such as Elemér Mályusz and John Jefferson, have interpreted the 
king’s involvement in distant political affairs as detrimental to the successful defence of 
Hungary against the Ottomans.
7
 Though it is accepted that Sigismund’s political activities in 
the west were intended at least in part to generate aid for his efforts to resist the Turks, the 
degree to which these were successful is debatable.
8
 Nevertheless, his diplomatic activities 
are often interpreted against a broader historiographical back drop which views Sigismund’s 
reign as one of disappointments, if not one of failures. Jaroslaw Goll summed it up most 
pithily in 1895, when he stated ‘das war eben seine Art, mehr zu wollen, als auszuführen, 
mehr zu versprechen, als zu halten’.9 A century or so later not much has changed, with Engel 
stating that ‘many of the emperor’s over-ambitious plans would finally come to naught’.10 In 
a similar vein, it has been said that Sigismund’s ‘west European orientation undeniably 
resulted in losses to Hungary’.11 However, Sigismund’s diplomatic involvement in the west, 
as this thesis will demonstrate, was of clear and direct benefit to the fight against the Turks on 
the Danube frontier. 
Perhaps Sigismund is also a victim of his own success in securing so many crowns 
and in ruling so many lands. Recent historiographical works have increasingly divided 
Sigismund’s reign and the scope of his politics into smaller, more manageable chunks. 
Malyusz’s lengthy and detailed work, Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn, as the title would 
suggest, focuses on Sigismund very much as the ruler of Hungary. Similarly, works by 
Sabine Wefers and Kintzinger focus on Sigismund as a German ruler. Wefers is primarily 
concerned with Sigismund’s operation within the Reich and how he attempted to exercise 
                                                          
6
 János Thuróczy, Chronicle of the Hungarians, trans. Frank Mantello (Bloomington, Indiana: Research Institute 
for Inner Asian Studies, 1991), p. 76; Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Historica Bohemica, ed. Joseph Hejnic, 3 
vols (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005), ii. 440-1. 
7
 Mályusz, Kaiser Sigismund, p. 94; John Jefferson, The Holy Wars of King Wladislas and Sultan Murad: The 
Ottoman-Christian Conflict from 1438-1444 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 144, 153-4. 
8
 For this approach, see the monographs of Baum, Sigismund and Frank Welsh, The Battle for Christendom: The 
Council of Constance, 1415, and the Struggle to unite against Islam (London: Constable, 2008). Gerald 
Schwedler, Herrschertreffen des Spätmittelalters: Formen- Rituale- Wirkungen (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 
2008), p. 125. 
9
 Jaroslaw Goll, ‘König Sigmund und Polen, 1419-1436’, MIÖG, 16 (1895), 222-75 (p. 275). 
10
 Engel, Realm, p. 257. 
11
 See the introduction in DRMH, ii. xxxiv. 
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power without having any Hausmacht of his own.
12
 Contrastingly, Kintzinger is interested in 
Sigismund as a German ruler, and his relations with the western neighbours of the Reich such 
as France, Burgundy and England.
13
 These restricted perspectives are of course entirely 
necessary as to tackle Sigismund in one entire sweep, a figure who reigned for fifty years and 
who ruled lands from the Black Sea to Burgundy, would be a gargantuan task. Nevertheless, 
tackling different aspects of Sigismund’s reign in a discrete manner does mean that the scope 
of Sigismund’s statecraft and the broader aims and imperatives that underpinned his rule can 
all too frequently be obscured.
14
 
Furthermore, one gets the impression from the extensive literature in German that the 
very idea that Sigismund could derive resources from the Reich to support his campaigns 
against the Turks is simply a non-starter.
15
 Historians have generally agreed that Sigismund’s 
position in the Reich was problematic to say the least.
16
 Faced with numerous problems, be it 
the opposition of the Imperial electors, no Hausmacht of his own and a constant lack of funds 
to name but a few, Sigismund directed most of his efforts at garnering what tiny amounts of 
money he could raise in Reich and using his influence only where it would count.
17
 He 
apparently had severe difficulty in raising money and collecting taxes from his subjects in the 
Reich, and mortgaged and sold significant amounts of property.
18
 According to the 
contemporary Klingenberger Chronik, Sigismund (among many other faults, including 
drunkenness) was constantly short of cash, so much so that he was apparently willing to 
ennoble anyone who would provide him with the wherewithal to settle the bill with the 
innkeeper in the morning.
19
 When these comments are set against the dominant 
historiographical backdrop fashioned by Peter Moraw, who characterises the authority of the 
Roman King in the Reich as increasingly distant and ineffective in the later medieval period, 
                                                          
12
 Sabine Wefers, Das Politische System Kaiser Sigmunds (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989). 
13
 Kintzinger, Westbindungen. 
14
 See also the comments in Karel Hruza’s Geleitwort and introductory chapter, in Kaiser Sigismund (1368-
1437): Zur Herrschaftspraxis eines europäischen Monarchen, ed. Karel Hruza and Alexandra Kaar (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2012).  
15
 See the chapter entitled ‘Der überfordete König: Wahl und Krönung, Rechte und Pflichten’, in Peter Moraw, 
Von offener Verfassung zu gestalteter Verdichtung: Das Reich im späten Mittelalter (Berlin: Propyläen, 1985), 
pp. 155-69. 
16
 For a summary, see Hoensch, Sigismund, pp. 507-18. 
17
 Ibid., pp. 507-8. 
18
 Eberhard Isenmann, ‘Reichsfinanzen und Reichssteuern im 15. Jahrhundert’, Zeitschrift für historische 
Forschung, 7 (1980), 1-76, 129-218. For Sigismund’s income and his unsuccessful attempts to collect money, 
see pp. 17-25. For his mortgaging and sale of property, see p. 13. For further discussion, see Len Scales, The 
Shaping of German Identity: Authority and Crisis, 1245-1414 (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), p. 93, 
19
 Die Klingenberger Chronik, ed. Anton Henne von Sargans (Gotha: Friedrich Perthes, 1861), pp. 208-9. 
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one wonders how Sigismund ever achieved anything.
20
 As a result, when historians have 
studied Sigismund’s relationship with the Reich they have usually done so through this prism, 
and focused on Sigismund’s attempted reform of the Reich and his efforts to restore Imperial 
authority.
21
 His plans to use his status as King of the Romans to combat the Turkish threat 
has never really featured in the historiography. 
Recent research by Len Scales has brought a more nuanced understanding to the 
nature of the later medieval Reich and its monarchy. Scales does not fundamentally challenge 
the view that the position of the Roman King in the Reich was a weakening one, and he 
accepts that plummeting revenues, sluggish institutional growth and lack of dynastic 
continuity resulted in a weak ‘state’.22 Nevertheless, Scales takes pains to highlight how a 
weak central authority did not preclude a sense of ‘common German belonging’ or a strong 
attachment among the Empire’s subjects to the monarchy.23 This brings him to the conclusion 
that the German monarchy was ‘materially peripheral and culturally central’.24 In many 
respects, aspects of this thesis build upon Scales’ work. Sigismund did indeed seek to use his 
status as Roman King and the charisma attached to the Imperial office to encourage his 
subjects to support him against the Turks, which suggests that the cultural pull of the Roman 
monarch was still a strong one. However, this thesis hopes to show that Scales’ dichotomy of 
a monarchy with little real strength on the one hand, but with a strong cultural gravity on the 
other, was far more complex. Sigismund was not a distant and liminal ruler of a monarchy 
whose main role was to act as a cultural figurehead for his German speaking subjects.
25
 He 
was a ruler who could genuinely make himself felt materially and physically in the Reich, 
and his ability to extract resources from his German subjects and lands in order to help 
withstand the Ottoman threat attests to this. 
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This thesis then, by exploring Sigismund’s response to the Ottoman threat as Roman 
King will therefore offer new perspectives on Sigismund’s relationship with the Reich and 
his subjects. However, it will not simply tackle issues present in the historiography of the 
later medieval Reich, but engage with much broader themes of interest as well.  
Most importantly, it will tackle the misconceptions surrounding Christendom’s 
response to the Ottoman threat in the later medieval period. Recent research, by historians 
such as Dimitris Kastritsis, Kelly DeVries and László Veszprémy, has reinforced the idea that 
western Europe failed to respond in any meaningful way during the first half of the fifteenth 
century.
26
 Put simply, this thesis will demonstrate that there was a meaningful response from 
western Europe, except it was channelled in ways that historians have seldom explored. 
Christendom’s response did not come in the form of crusades or the large military 
expeditions which historians have traditionally sought out, but through Sigismund, who used 
his connections throughout Christendom as Roman King and Kaiser in the attempt to 
galvanise a meaningful response to the Turkish threat.  
That is not to say that the institutions, conventions and rhetoric surrounding the 
crusading movement did not play a role in Sigismund’s response to the Ottomans for they 
certainly did. In this respect, Sigismund’s adaptation of crusading culture and motifs form an 
interesting case study to compare with recent research by historians such as Housley and 
Benjamin Weber, who have largely focused on the second half of the fifteenth century.
27
 The 
crusading attitudes and plans of figures such as Aeneus Piccolomini (1405-1464), Duke 
Philip the Good of Burgundy (1419-1467), and Frederick III, King of the Romans and later 
Holy Roman Emperor (1440/1452-1493), have been studied in far more detail than figures 
such as Sigismund a generation before.
28
 An exploration of how Sigismund attempted to use 
his status as Roman King in order to combat the Turks reveals a distinctive attitude towards 
the use and adaptation of crusading culture and motifs that has so far not been recognised in 
the historiography. As we will see, Sigismund meshed ideals surrounding crusading and 
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sanctified warfare with his own personal struggle against the Ottoman Turks, a struggle 
undertaken by himself as the Roman King and one which required support from the entirety 
of Christendom. 
In the course of tracing Sigismund’s response, this thesis will also bring new 
perspectives to the development of warfare and military technology and contribute to the 
debates surrounding the so called ‘military revolution’ of the later medieval and early modern 
periods. It has been argued that technological changes, bureaucratic advances and the rise of 
different attitudes to the art of war meant that the waging of warfare underwent fundamental 
changes during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
29
 Sigismund’s attempts to tackle the 
Turkish threat form a case study with which many of these themes can be explored.   
A significant amount of research in this field emphasises the importance of numbers 
and attaches special importance to the increasing size of armies which leaders in the later 
medieval and early modern period could field.
30
 It has been recently stated that it was ‘only a 
matter of time’ before the more populous Ottoman Empire, which could field a much larger 
army than sixteenth century Hungarian kings, triumphed over the Kingdom.
31
 This thesis 
demonstrates that this preoccupation regarding the amount of men which a polity could 
maintain under arms is in some respects more a preoccupation to modern historians than to 
contemporaries. Sigismund was not necessarily concerned with recruiting large numbers of 
soldiers or mercenaries to buttress his frontier, but was instead intensely interested in 
acquiring particular people with specific skills. His approach was not quantitative but 
qualitative. 
From a more general perspective, this thesis will draw attention to the very wide 
geographic base upon which Sigismund drew for military expertise and demonstrate the 
international nature of his recruitment. This reinforces the ease with which men with 
particular skills could find employment across Europe, a theme drawn attention to in the 
research of Uwe Tresp.
32
 The wide geographic base of Sigismund’s recruitment raises the 
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question of the extent to which so called ‘multiple monarchs’ such as Sigismund, that is 
monarchs who combined in their person more than one crown, were able to unite and tap the 
resources of their collective kingdoms for one common purpose.
33
 It has been argued by 
Kintzinger that Hungary, for the period between 1415-1419, had to fight the Turkish threat 
without Sigismund’s help and without support or finance from western Europe.34 The 
research in this thesis would suggest otherwise, as Sigismund recruited numerous experts 
while in the Reich during this period who were dispatched eastwards precisely in order to 
shore up resistance to the Turks. As this thesis will show, he was able to extract resources 
from one kingdom for the defence of another, though this was not accomplished in the forms 
that historians have traditionally sought out.  
As well as the development of warfare, this thesis will also form a contribution to the 
history of technology, notably, the transfer of technologies and military skills from 
Sigismund’s connections across Christendom to the Danube frontier. There exists a 
significant literature on technological transfers and the spread of industrial skills and 
expertise in later medieval and early modern central and eastern Europe.
35
 It is frequently 
argued that the proliferation of industrial skills and expertise were channelled through trading 
links and economic connections. The research which supports this thesis offers a rather 
different picture. Technology transfers from one region to another and the proliferation of 
industrial and military expertise were not necessarily accomplished through trade or through 
economic forces, but by direct recruitment on the part of rulers such as Sigismund.  
For the study of Sigismund there exists a significant amount of printed primary source 
material as well as unpublished archival material in archives across Europe. What follows is 
by no means an exhaustive list, but is merely meant to outline the main works and archives 
consulted while undertaking research for this thesis. In terms of printed material, volumes 7-
12 of the Deutsche Reichstagsakten are invaluable for the study of Sigismund’s reign as 
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Roman King and Holy Roman Emperor.
36
 The four volumes of the Acta Concilia 
Constanciensis compiled by Finke make available a range of materials from archives across 
Europe.
37
 Two copy books dating from the fifteenth century and which contain noteworthy 
items of Sigismund’s correspondence have been edited by Hermann Heimpel and J. Caro,38 
and the Regesta of Sigismund’s correspondence compiled by Wilhelm Altmann, which 
contains c. 12000 entries, still remains a starting point for much of the research undertaken on 
Sigismund.
39
  
 The material printed by Sime Ljubić in his 10 volume Listine o odnošajih izmedju 
južnoga slavenstva I mletačke republike makes accessible a range of sources for the study of 
Sigismund’s relationship with Venice as well as the Dalmatian coast in general.40 In terms of 
Sigismund’s relationship with Ragusa (Dubrovnik), Jószef Gelcich and Lajos Thallóczy’s 
collection of sources forms the starting point for any investigation.
41
 
 There are numerous sources editions which revolve around the Hussite Wars but 
which also contain relevant documents for this thesis. Of most importance is František 
Palacký’s two volume Urkundliche Beiträge, though J. Caro’s edition of a Polish copybook 
of the fifteenth century also provides some important material.
42
 
For Sigismund’s reign in Hungary there exist numerous printed codices which collect 
together diplomatic correspondence, foundation charters and other materials. György Fejér’s 
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magisterial Codex Diplomatic Hungariae is rather dated but is still very useful.
43
 Lajos 
Thallóczy’s and Antal Aldasy’s Codex Diplomaticus Partium Regno Hungariae Adnexarum 
contains useful materials for exploring the Kingdom of Hungary’s relationship with its 
neighbours.
44
 Three recent projects in Hungarian scholarship in particular have made 
undertaking research for this thesis much more straightforward. Firstly, the project to publish 
and translate into English the legislation of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary has produced 
five very helpful volumes.
45
 Secondly, the volumes of the Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár (the 
documents of Sigismund’s age) form part of an ambitious project to collate and calendar 
every document produced in the Kingdom of Hungary during Sigismund’s age, with material 
from foreign archives included where they are thought to impinge directly upon Hungarian 
affairs.
46
 In its current state the Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár comprises of 12 volumes and covers 
the years 1387-1425. The first 10 volumes contain c. 32000 entries alone, and they form an 
important reference work for all researchers working on the age of Sigismund. Thirdly, Pál 
Engel’s impressive Magyarország világi archontológiája and Közepkori magyar genealógia 
must be noted, which are databases (archontologies) of the offices and office holders of 
medieval Hungary and lists of family trees. For each office, office holder and family tree, 
Engel has collated the references to the relevant published and archival materials. As a result, 
they make the study of Sigismund’s servants and governmental administration within the 
Kingdom of Hungary a far easier task.  
Numerous chronicles mention Sigismund but three have proven most useful. Eberhard 
Windecke (c. 1380-c. 1440), a banker from Mainz and a personal servant of Sigismund, 
preserves a wealth of material in his chronicle, even if not all of his fantastical tales are 
entirely reliable or believable.
47
 The same could be said of the Chronica Hungarorum written 
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by Johannes Thuróczy (c. 1435-1490).
48
 Thuróczy provides some interesting perspectives on 
Sigismund’s reign in Hungary, though many of his tales do come with an interesting and not 
wholly believable spin. Jan Długosz (1415-1480) in his gargantuan Annales seu cronici incliti 
regni Poloniae (sometimes referred to as the Historiae Polonicae) also provides some useful 
material.
49
 
Nevertheless, it cannot be emphasised strongly enough that there exists a significant 
amount of unpublished archival material relevant for the study of Sigismund’s quest to 
combat the Turkish threat. Frequently, the sheer amount of printed material has often misled 
historians into believing that they can study Sigismund without engaging with any archival 
material. Recent works by historians such as Oliver Daldrup or Franz-Reiner Erkens exhibit 
this trend and have relied solely upon printed material.
50
 As a result, in producing this thesis I 
have undertaken stays of research in repositories and archives in Germany, Austria and Italy.  
Of most importance were the rich archival resources present in the record series 
known as the Ordensbriefarchiv, Pergamenturkunden und Ordensfolianten (hereafter 
Ordensbriefarchiv), in effect the letter and manuscript collection of the Teutonic Order. Now 
stored in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin, the Ordensbriefarchiv contains roughly 30,000 
individual folders for the years c. 1200- c. 1525, which have been calendared by Erich 
Joachim and Walther Hubatsch.
51
 As well as the calendar, Joachim’s article on Sigismund’s 
relationship with the Teutonic Order was of great help when conducting archival research in 
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the Geheimes Staatsarchiv.
52
 In terms of documentary material these folders can vary hugely 
in what they contain. Some contain nothing more than a tiny strip of parchment with a few 
words while other folders contain dozens if not hundreds of folios of closely written paper 
and parchment. Furthermore, the Ordensbriefarchiv contains an eclectic mix of documents, 
including items of correspondence (sometimes only in draft forms), inventories, minutes, 
memoranda and financial accounts to name but a few. As a result, material from the 
Ordensbriefarchiv can be put to numerous uses. 
 Several archives in Vienna contain material of use for this thesis. The Haus-, Hof- und 
Staatsarchiv, founded by Empress Maria Theresa (1717-1780) as the central archive of the 
Habsburg family in 1749, contains an extensive amount of material in the so called 
Reichsregisterbücher. For Sigismund’s reign as Roman King and Holy Roman Emperor there 
exists 8 Reichsregisterbücher (known now as books D- L), which record various types of 
imperial correspondence, accounts and paperwork of relevance to this thesis.
53
 The majority 
of these documents have been calendared in Altmann’s Regesta, but an examination of the 
original manuscripts not only revealed more information than Altmann had seen fit to include 
in his entries, but also documents which he had missed entirely. The Deutschordens 
Zentralarchiv, the central archive of the modern Teutonic Order, and the Wiener Stadt- und 
Landesarchiv, also provided some archival material which was used in this thesis. 
 A spell of archival research was also undertaken at the Institut für Stadtgeschichte, 
Frankfurt am Main, which contains the Stadtarchiv Frankfurt. Most of the relevant 
correspondence for this thesis in the Stadtarchiv was published in three volumes by Johannes 
Janssen.
54
 However, he was particularly prone to leaving out documents which are difficult to 
read and he compiled his three volumes of printed correspondence before the archive was 
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reorganised in the 1880s and 1890s. This reorganisation would appear to have brought more 
material to light which means that Janssen’s work contains some important omissions.55 
 Brief visits were also made to the Staatsarchiv Augsburg, Bavaria, and the 
Generellandesarchiv Karlsruhe, Baden-Württemberg. The Regesta of King Albert II’s 
correspondence compiled by Günther Hödl was particularly useful in helping support my 
research in Augsburg, as was the work of von Weech for my two days spent in Karlsruhe.
56
  
 The medieval documents present in the Hungarian National Archives (Magyar 
Országos Levéltar) are accessible through an online database. Of particular use in accessing 
documents relevant to Sigismund’s reign are the aforementioned volumes of the 
Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár. Where possible, under each entry in the Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár 
the reference to the original manuscript is given which allows the original document to be 
found in the online database.  
Resources in the Archivio Segreto Vaticano and the Biblioteca Apostolica were also 
consulted. The Registra Supplicationem, much of which is unpublished and which record 
petitions to the Pope, were particularly useful when examining Sigismund’s relationship with 
Pope Eugenius IV (1431-1447).  
With the exception of the first chapter, this thesis is structured on a thematic basis. 
Chapter 1 serves to provide the historical background required in order to contextualise 
Sigismund’s response to the Ottoman Turkish threat. Chapter 2 highlights Sigismund’s use of 
the ‘status’ that came with Roman King, in order to raise awareness of the danger throughout 
Christendom. It does so through examining his letter writing, courtly ceremony and orations. 
Whereas chapter 2 underlines the more abstract ideological and cultural resources which 
Sigismund could draw upon as Roman King, the next three chapters explore how he 
attempted to draw upon concrete military resources. Chapter 3 explores how Sigismund drew 
upon naval and riverine expertise from his subjects as Roman King in order to support his 
warfare against the Ottoman Turks on the waters of the Danube. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
fortification of Sigismund’s frontier with the Turks, and the manners in which he sourced 
expertise and resources from his subjects in the Reich in support of this. Lastly, chapter 5 will 
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underline how Sigismund drew upon the logistical and fiscal knowledge present in the Reich 
in order to support his campaigns and diplomatic manoeuvres against the Ottomans. 
 
 
Chapter 1: Sigismund of Luxemburg and the Ottoman Turkish Threat 
 
This chapter will first survey Sigismund’s response to the Ottoman threat between his 
accession as King of Hungary in 1387 and his election as King of the Romans in 1410. The 
second part of this chapter will then summarise his reign as Roman King and Holy Roman 
Emperor, his diplomatic travels and the major challenges which he confronted in order to 
help contextualise the thematic chapters that follow. In doing so, this chapter will provide an 
analysis of how Sigismund conceived of the Turkish threat and how he linked his Kingship of 
the Romans with his struggle against the Ottomans.  
1.1 Sigismund and the Ottomans, 1387-1410 
 Sigismund, the second son of Charles IV (King of the Romans 1346-1355, Holy 
Roman Emperor 1355-1378), was born in Nuremberg in 1368 and was only 17 years of age 
when he was invited to become the antecessor et capitaneus of the Kingdom of Hungary.
57
 
Less than two years later he was crowned as King on 31 March 1387. Meanwhile, the 
Ottoman threat to Hungary had been growing since 1354 when the Turks had acquired a 
bridgehead at Gallipoli and had begun their conquest of the Balkans. After a Turkish army 
under the command of Murad I (1362-1389) decisively defeated a Serbian force at the Battle 
of Kosovo in June 1389, the Kingdom of Hungary was exposed to Turkish attacks and 
Sigismund was forced to respond. His first campaign against the Turks occurred at some 
point in the autumn of 1390, when he personally led an unsuccessful attempt to recapture the 
fortress of Golubac that had been seized by the Turks earlier that year.
58
 It would be outside 
the same castle 38 years later when Sigismund would personally lead his last campaign 
against the Turks, before age and ill health ruled out further military campaigning on his part. 
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Much of his life thereafter was taken up with the struggle against the Ottomans. 
Around 1450 Johannes de Segovia, a Spanish theologian from Castile, put his hand to writing 
a monumental history of the Council of Basle.
59
 While discussing negotiations between 
Sigismund and a group of cardinals in the early 1430s, Segovia digresses and recounts the 
major events in Sigismund’s life. Segovia begins by stating that Sigismund, ‘had made war 
for the faith from the beginning of his life, [and] that he was well known in many clashes 
against the Turks during in the first flowering of his youth.’60 Though Segovia exaggerates, 
this perception of Sigismund is one grounded in reality. Sigismund first campaigned against 
the Turks at the age of 22 and he would still be campaigning personally against the Ottomans 
38 years later, at the age of 60.
61
 In the last year of his life the desire to fight the Turks was 
still his overriding concern and he passed away on his deathbed lamenting that he was in too 
poor health to conduct a campaign to recover the Holy Land.
62
 
Sigismund conducted campaigns with mixed success across the length of his kingdom 
between 1390-1395.
63
 The scale of Sigismund’s campaigning in the first few years is difficult 
to ascertain, but by 1395 Sigismund was able to concentrate enough resources to wrest from 
the Turks the critical Danubian fortress of Little Nicopolis.
64
 His next campaign against the 
Turks is his most famous. In the summer of 1396 Sigismund led a crusading force composed 
of French, Burgundian and German contingents against the Turks. It would appear from 
Aşikpaşazade’s account that the scale of this campaign alarmed Sultan Bayezid (1389-1402), 
who quickly raised his siege of Constantinople, burnt his siege machines and marched to 
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Hungary.
65
 After several successful sieges and skirmishes the crusading host besieged the 
fortress of Nicopolis, and was defeated by Bayezid’s relief force on 25 September 1396.66  
As regards these early clashes with the Ottomans there seems to be this notion in the 
historiography that Sigismund aimed to expel the Turks from Europe in their entirety in one 
fell blow. In the words of Ferenc Szakály, Nicopolis shattered the idea that ‘the Turks could 
be expelled from Europe with the collaboration of the European powers in a single 
offensive’.67 More recently, Engel has stated that Sigismund embarked on the campaign of 
Nicopolis ‘with the ambitious aim of driving the Ottomans out of Europe’.68 This hinges on a 
few lines of Froissart’s chronicle and nothing else. A closer reading of the sources suggests 
that Sigismund’s plan to drive the Turks out of Europe in one fell swoop did not exist. A 
closer reading of the sources also suggests that Sigismund’s campaigning in 1396 brought 
genuine military successes and ones which he was able to maintain despite the defeat of the 
crusading force at Nicopolis in September of that year. 
More convincing here is the argument of Veszprémy, who asserts that the Nicopolis 
‘campaign itself was the finale of a strategic plan pursued over many years’, and that 
Sigismund was primarily concerned not with some great decisive showdown with the Turks, 
but with securing fortresses.
69
 Though Veszprémy does not develop this point in any detail, 
the evidence available in Sigismund’s donation charters to members of his nobility certainly 
supports this idea. Donation charters to nobles in the Kingdom of Hungary frequently contain 
a short biography of the noble in question in the narratio, and for many the Nicopolis 
campaign features highly. Sigismund’s donation charter to Hermann Cilli (1365-1435) in 
August 1397 contains an account of the military service which the count and his followers 
rendered to Sigismund during the Nicopolis campaign, and the wresting of Danubian 
fortresses from Turkish hands lies at the centre of the narrative.
70
 Considering Sigismund’s 
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capture of Little Nicopolis the year before, he clearly had his mind on strengthening his hold 
on the Danube by capturing more fortresses in the area.
71
 Overall, despite suffering a defeat 
at Nicopolis the campaign was a positive one for Sigismund. Between 1390 and 1396 he 
regained the fortresses which were vital for his kingdom’s security and these would, with a 
few exceptions, remain in Hungarian hands until the sixteenth century.  
Similarly, Sigismund’s response to defeat at Nicopolis was a vigorous and effective 
one and it would be otiose to discuss it in great detail.
72
 In brief, he attempted to reform his 
kingdom’s finances, raise a peasant militia and oblige the Kingdom’s nobility to take a more 
active role in the defence against the Turks.
73
 1401 and 1402 were particularly difficult years 
for Sigismund as he had to face a rebellion led by Ladislaus of Naples, a rival claimant to the 
Hungarian throne.
74
 His victory, however, was a complete one and this came alongside a 
drive to strengthen further his own authority in the Kingdom of Hungary through marrying 
Barbara of Cilli, the daughter of Hermann Cilli.
75
 In 1408 Sigismund founded the Order of 
the Dragon with Barbara, which initially included 21 members and which pledged all of its 
members to both support the king and queen and to fight the pagans.
76
 The Order of the 
Dragon was critical in allowing Sigismund to stabilise his power in Hungary, but the support 
of its members was purchased by the ceding of numerous royal estates and by Sigismund’s 
death the royal demesne had been significantly reduced.
77
   
After Nicopolis Sigismund was keen to strengthen his relationships with his southern 
Christian neighbours, in particular the Duke of Bosnia and Despot of Serbia, in order to 
create what Rady has termed a cordon sanitaire, between him 
 
and the Turks.
78
 Sigismund’s 
attitude towards this cordon sanitaire evolved throughout his reign, but a letter to John the 
Fearless in 1404, Duke of Burgundy and veteran of Nicopolis, would imply that its basic 
components were in place by then.
79
 In this letter, Sigismund notes that he had allied with the 
King of Bosnia and turned Stefan Lazarević, the Despot of Serbia, into his vassal and that he 
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was engaging the Turks with success. He had also sent forces to aid the Byzantine emperor 
and was simultaneously aiding the Voivode of Wallachia against the Turks.
80
 The claims in 
this letter may appear bold, but they are substantiated by the continuation of the chronicle of 
Johann von Posilge (c. 1340-1405) which notes in 1407 how Sigismund had fought with 
success against the Turks, suggesting that news of his campaigning had circulated as far as 
Prussia.
81
 
As Sigismund’s letter to the Duke of Burgundy implies, his sphere of military activity 
against the Ottomans was therefore stretched across three main zones in a broad arc directly 
to the south of Hungary. This was a trend which would characterise his conflict with the 
Turks for the rest of his reign. A document outlining the defence of the Kingdom of Hungary, 
probably dating to 1415-1417, notes the distribution of 2200 lances a parte partium 
Transalpinarum, Bulgarie [et] Rascye.
82
 The precise locations in which Sigismund fought the 
Turks of course changed throughout his reign, but it is worth briefly sketching them out. The 
most western zone comprised of the region around Slavonia and Bosnia. The second where 
the Hungarian Kingdom bordered the Despotate of Serbia, notably along the stretch of the 
Danube between Belgrade and Severin, roughly contiguous with the Banate of Severin.
83
 The 
third zone comprised of Wallachia directly on the eastern flank of Severin, where campaigns 
usually revolved around supporting the Voivode against the Turks.
84
 Taken together, the 
zones in which Sigismund needed to devise methods to counter the Turks stretched roughly 
from Wallachia, along the lower Danube to Belgrade and then along the Sava and Drava into 
the Banate of Slavonia and Dalmatia.
85
  
As Rady states, the word ‘frontier is…a slippery concept and can mean many things’, 
but it seems appropriate to describe this broad zone as Sigismund’s frontier with the Ottoman 
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Turks.
86
 It is broadly along this zone that Sigismund focussed his efforts on securing allies, 
building fortresses and campaigning. It has been noted that in order for the frontier ‘to remain 
a valid explanatory term… its singularity has to be established’.87 I do not mean to imply that 
any aspect of this frontier, be it institutional, military, social, political, were unique to 
medieval Christendom at the time, only that it was here where Sigismund grappled with the 
Turkish threat.
88
 This was arguably the most significant frontier on land – if not the only land 
frontier – between a Catholic power and the Ottoman Turks in Christendom. 
Although Sigismund’s strategy against the Turks involved political and military 
overtures in the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas, it was primarily along the Danube that his 
involvement in the defence against the Turks was most active.
89
 Turkish pressure was most 
acute on the stretch of the Danube between Belgrade and Severin, and it was this region 
where Sigismund arguably focussed the majority of his resources in order to counter the 
Ottoman threat. This thesis will therefore use the term ‘Danube frontier’, much like Rady 
does in a recent edition of the DRMH.
90
 As chapter 3 will demonstrate, Sigismund 
conceptualised much of his struggle against the Turks as based directly on the Danube. In 
these contexts, his military planning and his rhetoric revolved around the Danube, and his 
campaigning was aimed at securing his hold on the river. Therefore, the term ‘Danube 
frontier’, which emphasises the waters of the Danube as the most critical geographical barrier 
between Sigismund and the Ottomans is not anachronistic as it reflects the military and 
political priorities which he held himself. 
Overall, Sigismund was successful in securing these southern reaches of his Kingdom 
against Ottoman attacks throughout the first decade of the fifteenth century. Much of this can 
be attributed to his effective response, though it is worth emphasising that Sigismund very 
much had a free hand, as between 1402 and 1413 the Ottoman Empire was in a state of civil 
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war and their rulers were not in a position to place the Kingdom of Hungary or its neighbours 
under military pressure.
91
 
1.2 Election as Roman King and the Council of Constance, 1410-1419 
It was during this period of diminished threat that Sigismund acquired another crown. 
In May 1410 the King of the Romans, Rupert of Germany (1400-1410), died, and Sigismund 
was elected in his place. While he had to overcome some opposition from his cousin, Jobst of 
Moravia (1354-1411), Sigismund was crowned as King of the Romans in Aachen on 8 
November 1414.
92
  His election as King of the Romans marks the beginning of an intense 
involvement in the affairs of Christendom and Sigismund was absent from Hungary between 
1412 and 1419.
93
 Sigismund set himself the task of ending the Papal Schism and, after 
securing the agreement of Pope John XXIII (1410-1415) in November 1413, convened the 
Council of Constance which was opened in November 1414. As we will see in the next 
chapter, Sigismund explicitly linked his assumption of the Roman Kingship with the fight 
against the Ottoman Turks. 
In many respects, it is the Council of Constance for which Sigismund is best 
remembered. In a nineteenth century life size portrait of Sigismund now on display in the 
Kaisersaal in Frankfurt am Main, Sigismund holds in one hand a sword and in the other hand 
a piece of parchment on which is written concilia constanciensis. The so called 
Klingenberger Chronik notes the connection between Sigismund’s arranging of the Council 
and his Roman kingship, stating how while at the Council he saw to the matters of the Reich 
and ‘did other things, as a Roman King should do’.94 Bringing this Council to a successful 
close was a major feat which required an enormous amount of diplomatic skill, tact and 
determination. It also required him to travel extensively throughout western Europe and these 
travels left a great impression on contemporaries and he received praise for his masterful 
handling of the negotiations at Constance.
95
 Sigismund’s time in western Europe did not just 
involve political negotiations and discussions, but also active recruitment of military 
specialists for service against the Ottoman Turks, a theme explored in chapter 4. Sigismund’s 
activities while in western Europe also involved more humorous undertakings. His decision 
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to dance half naked through the streets of Strasbourg in the summer of 1414 with two 
hundred ladies was recorded with great amusement, but his antics could frequently turn from 
the eccentric to the offensive. In the summer of 1416 in Paris, for example, he turned up 
inebriated to a ball held in his honour, where his lascivious behaviour offended the ladies and 
his drunken singing and dancing even distracted the diners from eating their food.
96
  
Hungarian contemporaries or near contemporaries saw Sigismund’s involvement in 
these matters abroad as detrimental to the effort against the Turks. Piccolomini, in his 
Historica Bohemica, notes how the Hungarian barons were reluctant to elect a foreign king in 
1438, as the magnates claimed that ‘Sigismund, when he adopted the Roman crown, 
wandered through Italy, Germany and the remaining provinces and left Hungary open to the 
ravages of the Turks.’97 This perception has entered modern scholarship too, and to an extent 
they have a point.
98
 It was during Sigismund’s absence at the Council of Constance that, in 
the words of Engel, Sigismund’s southern frontier ‘began to crack’.99 The kingdom’s 
defences were certainly under pressure, in particular around Bosnia. It was here in 1415 that 
Duke Hrvoje of Bosnia with Ottoman support defeated a Hungarian force under the 
command of Pál Csupor, the Ban of Slavonia.
100
 Thúroczy’s Chronicle contains the amusing 
story of Hrvoje taking his revenge on Csuper by sewing him up into an ox’s skin, as Csuper 
used to bellow at him ‘like an ox’ whenever they met in Buda, presumably as some form of 
joke.
101
 
However, Hrvoje did more than simply settle old scores with former bullies. He 
attacked Hungarian garrisons spread across fortresses in northern Bosnia and by 1415 most 
had fallen, with the major exception of Srebrenik.
102
 Nevertheless, while the frontier was 
certainly under pressure during Sigismund’s absence, the severity of the situation should not 
be exaggerated. The basic point should be made that one of our main sources for the frontier 
pressure in Hungary during the Council of Constance is Sigismund himself. It was during the 
Council of Constance that Sigismund used every means at his disposal to spread awareness of 
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the Turkish threat and the peril in which Hungary lay. As we will see in the next chapter, this 
did not just include the circulation of letters, but the display of Ottoman prisoners during 
civic processions and invitations to join the Order of the Dragon. It must be remembered that 
while in the west it was in Sigismund’s vested interest to exaggerate the Turkish threat. This 
was not just to galvanise his fellow princes into aiding him, but also in order to hurry the 
negotiations taking place at the Council. 
The Council of Constance was a success in that it healed the Papal schism, with the 
synod electing Martin V (1417-1431) as the Pope recognised throughout Christendom. 
However, the Council’s condemnation and execution of Jan Hus gave rise to the Hussite 
religious wars in Bohemia.
103
 In 1419 Sigismund claimed the Kingdom of Bohemia after the 
death of his brother, Wenceslaus, and civil war broke out.
104
 While Sigismund was crowned 
in Prague on 27 July 1420, it would not be until 1436 that Sigismund succeeded in having his 
authority recognised in the Kingdom.
105
 
1.3 Sigismund’s response to the Ottomans, 1419- c.1426 
 Sigismund returned to Hungary in February 1419 after an absence of seven years and 
the next decade or so would see him organise campaigns against the Turks almost every year. 
There exist numerous modern summaries of Sigismund’s relationship with the Ottoman 
Turks between his return from Constance in 1419 and his death in 1437. However, existing 
summaries tend to cover his campaigns in patchy chronological detail and none of these are 
satisfactory for the purposes of this thesis as they do not focus in enough detail on how 
Sigismund himself conceived of his fight against the Turks.
106
 Moreover, much of the 
coverage revolves around Sigismund’s campaigning against the Turks, but both literary 
sources and archival material underline how important Sigismund’s peace treaties and 
negotiations were in managing his relationship with the Ottomans. Furthermore, there exists a 
significant amount of unpublished archival material, in particular in the Ordensbriefarchiv, 
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the Stadtarchiv Frankfurt and the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, which can shed new 
perspectives on Sigismund’s response to the Ottoman Turkish threat. 
 Sigismund’s campaigns against the Turks between 1419 and 1437 can be difficult to 
reconstruct. Diplomatic correspondence and the reports of observers present in Hungary often 
only report hearsay or rumours. Furthermore, they frequently do not correlate with our major 
narrative sources for this period, such as the chronicles and histories authored by Thuróczy, 
Bonfini, Długosz, Windecke and Doukas, which themselves are chronologically confused 
and which frequently contradict each other.
107
 Nevertheless, it is clear that Sigismund’s 
response to the Turks during the 1420s was an effective one. If anything, his hold on the 
southern frontier of Hungary was strengthened throughout this period. Piccolomini’s general 
assessment of Sigismund as one who fought unsuccessfully against the Turks (pugnavit 
infeliciter contra Turcos) is not a fair one.
108
 Sigismund succeeded in heavily fortifying the 
Danube frontier between Belgrade and Severin, through acquiring existing strongholds, 
renovating old fortresses and building new ones. While he was unable to establish his 
authority in Bosnia on a permanent basis, his vigorous campaigning in support of his 
Wallachian and Serbian vassals ensured that his southern and south eastern flanks were kept 
relatively secure.  
 While the pressures which the Ottomans placed on his kingdom during Sigismund’s 
absence have been exaggerated both by contemporaries and modern historians, by 1418 there 
was certainly some cause for alarm.
109
 As well as setbacks in Bosnia in 1415, it would appear 
that the Turks took advantage of the death of Mircea the Great, Voivode of Wallachia (1386-
1418) and attempted to place their own candidate, Dan II (1420-1431, though his reign was 
punctured with numerous interregna) on the throne.
110
 The Ottomans subjected the critical 
area around the Iron Gates, the bridging point on the Danube defended by the stronghold of 
Severin, to the most pressure. The worsening of the situation is reflected in contemporary 
reports, two of which survive in the Ordensbriefarchiv. On 12 November 1418, a certain 
Hans Stadler wrote a letter from Buda to the Grandmaster of the Teutonic Order, in which he 
stressed both the loveliness of Sigismund’s wife and, on a more serious note, the damage 
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which the Turks were inflicting on Hungary (dy Turchken haben súst schaden in dem land 
getan).
111
 In the same month, Conrad, Bishop of Breslau (1417-1447) wrote to the 
Grandmaster expressing a similar sentiment, that der Torken groschen schaden haben getan 
in dem lande.
112
 Conrad went on to say that the Turks had done so at the request and with the 
help of the Venetians and that the extent of the damage seemed so great that it was the worst 
seen in Hungary for many years (mit antracht und holffe der Venediger und derselbige 
schaden sey so gros, das das schaden gleich nicht geschen… in dem lande vor vil jaren).113 
 Though Długosz is scathing of Sigismund’s attempts to fight the Turks in 1419, other 
sources give a more a favourable impression and suggest that his response upon his return to 
Hungary was an effective one.
114
 In 1419 Sigismund repossessed critical fortresses under the 
control of the Wallachian Voivode, such as Bran (Törzburg).
115
 The dating clauses in the 
documents which he issued in October, November and December reveal that he largely based 
himself in the region around the Iron Gates (Eysern tor) and in close proximity to fortresses 
such as Severin and Orsova.
116
 Sigismund recognised that this area needed strengthening and 
erected the fortresses of Drencova, Stanilowcz and Pojejena, around this time.
117
 Much of this 
fortress building and, as we will see, the campaigning in this area, was undertaken by Filippo 
Scolari, a Florentine general who was given high office in the Hungarian kingdom by 
Sigismund.
118
 Scolari was an active field commander and in 1419 he was campaigning in 
Transylvania.
119
 As well as building new fortresses, Sigismund needed to develop and 
support existing ones. The fate of Severin during these years has been debated, and Szakály 
has suggested without any evidence that it fell to the Turks in 1420.
120
 This assertion seems 
                                                          
111
 OBA, 2825. RhdOSMT, i, i. nr  2825. Turkish pressure on Hungary is also noted in Posilge, Chronik, p. 378. 
112
 OBA, 2828. RhdOSMT, i, i. nr  2828. 
113
 OBA, 2828. 
114
 Długosz, Historiae Polonicae, xi. 238. Abridged in Michael, The Annals, p. 449. Sigismund’s campaigning 
in 1419 is mentioned in CDDSCZ, vi. 559 (nr 383). ZKO, vii. nr 998. 
115
 Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen, ed Franz Zimmermann and Carl Werner, 4 
vols, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2007), iv. nr 1864. ZKO, vii. nr 618. On Törzburg generally, see Liviu 
Cîmpeanu, ‘König Vladislav II., der Kronstädter Distrikt und die Törzburg’, in Between Worlds: The Age of the 
Jagiellonians, ed. Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, Christopher Nicholson and Florin Ardelean (Vienna: Peter Lang, 
2013), pp. 47-60 (Given the evidence contained in Urkundenbuch Siebenbürgen, iv. nr 1864, Cîmpeanu’s 
comments on p. 58 about Törzburg remaining in the possession of the Wallachian voivode until the mid-1420s 
seem unfounded). 
116
 One letter of 26 October 1419 carries the clause, ‘Geben uff unserm newen haws in der Bulgarei bei dem 
Eysern tor’. See the letter printed in Aschbach, Geschichte, ii. 451-2 (nr 29). 
117
 Ţeicu, Banat, pp. 72, 97, 99. 
118
 The figure of Scolari will be explored in detail in chapter five. The literature on Scolari is extensive. For an 
introduction, see Mark Whelan, 'Merchant, Administrator and General: Filippo Scolari in the Service of the 
Hungarian King, c. 1397-1426', Whispering Gallery, 115 (2012), 19-24. See also the references cited in, Ioan 
Haţegan, Filippo Scolari: Un condotier Italian pe meleaguri dunărene (Timişoara: Mirton, 1997), p. 92. 
119
 ZKO, ix. nr 939. 
120
 Szakály, ‘Phases’, p. 80. See also, Welsh, ‘The Battle for Christendom’, p. 195. 
34 
 
unlikely, though it would appear that the Ottomans were able to cross the Danube at the Iron 
Gates, the bridging point which Severin was supposed to safeguard.
121
 Severin remained 
under Ottoman pressure, but Sigismund ensured that it was effectively defended. Bonfini 
notes that Sigismund had specifically arranged for the defence against the Turks by sending a 
certain Stephen Losoncz to the region with full command, and this would appear to have 
some grounding in reality.
122
 In a letter of 25 July 1420, Sigismund Losoncz, the castellan of 
Severin, Orsova, Mihald and Sebes noted the successful repulse of a Turkish attack, and other 
items of correspondence reveal that Scolari was also campaigning too.
123
 Within a few years 
Severin had been strengthened and renovated.
124
 Losoncz’s letter also reveals that the peace 
treaty, which, according to Windecke, was agreed between Sigismund and Murad in 1419, 
was not adhered to.
125
 
 Contemporaries and modern historians present Sigismund as needing to make a 
choice between either fighting the Hussites or fighting the Turks. Though Windecke’s 
chronology is sketchy, he implies that it is around 1422/23 when Sigismund refused to 
campaign against the Hussites on account of the threat which the Turks posed to Hungary.
126
 
Similarly, Piccolomini noted that Sigismund chose to fight the Turks rather than the Hussites, 
a decision which he criticised sharply. In Piccolomini’s eyes, Sigismund proved unable to 
resist the Turks anyway, and lost the Kingdom of Bohemia and left swathes of Germany open 
to Hussite raiding and pillaging, a judgement repeated (almost word for word) by Długosz 
and Bonfini.
127
 Their chronology is roughly correct. After all, it was in 1422 when Sigismund 
last took personal part in a campaign against the Hussites, but the reality was more complex.  
 For Sigismund it was not so much a decision whether to concentrate his forces against 
the Hussites or the Turks, for he clearly thought that combatting the latter took priority, but 
rather where precisely to fight the Turks. Sigismund knew well that he did not have the 
resources to support his allies and vassals against the Turks in Dalmatia, Bosnia, Serbia, 
Wallachia and Moldavia. He would have to prioritise, and throughout the 1420s and 1430s 
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Sigismund would consistently choose to concentrate what resources he had in support of his 
Wallachian and Serbian allies and on securing his hold on the Danube between Belgrade and 
Severin. Sigismund’s hold on Bosnia and Dalmatia was indeed weak and historians, such as 
Engel and Fine, are right to point this out.
128
 However, it was precisely these regions which 
slipped down in Sigismund’s list of priorities during the 1420s and the 1430s. Sigismund did 
not support his allies in Bosnia and Dalmatia, for example, when they appealed for aid in 
1422 and 1423. A letter of 25 October 1423 notes how Sigismund had recalled forces from 
Bosnia, precisely to support his campaigns in Transylvania.
129
 Placing Bosnia and Dalmatia 
at the bottom of his list did not make Sigismund popular, but he should at least be given the 
credit for making a clear choice. As we will see in the last section of this chapter, this was 
probably the correct choice. The events of the later 1420s and, in particular, the years 1435-7, 
would suggest that Sigismund did not need to invest considerable resources in holding the so 
called passus Bosne. Even without these he was able to establish a defensive system which 
shielded Hungary from the Turks based upon just a handful of fortresses in northern Bosnia, 
supported by three marches dug deep into the banates of Croatia and Slavonia.
130
  
 Throughout the 1420s Sigismund threw his weight behind supporting his Wallachian 
and Serbian allies and in securing the critical stretch of Danube between Belgrade and 
Severin. Sigismund initially encountered difficultly in securing Wallachia against a resurgent 
Ottoman power now led by Sultan Murad II (1421-1444, 1446-1451). These difficulties 
resulted from Sigismund’s absence from Hungary in 1420 in order to personally campaign 
against the Hussites. The Turks raided Transylvania in both 1420 and 1421, in the first 
instance apparently reaching Braşov (Kronstadt) and burning its suburbs.131 Sigismund was 
absent once again in 1422, and though Sigismund was keen to emphasise the dangers which 
the Turks posed to Hungary in his correspondence, it would appear that his forces in 
Wallachia and Transylvania fought with some success.
132
 Sigismund returned to Hungary in 
1423 and concentrated on securing Dan II’s authority in Wallachia.133 Though initially 
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supported by the Ottomans, Dan II had switched sides and joined with Sigismund and by the 
summer of 1423 he was on the Wallachian throne.
134
 Sigismund stressed in 1399 the danger 
that was posed to Hungary if the Wallachians pledged fealty to the Turks.
135
 If the 
Wallachians were to submit to the power of the Turks, Sigismund asked, ‘in how great a 
danger and crisis would our kingdom be in afterwards?’ (in quanto postea periculo et 
discrimine existeret regnum nostrum).
136
 The stakes were even higher in the 1420s and 
Sigismund did his utmost to keep his own candidate on the Wallachian throne.   
 It was in the early 1420s when Sigismund entered into negotiations with Władysław II 
of Poland (1386-1434) and Witold of Lithuania for aid, and his requests for aid contra 
infaustos Turcos were repeated throughout the decade.
137
 It is unclear whether Sigismund 
wanted them to lend him soldiers to support his campaigning, or if they should attack with 
their own forces on a different flank to relieve pressure on his. According to Długosz, 
Władysław claimed in 1419 that he had already helped Sigismund against the Turks by 
paying for the freedom of Hungarians who had been captured by the Turks while he was 
absent at Constance.
138
 This may be true, as Długosz recounts earlier in his chronicle how 
Władysław sent embassies to the Turks in 1415 to arrange for the ransom of Hungarian 
barons taken prisoner in Bosnia. Though his legates made contact with the Turks, on their 
way back through Hungary they were captured by Scolari and thrown into prison, robbed of 
their belongings and, as Długosz is particularly keen to emphasise, stripped off their clothing, 
including even their shoes and shoelaces.
139
 Though Scolari’s behaviour may seem harsh, he 
was right to be suspicious. These Poles had letters from the Turks in their possession and no 
letters of safe conduct for passage through the Kingdom of Hungary, and Scolari may have 
feared that they were conspiring with the Ottomans.
140
  
 Whatever the case, Sigismund probably wanted more active involvement on the part 
of Władysław and Witold and he was eager to make them aware of the campaigning which he 
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was undertaking against the Ottomans. In March 1423 Sigismund met with Władysław and 
Witold among others at Käsmark (in modern day Slovakia).
141
 The Voivode of Wallachia had 
recently inflicted a severe defeat on a Turkish army and, according to Andreas von 
Regensburg (c. 1380-c. 1444), had taken the Turkish captain captive and led him to 
Sigismund’s court, presumably so that he could be displayed by Sigismund to his fellow 
rulers.
142
 As we will see in the next chapter, the display of Turks captured in battle at courtly 
events was something which Sigismund did while travelling in the west. Regensburg also 
notes that Wallachian forces had found two banners of King Władysław among the piles of 
Turkish treasure which they had taken, banners which Sigismund presumably returned to 
Władysław.143  
 Regensburg garbles these events slightly as he identifies the voivode who vanquished 
the Turks as Merczweida (Mircea), who at the time was actually fighting for the Turks 
against Dan and Sigismund. Nevertheless, Regensburg’s tales of success in Transylvania 
would appear to be essentially accurate, as they are supported by Bonfini, who notes that a 
member of the noble Macedóniai family, based in southern Hungary, scored numerous 
successes against the Turks in the bella in Transalpinis.
144
 Bonfini, as usual, does not give 
explicit dates, but these successes appeared to have occurred in the early 1420s as they are 
located in the same section in which the civil war between Dan (Daan) and Mircea (Merches) 
is recounted.
145
 His next section begins by reminding the reader that Sigismund, by this point 
in his narrative, had ruled Hungary for 34 years, which would imply that these events took 
place in the very late 1410s or the early 1420s.
146
 However, it is probable that Regensburg 
and Bonfini are both describing the same events as similarly to Regensburg, Bonfini also 
notes the capture of Turkish banners and other booty which was sent to Sigismund’s court.147 
After securing Dan’s position in 1423 Sigismund continued to campaign on his 
behalf. 1424 saw further campaigning with renewed attention on the Danube frontier and the 
region around the Iron Gates.
148
 Scolari began renovating Severin and other nearby fortresses 
(aliorum fortaliciorum confiniorum) in this year and led a campaign in support of 
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Lazarević.149 He appears to have fought with success, though some of his methods did cause 
consternation. In the same year, for example, the county of Krassó complained to Scolari, as 
his deputy had forcibly conscripted a group of peasants for service in his army.
150
 The leaders 
of Krassó had a point, and Sigismund’s military use of the peasantry may have been more 
significant than initially meets the eye.
151
 Bonfini notes that Sigismund, rather than rely 
solely on knights, called upon the common people and rural peasantry to serve in his armies 
against the Turks (gregarium aut e rustica plebe evocatum erat).
152
 According to Bonfini, 
Sigismund was able to collect together a significant number of peasants in this way (agrestem 
congerit multitudinem), as they were motivated by their desire to fight ‘for hearths and 
homes’ (pro aris ac focis).153 Slightly to the east, a strong force supported with troops drawn 
from Scolari’s banderium campaigned in Transylvania.154 To the west, Hermann Cilli, 
Sigismund’s father-in-law, lent military help to King Tvrtko of Bosnia (1421-1443).155  
Though details are scarce, Sigismund’s campaigning in 1424 would appear to have 
been on a scale large enough to bring Murad to the negotiating table. Murad’s peace 
overtures may have also been influenced by the ongoing siege of Thessalonica (1422-1430), 
and he may have wished to free up resources on the Danube for use in northern Greece. 
Windecke records numerous Turkish visits to Sigismund’s court and places these around the 
time of John VIII Palaiologus’ visit to Buda which took place in 1424.156 In one case he 
records that Sigismund agreed a two year peace, but this was not kept by the Turks (es wart 
aber nit gehalten von den Dürken).
157
 In another tale, Windecke notes how Sigismund treated 
one Turkish emissary upon his arrival at his court.  This emissary was, apparently, ‘a most 
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lovely person to look at’ and Sigismund did not insult him (der konig geneiget ime nie), but 
instead sat him down on a stool which he placed directly opposite him and began chatting.
158
 
The Turkish emissary was not so polite, ‘and insulted him a little’, though what form these 
insults take Windecke does not say.
159
 This meeting was relatively fruitless as the peace 
which was eventually agreed was not kept to, though Sigismund did receive numerous gifts, 
including 10 pagan carpets (10 heidesch deppich).  
 Admittedly, Windecke’s tales are amusing and his coverage of Sigismund’s activities 
in the mid-1420s appears particularly fantastical. It is around 1424 when Windecke recounts 
in his work the bizarre tale of how Sigismund was near death after being poisoned by some 
black pepper.
160
 A Viennese doctor saved his life by working ‘many wonders’, which 
included hanging the king upside down by his feet for 24 hours.
161
 When tales of suspect 
batches of black pepper are left aside, however, Windecke’s basic assertions as regards the 
Turkish emissaries can be vindicated with other sources. The correspondence of Claus 
Redwitz, a Teutonic Knight who was in Sigismund’s service perhaps as early as 1422, 
survives in significant quantity in the Ordensbriefarchiv and gives invaluable glimpses into 
life at Sigismund’s court.162 Redwitz’s letter to Rusdorf on 19 January 1425, for example, 
supports Windecke’s tales of Sigismund negotiations with the Turks. As well as informing 
Rusdorf that the despot, presumably the Despot of Serbia, was not dead (der dispoed nicht tot 
ist), Redwitz also noted that Sigismund had an assured peace with the Turks (eynen 
wolgesischerten fred mit den Torken).
163
 That Turkish emissaries were present in Buda in 
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1424 is supported by a letter of Ragusa addressed to Sigismund on 31 August, which notes a 
certain orator Theucrorum in Sigismund’s company.164 
 The peace did not last and within a year the Ottomans had removed Dan from 
Wallachia and replaced him with Radul. Upon receiving news that Dan had been ousted by 
the Turks, Windecke records that Sigismund was ‘somewhat distressed’ (etwas bekumbert), 
which seems to be something of an understatement.
165
 Another contemporary noted how the 
Turks had won Wallachia in 1425, leaving Transylvania open to attack.
166
 The summer of 
1425 therefore saw campaigns against the Turks in two theatres in response. Sigismund 
dispatched one army against the Turks in Transylvania in support of Dan, while Scolari led 
another force against the Turks along the Danube frontier and the vicinity of the Iron 
Gates.
167
 The campaigning was extended into the next year.
168
 Sigismund would note in a 
letter to Cardinal Beaufort in June 1426, how he had defeated the Turks and restored Dan to 
his previous position.
169
 Once again, the importance of guarding the Iron Gates and 
supporting his Wallachian allies against the Ottomans emerges clearly from Sigismund’s 
correspondence. In May 1426, Sigismund stated in a letter to Witold how he was moving to 
secure Severin (Zewrino), from where he would then head eastwards into Transylvania to 
support Dan.
170
 Windecke claims that Sigismund was forced to campaign in Wallachia and 
Bulgaria during the summer of 1426, as had he not done so the lands would have been lost to 
the Turks.
171
  
 While 1426 was a successful year for Sigismund, it did come at a cost. Scolari met his 
death in a battle and Sigismund was deprived of one of his most talented generals. Scolari, 
supported by his Hungarian forces as well as several hundred Portuguese soldiers led by Dom 
Pedro (1392-1449), a prince of Portugal, had engaged the Turks near the fortress of Golubac 
and later died from wounds sustained during the battle.
172
 Furthermore, Tvrtko, Sigismund’s 
candidate in Bosnia, capitulated to the Turks after they campaigned with a force 4,000 strong, 
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leaving Hungarian possessions in Croatia and Dalmatia vulnerable.
173
 With Bosnia excepted, 
however, Sigismund had campaigned with relative success against the Ottomans in the 6 or 
so years since his return from Hungary. Before exploring the next few years of his 
campaigning, for which we have particularly rich sources, Sigismund’s conception of the 
Ottoman threat needs to be considered. 
1.4 Between Turks and Hussites: Sigismund’s broader conception of the Ottoman threat 
To modern eyes Sigismund seems surrounded by enemies. With Turks to the south, 
Hussites to the north west and Venetians to the west, not to mention disputes with the Polish 
Kingdom and Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the north and north east, Sigismund had a great 
deal to defend and a great many relationships to manage. It is no surprise that the idea that 
Sigismund was surrounded by enemies held currency with contemporaries. One gets an 
impression of the difficulties which Sigismund faced when reading a summary of a letter in 
Windecke’s chronicle. Windecke notes Sigismund’s rather desperate situation, noting how he 
could not do as he wished because he was surrounded by ‘pagans and Turks’ (heiden und 
Durken), who were inflicting great damage on the Christians in Hungary.
174
 Windecke also 
wheeled out the stock rumour that the treacherous Venetians had played a role in supporting 
Turkish attacks.
175
  
The idea that Sigismund was surrounded by enemies was one which he was keen to 
promote himself. In 1424, for example, Sigismund emphasised the suffering of his Kingdom 
of Hungary as they sought to battle simultaneously the Turks, heretical Bosnians, other 
unbelievers and the Hussites.
176
 Contemporaries appear to have picked up on the fact that this 
image of a Hungarian Kingdom, beset on all sides, struck a chord with Sigismund. In August 
1433, the city of Ragusa sent an embassy to Sigismund and included instructions on what to 
say so that ‘our said lord would be most kind’ (detto signor nostro fosse tanto benigno).177 
One of the things they were to emphasise was Hungary’s position, and how it was not just 
envied and detested by schismatics and heretics, but was in fact surrounded by them (molto é 
invidiata et odiata non solamente dali scismatici et heretici, da i quali la circumdata).
178
 
Sigismund’s own conception of his situation is best demonstrated in a report written by a 
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certain Peter Wacker, who visited his court in 1425. The detailed report of Peter is instructive 
and humorous in equal measure. He was sent to Sigismund with a certain Konrad of 
Bickenbach on behalf of the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire in order to discuss the 
arrangements for the upcoming Reichstag at Vienna. Konrad and Peter’s instructions survive, 
and set out very clearly what questions they were to ask the King and what was to be 
discussed.
179
 The items on the agenda very much reflect the priorities of the Imperial electors, 
and revolve around whether Sigismund would personally attend the Reichstag in Vienna, the 
actions which he intended to take against the Hussite threat and the state of his health. The 
fact that Sigismund placed the Turkish threat at the centre of his replies indicates the 
importance which Sigismund attached to combatting the Ottomans. 
Sigismund has been called the ferne König by modern historians and Peter Wacker 
may have agreed, as it took him around a week to track him down in northern Hungary.
180
 
Even once they found Sigismund in the village where he was staying Peter and Konrad 
struggled to secure an audience as they were told the king was out hunting. A few days later 
they resorted to waiting patiently outside the church where they heard that Sigismund was 
hearing mass and sprung upon him as he made his exit. They asked for an audience and 
Sigismund promised to grant them one later.  
Sigismund’s court seems to have been quite a busy one and reflects his status as the 
secular head of Christendom. Peter lists the numerous German and Hungarian lords and 
prelates in Sigismund’s chamber and notes the presence of embassies from throughout 
Christendom and beyond, including from the Byzantine emperor, the Despot of Serbia, the 
King of Poland, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, the Teutonic Order and numerous other 
lords.
181
 Peter and Konrad asked Sigismund if he would personally attend the Reichstag in 
Vienna and if he would consider travelling further into the Reich in order to hold court at 
Regensburg. Sigismund’s reply was very clear. He did not want to ride to Vienna, let alone 
Regensburg. Sigismund stated that he was in an awful position, that he thought only of the 
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‘honour and unity of Christendom’ and that he was always stuck in the middle, in between 
the unbelievers.
182
 
 Sigismund explained his predicament in some detail to Peter.
183
 He felt as if he was 
always sat in the middle of everything and always under the unbelievers.
184
 Whenever he 
went to Vienna, his people in Hungary believed that he was abandoning them to the pagans 
and the Turks. Whenever he headed south to Siebenbürgen in order to fight the Turks, his 
son-in-law, the Duke of Austria and his Bohemian allies, felt abandoned too, as Sigismund 
was not helping them against the heretics and Hussites. Wacker continued, that ‘he 
[Sigismund] now dearly wishes to come the aid of every part of Christendom and put towards 
this all which God has given him, just as he has done before’.185 Sigismund emphasised how 
he had tried to come to the aid of his subjects in the Reich before, but that it had gone 
horribly wrong. He recalled a time where he was travelling during the winter cold, and how 
he lost all of his horses and many of his men to the freezing weather.  The cold made him so 
scared for his own life that he could apparently count the days he had left with just his feet 
(das er es an sinen fußen sine leptage nummer uberwünde).
186
 It was far better if he remained 
‘in the middle in Hungary, between the Hussites and the Turks’, as he could do more good 
from there.
187
 
Nevertheless, Sigismund was prepared to tell his subjects in the Reich what they did 
not want to hear, notably that it was more important for him to defend Hungary from the 
Turks than it was to defend the Reich from the Hussites.
188
 Sigismund stated that he now 
needed to dedicate everything he had to Hungary (das müße er alles mit den Ungern 
zubringen), even if that meant giving others much less help.
189
 After reminding Peter that his 
own son-in-law, Albert, was campaigning in person against the heretics in Moravia, 
Sigismund noted that both Greeks and Bosnians were being attacked by the pagans and Turks 
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widder die cristenheid.
190
 Sigismund stated that he had promised to help the King of Bosnia 
against the pagans and Turks and that he had (or should have had – the German is unclear) 
sent a force of 1500 lances (funfzehenhundert spieß) to help him.
191
 Sigismund stated that he 
was in a position to help the Reich against its enemies, but it would be of less use (aber der 
nütze cleine), leaving Peter with the implication that it was the Turks who needed fighting 
most of all. 
Peter’s talk with Sigismund in the summer of 1424 is illuminating in several respects. 
It notes the overriding significance of the Turkish threat in Sigismund’s reign. The Hussite 
threat was of course a major consideration of Sigismund’s, but, as the next chapter will 
underline, the role of the Hussites in Sigismund’s politics has been distorted and made too 
significant. Our perception of the Nuremberg Reichstag, for example, as one which primarily 
revolved around the Hussite threat is one fashioned by the relevant edition of the 
Reichstagsakten. The editor, Dietrich Kerler, was highly selective when it came to the 
documents which he included in its publication. When unpublished archival material is taken 
into account, the Nuremberg Reichstag of 1431 was also meant to act as a springboard for a 
campaign against the Ottoman Turks too, though very little of this came to fruition. 
Peter’s talk with Sigismund also attests to the king’s grasp of his competing priorities 
and responsibilities across Christendom. Nicholas Garai, the palatine of Hungary, said of 
Sigismund in 1431 that he is a ‘king who has great spirit and who therefore pays attention to 
a great range of things, such as the Turks, matters of the Reich and indeed the entire world, so 
much so that he forgets about the matters of Dalmatia’.192 Historians have therefore often 
interpreted Sigismund as being overwhelmed by his various crowns and responsibilities.
193
 
This thesis highlights how this simply is not the case. As the archival research which supports 
this thesis will show, Sigismund had a detailed grasp of the challenges which he faced and 
how he could use his status as King of the Romans to overcome many of these. Many of his 
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projects were, of course, not successful, but they represent how his engagement with the 
Ottoman threat was a vigorous one. 
Peter’s talk with Sigismund was, in essence, just a talk. Contemporaries accused 
Sigismund of talking too much and achieving too little. In the words of the near 
contemporary Kleinberger chronicle, sine wort warent süess, milt und guot, die werk kurz, 
schmal und klain (‘his words were sweet, milk and honey; the work short, thin and little’), an 
impression which has subsequently entered modern scholarship.
194
 As this thesis will 
demonstrate, Sigismund did more than just talk about fighting the Ottomans, and he was able 
to draw upon resources throughout the Reich when doing so. 
1.5 Campaigns, coronations and further warfare, c. 1426-1432. 
 Though Sigismund complained at great length to Peter Wacker about his situation in 
1425, the military pressures exercised on his frontier by the Ottoman Turks arguably 
worsened over the course of the next few years. As well as increased Ottoman pressure on 
Wallachia, the death of Lazarević in July 1427 and the ceding of several Serbian fortresses to 
Sigismund, notably Belgrade, stretched his defensive commitments along the Danube 
frontier.  
 As we have seen, the years 1425 and 1426 saw Sigismund organise campaigns in 
Wallachia and Transylvania in support of Dan and along the Danube frontier in defence of 
his fortresses and in order to support Lazarević. His campaigns were relatively successful and 
both succeeded in restoring Dan to the Wallachian throne and in keeping the Danube frontier 
secure. Sigismund’s campaigning in 1427 and 1428 leave much greater marks in the source 
material and would suggest that these were his largest yet. His instructions to the town of 
Sibiu (Hermannstadt), contained in a letter of November 1426, reveal the preparations in 
place for the campaigns next year.
195
 Among other issues, Sigismund reminded the council of 
Sibiu that he had given Dan a guard of 1000 men (100 of which were mounted soldiers) and 
that they were obliged to help support the voivode, as well as contribute their own troops to 
the fighting in dictas partes Transilvanas.
196
 Sigismund also produced a military ordinance in 
preparation for his campaigns in Wallachia in 1427.
197
 These ordinances suggest that 
Sigismund was having to supply and keep ready a significant military force all year round, as 
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allowance is made for the provisioning of food, housing and fuel for soldiers even in 
wintertime.
198
 Similarly, Bonfini recalls in his work that Sigismund gathered a great array of 
men for the fight against the Turks around this time, including peasants, common people and 
knights, and goes on the say rather vaguely that he wintered them in the province (in 
provincia hibernarant).
199
 Once again, Sigismund’s campaigning was largely focussed on 
keeping Dan II on the Wallachian throne. Witold’s description of Sigismund’s campaigning 
in a letter to the Master of Livonia written in March 1427, accurately reflects the dynamic 
which existed between Sigismund, Wallachia and the Turks.
200
 Witold records how Dan has 
been given an army by Sigismund and is accompanied by him (und Dan der Grossen 
Walachye…ein herre gesaczt [ist] von dem Romischen konige) and that Radul, Dan’s 
opponent, has an army put at his disposal by the Turks (gesaczter von den Turken).
201
  
 As Witold’s letter demonstrates, most of our reports which contain information about 
Sigismund’s campaigns repeat details second hand. For 1427, however, we are lucky enough 
to have an eyewitness account of Sigismund as he travelled south towards the Danube in 
order to campaign against the Turks.
202
 Claus Redwitz informed Rusdorf in a letter dated 11 
April 1427 of Sigismund’s plan to invite the Order to Hungary in order to serve as a bulwark 
against the Turks. The contents of this letter and the transfer of the Teutonic Order to the 
Danube will be dealt with in detail in a later chapter, but the context in which Sigismund first 
put serious consideration to his plan to use the Order against the Turks is evocatively 
depicted by Redwitz. The original letter is scruffily written, dotted with frequent mistakes, 
crossings out and with words entered into the margins and would appear to have been written 
hurriedly by Redwitz himself while accompanying Sigismund on campaign in southern 
Hungary.
203
 Redwitz enjoyed close personal contact with Sigismund and the picture he offers 
of the middle aged king in his correspondence in general is a rather intimate one. This letter is 
no exception, and in this instance he notes that Sigismund appeared most troubled, with ‘his 
hand on his head’ (sein hant auf sein heupt).204 Sigismund was worried for a reason, for while 
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travelling south to campaign against the Turks he received some worrying news from an 
envoy of Dan II, 
[who] said to the king in truth that the Turkish Kaiser [torken keiser], who one calls 
the great Turk, has come over the sea, which one calls the arm of St. George, and has 
brought with him 11,000 [men] and that he currently lays between the same sea and 
the Danube and that daily more  people come to him…205 
Upon hearing this news Sigismund decided to move further south. It would appear that he 
spent the next few days deep in thought after which, ‘according to his habit’, he invited 
Redwitz to join him on his evening ride.
206
 Sigismund did not invite him out to ride merely 
for his conversation, as Redwitz reports that ‘he [Sigismund] spoke, that “we have long 
thought about how we wanted to settle your order in a place in this land against the Turks”’, a 
theme which Sigismund then discussed in more detail.
207
 
 As we will see in chapter 3, this letter forms the first link in the chain of events which 
would result in Sigismund transferring the control of the Banate of Severin to the Teutonic 
Order. The negotiations which led to Sigismund’s ceding of his critical Danubian fortresses 
to the Teutonic Knights were protracted ones, and the Order would not arrive in force until 
1429. Nevertheless, the glimpse offered by Redwitz in 1427 into Sigismund’s campaigning is 
instructive in numerous ways. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain the scale of the 
campaigning between Sigismund and the Turks, and for numerical estimates we are reliant on 
the estimates of contemporaries which often seem unbelievable.
208
 The Wallachian envoy’s 
admission that the Sultan had crossed into Europe with 11,000 men and the worry it evoked 
in Sigismund seems believable, and accurately reflects the scale of the campaigning in this 
region and during this period. Furthermore, Redwitz’ letter brings the importance of the 
Danube frontier into sharp focus, as the best way to blunt Turkish offensives would be to not 
allow them across the river in the first place. The role which the Danube played in 
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Sigismund’s campaigns is a theme explored in chapter three, and will be explored in more 
detail then. 
 Sigismund’s campaigning with Dan II succeeded in shoring up his position but it was 
cut short by the death of Lazarević in July 1427.209 In return for Sigismund’s recognition of 
his nephew, George Branković, as his rightful heir, Lazarević had offered to transfer 
numerous Serbian fortresses to Sigismund, notably Belgrade, upon his death.
210
 Upon 
receiving news of the despot’s death Sigismund hurried westwards to ensure that these treaty 
arrangements were put in place. The transfer of Serbian controlled fortresses was not a 
smooth affair, and Sigismund waited outside Belgrade for several weeks in late September 
and early October before finally gaining control of the fortress.
211
 Meanwhile the Turks took 
advantage of the confusion left in the wake of Lazarević’s death, and seized fortresses in 
Serbia, including the critical stronghold of Golubac, sited on the southern bank of the Danube 
and which commanded an important river crossing.
212
 Bonfini decried the fall of Serbia to the 
Turks and noted that in his own time it was only Hungary who ‘now watches the Turks’, 
pithily remarking that Hungary was the only bulwark left against the Turks (Ungaria unicum 
est propugnaculum).
213
 
 However, Bonfini’s lamentations should not be taken too seriously as Sigismund’s 
seizure of Belgrade was a significant moment in the development of his defensive system on 
his southern frontier, a fact that the king was keen to emphasise to his contemporaries. In one 
instance he underlined the great value of Belgrade, claiming that he seized it ‘so that the 
boundaries of the Hungarian Kingdom can be watched over uninjured’ and the Kingdom of 
Serbia can be protected.
214
 Doukas reinforces the importance of Belgrade when he notes how 
it was fear of the Turks which compelled Branković to cede Belgrade to Sigismund, as if 
Belgrade had fell to the Ottomans the cities of both Hungary and Serbia would have been 
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defenceless.
215
 Archival material in the Ordensbriefarchiv gives deeper insights into the 
impact which this expansion in Sigismund’s defensive commitments had on his campaigning 
against the Turks, and many of these issues are considered in detail in chapters three and four.  
 With Belgrade secure, Sigismund sought to take Golubac.
216
 We are lucky enough to 
have an eyewitness account of Sigismund and his forces as he was mustering for his attack on 
Golubac. Walter von Schwarzenberg, a Frankfurter and a hofdiener of Sigismund’s, wrote a 
letter addressed to his superiors in Frankfurt dated 18 May 1428 in Buda (gegeyben zú Offin 
dinstag vorphingsten).
217
 The letter is damaged and some of its contents can only be guessed 
at, but even the legible details provide important details. Walter notes rather vaguely that he 
left Sigismund about 70 miles before Golubac (dübenberg), which would imply that 
Sigismund had not yet begun the siege which he begun in late April.
218
 Therefore, it would 
appear that Walter met with Sigismund in April, before travelling to Buda and writing his 
letter to Frankfurt in order to inform them about his discussions with the king. Walter notes 
that Sigismund is now on the border between Turkey and great Wallachia (ist uff der 
grennecz czüsen thorký [und der] grüße wallacheii) and notes the particularly strong force 
which he has assembled, including the great deal of artillery prepared for the siege (und hayd 
dar fürre fille geschücze).
219
 Walter went on to say, however, that he had worries (ich han 
abbir sorge) as regards Sigismund’s prospects of victory. He informed Frankfurt that the 
Turks had gathered together, that they have sent many men against Sigismund and that they 
fully intend to fight (dý thorken hatten sich gesamet…fille fulkes gegen in geschecket und will 
laßen striden). Walter’s fears were to prove well founded.  
 Sigismund’s attack on Golubac was a failure and his response to defeat will be 
covered in detail in chapter three. Briefly however, though Sigismund suffered a military 
reversal at Golubac it was by no means a disaster. Sigismund immediately began construction 
of the fortress of Lászlóvár, sited on the bank opposite to Golubac, to counter the new 
Turkish presence there.
220
 Nor did Sigismund’s defeat expose his frontier to further Turkish 
attacks. In a letter of August 1428 Witold reveals to the Master of Livonia how after winning 
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at Golubac, the Turks continued into Wallachia and ousted Dan from his throne.
221
 Witold 
makes it clear that he is reporting hearsay (his account begins with the disclaimer, und do si 
sogen) and evidence for this incursion actually occurring is scarce, though there is some 
evidence to suggest that Dan was briefly usurped the year before.
222
 A letter of Sigismund’s 
dated 31 August would imply that the Turks were in fact largely focussed on rebuilding 
Golubac, though they had forces ready to attack Belgrade and other Serbian fortresses.
223
 
Whatever the case, defeat at Golubac did not open up the frontier to the Turks and Dan was 
in fact secure on his throne until his death in 1431 or 1432.
224
 Doukas dates a major Turkish 
incursion led by Murad himself into Hungary to around this time, though his account is 
clearly chronologically in the wrong place.
225
 Murad campaigned in person north of the 
Danube only in 1432 and between 1438 and 1440, and Doukas has clearly placed one of 
these campaigns earlier in his narrative.
226
 Doukas notes in his account of Murad’s raid in 
1427/8 that he made it to a town known as Zipinion (Ἐλθόντες δὲ ἄχρι Ζιπηνίου), which is 
probably Sibiu (known in German as Hermannstadt). This would seem to imply that this 
campaign is in fact that of 1438.
227
 The fact that Doukas states that Murad was guided by 
Vlad Dracul (Voivode of Wallachia, 1436-42, 1443-7) makes it almost certain that Doukas is 
referring to the Sultan’s campaign in 1438. George of Hungary’s eyewitness account of the 
siege of Sebeş in 1438 records how Vlad Dracul was present with Murad, and even managed 
to convince some of the townsmen and women to surrender to the Turks without a fight.
228
 
The main consequence of Sigismund’s defeat at Golubac was not continued conflict, but in 
fact a cessation of hostilities on the frontier around the Iron Gates and Wallachia. In the later 
months of 1428 Sigismund and Murad negotiated to extend the short term armistice which 
they had agreed in June.
229
 
 Before discussing Sigismund’s negotiations with Murad, it is important to balance 
Sigismund’s military campaigning and overtures for peace with his other endeavours to 
combat the Turks as Sigismund’s focus on securing the Danube frontier was part of a much 
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broader strategic approach. Sigismund did not just need to command the waters and fortresses 
of the Danube between Belgrade and the Iron Gates and support his Serbian and Wallachian 
allies, but also to prevent himself from being encircled to the east and north east. Much has 
been written on the nature of the relationship between Sigismund and Witold, but neglected 
archival material in the Ordensbriefarchiv throws new light on the pressures which the Grand 
Duke faced and the background to Sigismund’s offer of a royal crown in 1429.230 On 7 May 
1427 Witold wrote a letter (in rather awkward German) to Rusdorf, in which he discussed the 
very real dilemma in which he found himself. Witold notes, that  
 an embassy from Turkey has come to us and this we are most worried about, that 
 such a messenger would come to us from Turkey at this time when we are good 
 friends with the lord Roman King and when he fights with the Turks and is engaged 
 in hostilities [with them] and we worry whether he would be easy about this (literally, 
 umb das her leichte darum wirt) and would assume…that we wished to be at one with 
 the Turks against him. Regarding this we have now written to him and also to the lord 
 King of Poland [regarding] what they want to prescribe and advise us [regarding] how 
 and with what answer we should speak to the same Turkish messenger.
231
 
Witold stressed at the end of this letter how he feared that the Roman King would view him 
with suspicion and that he would be resented by the king (wir besorgen uns vordechtnisse 
von dem egenanten herrn romischen konigen in der wir von im ungerne blieben wolden).
232
 
He was right to fear the suspicion that could result from Turks visiting his court. Both Witold 
and his brother, Władysław II, were converts to Catholicism and the Teutonic Knights had 
attempted to blacken both their names at Constance by denouncing them as pagans.
233
 
Whether real or imagined, any collusion with the Turkish infidel could play directly into the 
hands of the Teutonic Knights and Sigismund. Nevertheless, Sigismund needed to ensure that 
Witold remained on his side and, thankfully, his status as Roman King gave him access to 
more methods aside from military force with which he could accomplish this.  
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 Historians, such as Jörg Hoensch and Julia Dücker, interpret Sigismund’s offer of a 
royal crown to Witold from the standpoint of his Hussite politics and as an attempt to weaken 
Władysław II’s hold on Witold.234 These were certainly pertinent issues for Sigismund and 
even more so for Pope Martin V (1417-31), who stressed to Witold how once he was king he 
would need to assist Sigismund contra Bohemos haereticos.
235
 In a similar vein, Długosz 
claims that Sigismund offered Witold a crown and membership of the Order of the Dragon 
simply so that he would be a friend and ally of the Empire (ut Withawdus ipse amicus fieret 
Imperii et socius).
236
 However, the spectre of the Turkish threat barely features at all in the 
analysis of Hoensch and Dücker, and they underplay its role in the entire affair. Długosz 
reports an apparent exchange of letters between Władysław and Sigismund in 1428, in which 
Sigismund vigorously complained to King Władysław that he had not received the aid against 
the Turks which he had promised him (in quibus queri de Wladislao Rege graviter visus est, 
quod sibi in expeditione contra Turcos constituto promissum subsidium non tulerit).
237
 
Władysław, Witold and Sigismund met at Lutsk in early 1429, principally to discuss 
Sigismund’s offer of a royal crown to Witold. Długosz’s covers the debates which this offer 
sparked in excruciating detail, but the question of the Turkish threat does appear briefly at the 
beginning of his narrative.
238
 It is clear that Sigismund was negotiating with Władysław and 
Witold for Polish and Lithuanian aid against the Turks, as Długosz records the Polish king’s 
exasperation at being repeatedly accused by Sigismund of not coming to fight the Turks. 
Apparently, Władysław claimed (though rather vaguely) that he had dispatched an army in 
support of Sigismund a previous summer. Though it remained stationed on the Danube for 
two months (usque ad Danubium…et prope duobus mensibus immorati), Sigismund never 
arrived to lead it and it eventually went home.
239
 Władysław was adamant that it was 
Sigismund who was to blame, and that there was no point organising a campaign against the 
Turks if Sigismund could not even bother to turn up when he said he would!
240
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 The cautious tone of Witold’s letter therefore reflects Sigismund’s fear of being 
surrounded by neighbours allied with the Turks and points to his sincere desire for Polish and 
Lithuanian aid. Sigismund constantly sought to ensure that Bosnian, Serbian and Wallachian 
leaders fought with him against the Turks rather than vice versa, and Witold’s coronation 
needs to be seen in the same light. By crowning Witold, Sigismund could establish a closer 
relationship with the Grand Duke and further incentivise Lithuanian resistance to the Turks. 
Far from being an unsuccessful move in the power play between Sigismund and Władysław, 
the coronation of the Grand Duke was in fact an innovative way of widening the so called 
cordon sanitaire beyond the states on his southern frontier.  
 Sigismund’s offer of a royal crown to Witold in 1428 was only made possible by the 
power which he drew from his status and authority as Roman King.
241
 Sigismund said so 
himself. According to Długosz, while at Lutsk Sigismund and his wife entered uninvited into 
Władysław’s chamber so early in the morning that he was still in bed, and tried to convince 
him that raising the Grand Duke to the rank of king was a good idea.
242
 Sigismund apparently 
announced, that ‘I have this power as the King of the Romans’.243 A rather mysterious list of 
the barons, prelates and other notables in Sigismund’s court, produced c. 1429, underlines 
further how Sigismund’s offer of a royal crown to Witold was an imperial affair.244 The list is 
divided into three sections and the third records those whom Sigismund intended to send to 
Witold to perform the coronation.
245
 Sigismund planned to send the archbishops of Cologne 
and Magdeburg, a Bavarian duke, as well as two Hungarian barons, a Hungarian bishop and a 
Bosnian lord.
246
. Furthermore, the fact that Witold was inducted into the Order of the Dragon, 
which obliged him to aid Sigismund in the fight against the infidels, further supports the idea 
that Sigismund sought aid against the Turks from the prospective King of Lithuania.
247
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 While the arrival of Turkish embassies at his court worried Witold in May 1427, by 
September 1429 he had no such qualms and was openly accepting them.
248
 Witold felt 
confident enough to do this as Sigismund himself began negotiations with Murad for peace 
after suffering defeat at Golubac in June 1428. The initial truce agreed between himself and 
the Turks in June 1428 was soon extended.
249
 In February 1429 Sigismund noted in a letter to 
Rusdorf that he had concluded a three year peace with the Turks, which would ensure that 
Wallachia, Serbia and Russia (Walachye, Syrsey und Ruwszen) would remain free.
250
 The 
term Ruwszen here is unclear, but it perhaps refers to Red Ruthenia, a region between the 
Kingdom of Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Hungary, or the 
entire region beyond Hungary in general.
251
 Doukas notes in a different context how Murad II 
wished to have a guide that could lead his armies to Ἀλαμανίας τε καὶ Ῥωσίας (Germany and 
Russia), which implies that Ruwszen was broadly the region beyond Hungary and was a 
possible target of Murad’s.252 Sigismund goes on to say that a certain Saybeg, the Torken 
hoffmeister, had arrived to strengthen the peace (sulchen fride mit uns czu befestigen) and to 
negotiate with Venice for peace too.
253
 Saybeg’s visit to Sigismund was clearly a precursor to 
something much bigger, as in a letter of 7 April, Sigismund reported that a Turkish 
delegation, numbering 90 horses and bringing numerous gifts, had arrived in Buda.
254
 In 
August of the same year Rusdorf noted in a letter to the procurator in Rome how Sigismund 
had secured a three year peace with the Turks.
255
 Sigismund strongly desired peace so that he 
could head to Rome in order to be crowned as Holy Roman Emperor, and after overseeing 
the unsuccessful Fifth Hussite Crusade in the summer of 1431 from Nuremberg, he began his 
journey to Rome.
256
  
 This peace brought a respite to the Iron Gates, Transylvania and Wallachia until the 
Turks launched a major offensive in the summer of 1432. Between 1429 and 1431 Murad 
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appears to have kept to the terms of his agreement with Sigismund, largely leaving Walachye, 
Syrsey und Ruwszen alone and campaigning elsewhere.
257
 A letter of the Teutonic Order’s 
procurator in Rome to Rusdorf in May 1430 makes this point clear. In this letter the 
procurator reports that the Turks have refrained from attacking Hungary, and have instead 
attacked Venetian territory with a great force of 180,000 men (dy turken gewest sein in der 
fenidier lande mit groser macht, als mit hundert tuss und achczig tuss man).
258
 He goes on to 
say that they have seized two Venetian towns in Slavonia (zwu stete in Sclavonie). Hungarian 
controlled territory around Belgrade was not attacked and relations with the Ottomans seem 
to have remained cordial. In August of the same year the presence of Ottoman emissaries is 
recorded in Belgrade, with the Ragusans present in the city greeting the ambassador del 
Turcho with a guard of fifty horses.
259
 The next year Ragusan accounts emphasise the 
pressure placed on Tvrtko by the Turks, though he was able to maintain his position.
260
 
Sigismund’s forces along the Danube were still on guard during this time. In January 1431, 
for example, Franko Tallóci, the Captain of Belgrade, readied his forces in the County of 
Keve and stationed them on the ports and harbours of the Danube.
261
 He did so for the 
Danube had frozen over and he feared that the Turks would use the opportunity to raid into 
Hungary.
262
 
1.6 Rome, Basle and continued fighting with the Ottoman Turks, 1432-1437. 
The conditions on Sigismund’s southern frontier after 1429 gave him the opportunity 
to journey abroad in order to be crowned as Holy Roman Emperor. Sigismund began his 
passage to Rome in the summer of 1431 from Nuremberg and his journey to Rome was 
marked by protracted political negotiations with the Papacy and other north Italian states.
263
 It 
was also marked by a whole range of civic processions, ceremonies and entries, and his 
penchant for dancing with any lady he could annoyed one particular husband in Lucca.
264
 He 
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received the Iron Crown of the Lombards in Milan in November 1431, after which he 
apparently wintered at Piacenza in great poverty.
265
 Sigismund was crowned as Holy Roman 
Emperor by Pope Eugenius IV on 31 May 1433, and departed from Rome on 14 August.
266
 
As the next chapter will show, his supplications to the Pope survive and they allow historians 
an insight into how he conceived of his struggle against the Turks. 
Meanwhile, Sigismund’s frontier was under severe pressure. In 1432 Murad shifted 
his focus from Bosnia and committed substantial forces to campaigning along the Danube 
frontier. It would appear that Ottoman commanders began campaigning in January 1432 and 
they initially massed their forces opposite the Danubian fortress of Keve.
267
 This was perhaps 
a diversionary tactic to throw the defenders off guard, as they then swiftly manoeuvred 
westwards and placed pressure on Belgrade.
268
 Belgrade’s captain was up to the task and 
concentrated his forces in Belgrade, which seems to have caused the Turkish Begs to refrain 
from launching any attacks.
269
 The Turks were right to be cautious as Belgrade was well 
defended. Bertrandon de la Broquière (c. 1400-1459), who was present in Belgrade in 1433, 
noted the city’s extensive fortifications, the impressive artillery, the fleet of ships and the 
German mercenaries stationed there.
270
  
A far more concerted effort on the part of the Turks came later in May and June, but 
perhaps on account of Belgrade’s strength, Murad committed his forces to campaigning in 
Wallachia and the area around the Iron Gates. This change in focus may have also been 
stimulated by a change in leadership in Wallachia. According to Doukas, it was around this 
time that Dan II was killed by Vlad II, though whether this took place in 1431 or 1432 is 
difficult to ascertain.
271
 Whatever the case, by the summer of 1432 Alexandra Aldea was 
clearly in place as Voivode of Wallachia (1431-1436) as he was in charge of organising the 
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defence against the Turks.
272
 In June 1432 Ottoman forces crossed the Danube where they 
divided into separate forces, each led by a beg, and penetrated deep into Wallachia and 
Transylvania.
273
 According to one report, Ottoman forces almost reached Târgoviște.274 The 
Ottomans were able to penetrate so far because the defences around the Iron Gates, under the 
control of the Teutonic Knights since 1429, had collapsed. A letter to Rusdorf, penned by 
Švitrigaila, Grand Duke of Lithuania (1430-1432) on 22 June, reports the Ottomans as 
entering Hungary around the Iron Gates (in das lanth ken ungern umbe eyseryn Thor).
275
 
There the Turks killed numerous Hungarian lords and a later report, written in December of 
the same year, recounts how the Teutonic Knights had lost three fortresses.
276
 Fighting was 
not just fierce for the Teutonic Knights and the Hungarians, as Aldea’s own forces needed to 
resist pro-Turkish Wallachian forces. In one case, Aldea had to rally his forces to meet a 66 
strong fleet of ships raised by a brother of his to conduct raids in des wayewode land, which 
he in the end defeated succesfully.
277
 This may have been to no avail, as a Ragusan letter 
dated 31 July 1432 notes that the Dominus Vlachorum, perhaps Aldea, had submitted to 
Murad.
278
  
 The events of 1432 were certainly destructive, and they leave a significant footprint in 
the sources. The supplications to the Papacy made by Transylvanian clerics in the 1430s, for 
example, paint a picture of widespread destruction and fear. In a supplication dated 13 July 
1433, a certain John, son of Balthasar de Enned, asked for permission to raise money in order 
to rebuild properties throughout the diocese.
279
 This was because numerous buildings and 
houses, including almshouses and hospitals, had been destroyed by Turkish invasions and 
raiding.
280
 Later, in a supplication of 20 December 1436, a certain decanus districti Cybensis, 
stressed how his diocese existed in an area on the bounds and limits of the pagans, 
schismatics and Turks (quod in districtu qui in finibus et limitibus paganorum scismaticorum 
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Torcorum).
281
 The supplication goes on to say that they were being invaded by infidels in all 
parts (partes alle ab infidelibus invaduntur), and gives descriptions of how the local dwellers 
were forced to haul themselves into local towers and ramparts with their wives and daughters 
(in turribus deffensiones et propugnacula… cum uxuubis (sic) suis et mulieribus) whenever 
the Turks attacked, as that was the only secure place to be.
282
  
 However, it is important not to take sources such as these at face value and not to 
exaggerate the scale of the damage or the ineffectiveness of the defence. It would appear that 
the Turks, for example, were unable to take well defended sites such as Braşov, and instead 
raided easier targets such as the nearby villages and hamlets in the forests.
283
 Fundamentally, 
the Turks were primarily interested in raiding and any fortresses which they were able to 
seize swiftly fell back into Hungarian hands. Though the damage wrought to the local 
infrastructure is difficult to assess, it would appear to have been repaired rather quickly. The 
roads around Braşov were clearly in good repair after the invasions of 1432, as in 1438 they 
were ordered to be made impassable in order to slow the approach of Turkish forces.
284
 In 
most cases, the defences would not collapse in the face of Turkish attack until after 
Sigismund’s death.285 In fact, it is all too easy to take the tales of continual crisis and disaster 
present in the source material at face value, and infer that Sigismund’s attempts to defend 
against the Turks were unsuccessful and that his military policies were simply not fit for 
purpose. 
 It is precisely this gloominess and sense of alarm in the sources which has unfairly 
coloured the modern literature. Rokai Petar has argued that Sigismund’s campaigns in the 
later 1430s did not meet the expectations of contemporaries and that his entire 
‘Balkanpolitik’ in this period should be characterised as fruitless and as a failure.286 
Similarly, Szakály has commented on Sigismund’s inability to shift the balance of power in 
Hungary’s ‘foregrounds’ and characterises the period of 1427-1437 as one in which 
Sigismund lost ground in the Balkans.
287
 Nevertheless, Sigismund’s response in the last five 
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or so years of his reign was not one marked by stagnation and should not be characterised as 
simply him doing his best to defend what little he could. If anything, in the last four years 
Sigismund actively took the fight to the Turks beyond the Danube. This did not just involve 
attempts to outflank the Ottomans by paying renewed attention to Bosnia, but also the 
launching of attacks across the Danube into Serbia and Bulgaria in order to destroy Ottoman 
fleets and regain the initiative after the events of 1432. 
 After Sigismund relieved the Teutonic Knights of their command in 1432, the task of 
defending the southern frontier eventually fell to a family of Ragusan origin known as the 
Tallóci, principally comprised of four brothers. By the later 1430s they dominated the 
management and the defence of the frontier. Upon Sigismund’s death in 1437, Matko Tallóci 
was the Count of Kevi , Ban of Slovenia, Dalmatia and Croatia and Franko Tallóci was the 
Captain of Belgrade and Ban of Severin. Jovan Tallóci was Prior of the Hospitallers in 
Hungary and Perko Tallóci later held major office under Sigismund’s successors.288 They 
proved to be highly effective administrators and military commanders, and were able to draw 
upon specialised expertise from their native city of Ragusa in order to support their 
campaigns against the Turks. Matko, for example, used Ragusan architects to improve the 
fortifications in Belgrade.
289
 In some cases, they tried to draw directly upon Ragusan military 
resources in their campaigns against the Turks. In 1436, for example, Matko requested two 
pieces of artillery with suitable equipment and arms for an expedition against a lord who had 
allied himself with a certain lord Zelapie Teucro.
290
 The Ragusans never did send the cannon, 
though they had a rather good excuse. Their armoury had exploded the year before, causing a 
great deal of damage and they simply had no cannon to give.
291
 
 The Turkish attacks of 1432 and the Hussite attacks in northern Hungary in the same 
year left an impression on Sigismund, and he submitted proposals outlining the military 
resources of the Kingdom of Hungary and how they were to be deployed.
292
 Though the 
defences around the Iron Gates and in Transylvania had given way in the summer of 1432, 
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they were soon restored, though fear of attack lingered. In May 1433, for example, Michael 
Jackch, Count of the Szeklers (1427-38), promised to help Braşov (Kronstadt) should the 
Turks attack.
293
 It would appear, however, that Turkish pressure in 1433 and 1434 turned out 
to be significantly less than in 1432. Perhaps because of this, Sigismund in 1434 felt 
confident enough to pursue a more proactive policy in Bosnia, perhaps in an effort to broaden 
the front on which he engaged the Turks. This allowed Sigismund to invest considerable 
resources in supporting Tvrtko in Bosnia and in securing the Kingdom of Hungary’s south 
western flank. A document dated 27 June 1435 recounts the campaigning which Matko 
Tallóci undertook there contra sevissimos Turcos the previous summer with a force of 1117 
lances (mille centum ac decem et septem lancearum).
294
 The military effectiveness of 
Sigismund’s banderial system is clear, as in one season Matko and his banderium were able 
to reconquer the critical fortresses of Jajce and Bihác as well as many other fortresses 
(Jayischa… et Bochach… et alia multa castra), and leave them provisioned with supplies and 
munitions (fortalicia et municionis in eodem regno… apparavit).295 Though these gains were 
impressive Sigismund simply could not afford to station Matko and over a thousand lances in 
Bosnia on a permanent basis, as by 1435 they were needed elsewhere, notably along the 
Danube near Belgrade and in Transylvania.   
 Pressing his aims in Bosnia thus slipped down his list once again, and in 1435 a 
Turkish force of 1500 men would roll back many of the gains made by Matko the year 
before.
296
 However, the subsequent years would prove that Sigismund’s decision to 
downgrade the defence of Bosnia in favour of supporting the Danube frontier and his 
Wallachian allies was the correct choice. Even without the control of the so called passus 
Bosne, Sigismund was able to establish an effective defensive system on the Kingdom of 
Hungary’s south western frontier with only a handful of fortresses and a reform of military 
organisation in the area.
297
 A contemporary list of castles and towns drawn up in 1437 notes 
the three fortresses along the Bosnian frontier which were still in Hungarian hands as Jajce, 
Komothyn and Bihác, meaning that at least two of Matko’s conquests in 1434 had been 
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held.
298
 Sigismund, by arranging three marches dug deep into the banates of Slavonia and 
Croatia and centred behind notable fortresses, was able to provide for his kingdom’s security 
in that area.
299
 
 Throughout 1435 and 1436 the Ottomans continued to put pressure on Sigismund’s 
southern frontier, though the impact which their incursions had, if any, is difficult to 
ascertain. John of Ragusa (c. 1380- c. 1440), a legate of the Council of Basle present in 
Constantinople,  wrote two letters in February 1436, one to the synod and the other to 
Cardinal Julian Cesarini (1398-1444).
300
 In both these letters and in colourful language, he 
emphasised how the Turks were laying waste to Hungary and enslaving Christians by the tens 
of thousands and deporting them to Asia.
301
 It is difficult to find sources that can support 
these disaster stories, and the reality of the situation on the frontier seems to have been much 
more stable. 1435 and 1436 saw Sigismund shift his attention away from Bosnia once again, 
in favour of the Danube frontier and Wallachia. Rumours circulating in Nuremberg in April 
1436 suggested that Sigismund had based himself in Szeged in order to see to affairs 
regarding the Turks.
302
 Although Szeged is noted as being on the border between Hungary 
and Serbia, which is clearly inaccurate, Sigismund was indeed in Szeged at that time and his 
correspondence in April shows that he was attending to the defence of his border.
303
 In a 
letter of 22 April 1436, for example, Sigismund dealt with issues regarding the taxation of 
ecclesiastical property, as the money was needed to support forces that were to fight the 
Turks.
304
 Though the chronology is unclear, it would appear that it was in 1436 that 
Alexander Aldea, the Voivode of Wallachia, died. His successor was Vlad II Dracul, and 
Sigismund worked to ensure that he remained on the throne in the face of Turkish pressure. 
Details of campaigning are scarce, but evidence from after Sigismund’s reign would suggest 
that Sigismund had endowed Vlad with property and strongholds in Hungary, both to support 
his campaigning against the Turks and to provide a place of refuge should he have to flee 
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Wallachia.
305
 Meanwhile, Matko Tallóci campaigned against Turkish allies towards 
Dalmatia.
306
 
 The Turkish threat was clearly on Sigismund’s mind throughout this period, and it is 
unfair to suggest, as Szakály does, that Sigismund ‘focussed his attention on west European 
policy’ to the detriment of the fight against the Turks.307 It was towards the end of 1436 that 
Sigismund embarked upon one of his more bizarre ideas to buttress his efforts against the 
Ottomans, and began lobbying for the ecclesiastical council at Basle to be moved to Buda, an 
idea which will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. Though the reasons and 
justifications Sigismund gave for such a move can appear quite humorous, Sigismund 
emphasised above all how it would help him fight the Turks, as he argued that by placing the 
council closer to the power of the Turks, he would have a better chance of organising a great 
campaign against them. 
 The last year of Sigismund’s reign saw Sigismund draw upon Bohemian expertise in 
his fight against the Turks. The Battle of Lipany on 30 May 1434 significantly reduced the 
strength of the Taborite and Orphan factions in Bohemia and paved the way for the signing of 
the Compactata in 1436, which allowed Sigismund to secure his position as King of 
Bohemia. The point has been made that his power was never secure in Bohemia and that his 
authority was merely nominal. A gang known only by the amusing title of the ‘Young Ladies 
of Bohemia’ brazenly kidnapped and ransomed his loyal servant, Walter von Schwarzenberg, 
while he was in Bohemia in November 1436.
308
 Similarly, if Thuróczy is to be believed, 
Sigismund felt that he needed to leave Bohemia before he died, as he feared that his 
Hungarian nobles would be attacked and robbed if they were to be found in Bohemia after his 
death.
309
 
 Nevertheless, Sigismund’s position was not so weak that he was unable to draw upon 
Bohemian military expertise against the Turks. Writing from Prague in February 1437, 
Sigismund commanded Peter Cseh, the Voivode of Siebenbürgen (1436-1437), to be ready to 
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resist the Turks.
310
 He went on to say that he was planning a great expedition of his own, 
which would involve a great army of Bohemians (ingenti Bohemorum exercitu).
311
 This 
expedition will be explored in detail in chapter three, but, in brief, it involved a joint 
Bohemian, Hungarian and Austrian force striking deep into Ottoman territory that same 
summer. There they burnt numerous Turkish ships and, during their return, defeated the Beg 
of Vidin in battle.
312
 Jefferson has speculated, that if Sigismund’s plan was ‘to bring the 
forces of his various realms to bear against the Turks, it was a policy the elder monarch 
would never realise’.313 The campaign of 1437 shows precisely that he was able to bring the 
forces of his various realms together to bear against the Turks, uniting Taborites from 
Bohemia, naval resources from his subjects in the Reich and Hungarian troops into one force 
for a campaign against the Ottomans. Admittedly, he was only able to draw upon the 
resources of Bohemia for a very short period of time. Sigismund’s ability to draw upon the 
resources of the Reich, however, was far longer lasting, and it is to this theme that this thesis 
will now turn. 
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Chapter 2. Courtly Ceremony, Councils and Chivalric Orders: Sigismund and the 
Publicising of the Turkish Threat 
 
This chapter will explore Sigismund’s use of spectacle and propaganda to raise awareness of 
the Turkish threat as the Roman King and Holy Roman Emperor. It will demonstrate the skill 
and finesse with which Sigismund approached his task of raising awareness of the Turkish 
threat, both in his German lands and throughout Christendom. It will do so through 
underlining the more nuanced and less apparent ways in which Sigismund exercised and 
displayed his authority as Roman King in order to raise the profile of the Turkish threat. After 
an introduction, several relevant case studies of Sigismund’s ceremony will be explored 
before focussing on Sigismund’s use of his chivalric order, the Order of the Dragon. 
Afterwards the chapter will turn to the figure of Mossen Borra and then to Sigismund’s 
attitude towards the Council of Basle before concluding. 
There has been a significant amount of literature on the impact that the fall of 
Constantinople to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (1451-1481) in 1453 had on the perception 
of the Turks among contemporary European rulers. Historians, such as Karoline Döring, 
Matthias Thumser and Dieter Mertens, have argued that the fall of the city to the Turks 
marked the beginning of an intense reaction on the part of Christian rulers in the west to the 
Turkish threat.
314
 This manifested itself in courtly contexts, notably Philip’s feast of the 
Pheasant, but also in learned texts, orations and humanist discourse.
315
 Historians, such as 
Jonathan Harris and Anthony Bryer, have underlined other strategies pursued by crusade 
propagandists to heighten the awareness of the Turkish threat after the fall of 
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Constantinople.
316
 These included the use of Greek refugees to help sell crusade indulgences 
in England, as well as the display of exotic easterners by Franciscans in order to generate 
interest in launching campaigns against the Ottoman Turks.
317
 This focus on the period after 
1453 has obscured Sigismund’s own efforts in raising awareness of the Turkish threat. 
Moreover, Sigismund sought to spread awareness of the Turkish threat not through the 
medium of Latin but through the German vernacular. As the vast majority of research in this 
field has usually focused on humanist discourse, most often conducted in Latin, Sigismund’s 
attempts to advertise the Turkish threat in his German vernacular have gone relatively 
unnoticed.
318
 As the chapter will demonstrate, Sigismund, a generation before the fall of 
Constantinople and the birth of ‘Turcica’ as a literary form, was attempting to spread 
awareness of the Turkish threat and the peril in which Christendom lay through various 
means.
319
 
A few points should be made before discussing Sigismund’s courtly behaviour and 
ceremony and its links with the advertisement of the Turkish threat. Numerous works of 
literature on Sigismund’s diplomatic activity in the west have mentioned how one of 
Sigismund’s key aims was to generate aid for his campaigns against the Turks, but then 
ignore totally his use of ceremony in aid of this.
320
 It would seem that historians have not 
connected Sigismund’s use of ceremony as Roman King and Kaiser with the advertisement 
of the Turkish threat at all. Gustav Beckmann’s short but brilliant exploration of Sigismund’s 
plan to move Christendom into making a combined effort against the Turks, largely focused 
upon the years 1410-1415, features little or no mention of ceremony.
321
 Anna Maria Drabek 
in her study on imperial ceremony in the later middle ages includes dances and jousts and 
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other similar activities during diplomatic congresses or meetings under the sub-heading of 
‘festivities and distractions’.322 For Sigismund they were certainly not distractions. 
This all seems strange, for historians have had no problem in linking the courtly 
events and ceremony of, for example, Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy (1419-1467) or 
Frederick III, King of the Romans and Kaiser (1440/1452-1493), with the advertisement of 
Turkish threat.
323
 It has been recently pointed out by Housley that in the second half of the 
fifteenth century ‘Hungary does not appear to have had an equivalent to Philip the Good’s 
Feast of the Pheasant or Maximilians’s Society of St George’.324 This was certainly so, but 
the same cannot be said for the first half of the fifteenth century. As we will see, the 
diplomatic correspondence and chronicle accounts generated in the wake of Sigismund’s 
courtly events, diplomatic congresses and other such spectacles give the impression that the 
ceremony surrounding Sigismund as Roman King and the advertisement of the Turkish threat 
went hand in hand. Sigismund, much like the Duke of Burgundy at the famous Feast of the 
Pheasant of 1454, used courtly ceremony as an effective means to make Christendom aware 
of the Turkish threat. The difference here, however, is that Sigismund made good on his 
promise to fight the Turks and encouraged members of his audience to do the same. 
It has also been argued that Sigismund was not influenced that greatly by 
contemporary crusading ideals.
325
 This seems odd as Sigismund, even on his death bed, was 
said to be in despair for he was about to die having never made good on his vow to visit the 
Holy Land.
326
 Though the longing to visit the Holy Land upon one’s death bed is rather 
clichéd, this chapter will show how the ideals surrounding sanctified warfare and crusading 
were critical in Sigismund’s presentation of the Turkish threat, a fact which his 
contemporaries picked up on also.
327
 Sigismund’s crusade posturing, far from being unsuited 
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to the political and ideological environment of the early fifteenth century as a recent historian 
has argued, was actually of direct benefit to his wars against the Turks.
328
 
2.1 Sigismund, the Roman Kingship, and the fight against the Turks 
At the outset, it is worth tackling the point of whether Sigismund purposefully sought 
to use the status that came with his Roman Kingship to bolster his efforts against the Turks. 
One could of course argue that Sigismund did not purposely seek to use his power as Roman 
King to raise awareness of the Turkish threat and the plight of Hungary; that to suggest that 
Sigismund deliberately sought to use the Roman crown to garner more power to fight the 
Turks is to be far too generous. In fact, one could easily argue that he secured the Roman 
crown merely to increase his prestige and that his attempt, if one ever existed, to utilise his 
status as the King of the Romans to fight the Turks was one of mere opportunism. A letter of 
Sigismund, written at the beginning of his reign as King of the Romans, indicates that the 
fight against the Turks and the Roman crown, in Sigismund’s mind at least, were inextricably 
linked. This letter carries no date for the original does not survive, and we are reliant on the 
copy which survives in a codex now in the Vatican Library.
329
 It is highly likely that it comes 
from the time of the Council of Constance and it is addressed to an unknown figure in 
Constantinople.
330
 In this letter, after emphasising how the blasphemers have overrun the 
entirety of Asia and the east (totum asye ac orientis), Sigismund moves on to discuss his 
plans to aid the ‘city of Constantinople against the Turks’.331 Here, Sigismund explicitly links 
his Roman crown with the fight against the infidels, when he notes that  
truly to this end we have taken up the summit of the Kingdom of the Romans, so that 
we should therefore be able to bring about... a passagium generale against the infidels 
more easily and harmoniously.
332
  
In Sigismund’s mind at least, a combined effort against the Turks was made habilius et 
convenientius when the Roman crown was on his head. It is easy to see why Sigismund 
believed his Roman Kingship could make the organisation of a united effort against the Turks 
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easier to achieve. His status as Roman King and later, as Holy Roman Emperor, made him 
the secular head of Christendom and imbued him with a prestige and status far greater than he 
had simply as the King of Hungary. His coronation as King of the Romans also imbued him 
with a duty to combat the infidels in defence of Christendom, a duty he sought to fulfil in 
1412 when he convened his first diplomatic congress as Roman King.
333
 
 
 
2.2 Diplomatic events, crusading and marriages 
The first great diplomatic event which Sigismund held as Roman King was the so 
called Congress of Buda in April and May 1412.
334
 Sigismund had of course gathered kings 
and princes and other notables in Hungary before, precisely to negotiate for help in his fights 
against the Turks. However this council was different. The Congress of Buda, organised as it 
was by the now Roman King elect, the secular head of Christendom, was a truly international 
event.
335
 A contemporary description of the various rulers and emissaries present 
demonstrates this.
336
 This report, compiled for the benefit of the city council of Frankfurt, 
notes the presence of three kings, three captains of three lands, a despot, 13 dukes, 21 counts, 
26 lords and 1500 knights, 4000 servants, a cardinal, a legate, three archbishops and 11 other 
bishops.
337
 There were over 17 tongues present in the camp and representatives from over 19 
lands. These included, among others, Englishmen, Turks, Jews from the ‘Holy Sepulchre and 
even many ghastly pagans with long beards, great bellies and high hats’, whoever they may 
have been.
338
 Windecke’s account of the congress gives similar numbers of attendees and 
implies that the event was suitably catered for, with one hunt alone resulting in the slaughter 
and cooking of 612 animals.
339
 
 The main issue on Sigismund’s agenda at the Congress of Buda was to broker a 
lasting peace between the Teutonic Order and the Kingdom of Poland in the aftermath of the 
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Battle of Tannenberg (sometimes referred to as Grunwald) which had taken place in July 
1410.
340
 However, Sigismund made clear that he had a broader motivation behind securing 
this peace in a letter of April 1412 which he addressed to various towns throughout the Reich. 
He states in the letter how he considers the Teutonic Order to be the ‘strong shield of 
Christendom’, and how damaging warfare between the Order and the King of Poland truly 
was.
341
 Sigismund’s ultimate goal behind these peace negotiations was, as he continues, ‘so 
that we, the aforesaid king together with the [Teutonic] Order faithfully [can] help against the 
unbelievers, from which much good will come for Christendom’.342 That by unbelievers 
Sigismund means the Turks is clear from a statement made later in the letter, where he claims 
that he had spoken to King of Poland about this ‘and that he shall and indeed wants to help us 
against the Turks and other unbelievers with his entire force’.343 Beckmann is certainly 
correct when he underlines how it was Sigismund’s so-called ‘Orientpolitik’, his attempts to 
combat the Turks in the east, that was the main influence on his convening of the Congress of 
Buda. A Venetian report of March reflects the Turkish focus of the negotiations, and relays 
how the Polish King apparently told Sigismund of ‘his intention to fight against the 
Infidels’.344 It is clear then, that being the Roman King and organising the resistance to the 
Turkish threat went hand in hand from the very beginning of his kingship. 
Another letter, written around seven years after the Congress of Buda, is worth 
mentioning in this context too, if only for the bizarre spin it places on the Roman King’s 
crusading plans. In the Ordensbriefarchiv there survives a peculiar letter sent by the Komtur 
of Koblenz to the Grandmaster, Michael Kuchenmeister, dated to April 8 1419.
345
 This letter 
served to inform the Grandmaster of the various goings on in the region and what follows is 
rather mundane stuff. So mundane, in fact, that at first sight it would appear to bear no 
relevance to this chapter (or this thesis) at all. The Komtur reports how, among other things, 
that there seems to be a lack of ships in the area and that this may cause him difficulty in the 
near future when transporting shipments of wine. He goes on to reveal that feuding between 
some minor nobility in the local area has resulted in some violence. This has, among other 
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things, had the unfortunate effect of damaging some of the Order’s possessions. Eventually 
the Komtur turns to more distant matters and reports on the activities of Sigismund, der 
roemsche conyng. At this point the Komptur’s prose thankfully begins to liven up, as he then 
moves on to spinning out a garbled and fantastical account of the goings on in Sigismund’s 
court. He first reports that one has heard 
in the king’s court that the Roman King has deprived the Duke of Austria of his 
daughter and has given [him instead] a pagan queen sat in Hungary, which he had 
commanded from his land in his absence while he was in Germany.
346
 
This mysterious heydennische conynge, the Komtur continues, is then revealed to be someone 
with whom the Roman King himself has allied, to gather their power this summer and 
so to attempt, whether they may gain the Holy Sepulchre.
347
 
The Komtur would appear to be suggesting that the Roman King has allied with a non-
Christian princess with the intention of going on some form of crusade expedition, for their 
aim, as he clearly states, was das heilige graff, the Holy Sepulchre. The Komtur then reports 
that this is, however, a ruse, for  
with real concern it is feared, that their plan is perhaps not to gain the Holy Sepulchre 
but to lay waste to our order and its land, oh God forbid.
348
 
This short account raises many questions. Such an event or even rumours of such an 
event do not feature, as far as one can tell, in other items of contemporary correspondence or 
chronicles.
349
 Where on earth did the Komtur get such a rumour from and why did he see 
such a negative ulterior motive behind Sigismund’s plan to retake the Holy Sepulchre? 
Sigismund’s attitude toward the Order was often erratic, but would Sigismund really consider 
attacking Order territory, especially with the support of a pagan princess?  
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Whatever the case, in two respects this report would appear to be reading Sigismund’s 
intentions relatively correctly. Firstly, Sigismund, as this chapter will demonstrate, made no 
secret of his desire to fight the enemies of Christendom. Winning back the Holy Land, das 
heilige graff, was shorthand for fighting the Turks and it formed a consistent part of 
Sigismund’s rhetoric that presented itself in numerous guises.350 The extent to which we can 
discern a comprehensive and well-thought out plan on the part of Sigismund to be the leader 
of a united Christendom against the Turks is debatable, but the ideal remained a critical part 
of his rhetoric and appears in bursts in his correspondence throughout his reign as Roman 
King and Holy Roman Emperor.
351
 That the Komtur heard and chose to report this particular 
tale is significant, for it demonstrates that Sigismund’s zeal to retake the Holy Land was 
known outside the limited audience of his letters and orations. 
Secondly, in terms of Sigismund’s marriage politics, the Komtur’s rendering of the 
king as a ruler willing to use his daughter as a diplomatic pawn within the context of crusade 
planning is not too far off the truth. At first sight the idea that Sigismund would wish to 
cancel the planned marriage between his daughter, Elizabeth, and the Duke of Austria, seems 
rather outlandish. Why would Sigismund deprive Albert, the Duke of Austria, of his 10 year 
old daughter? Albert had been promised Elizabeth eight years previously, an honour which 
Sigismund was charging the duke a considerable sum of money for.
352
 However, Sigismund 
did approach Elizabeth’s marriage with some flexibility. While narrating events of 1421/1422 
Windecke notes how a part of Sigismund’s council advised Sigismund that he should give his 
daughter not to Duke Albert, but to the ‘son of the Turkish Emperor’ instead (des Durken 
keisers sone)
353
. Failing that, as Windecke continues, the suggestion that Sigismund should 
give his daughter to Duke Sigismund, the Grand Duke of Lithuania’s son in law, perhaps in 
the attempt to stop him supporting the Hussites, was also present in Sigismund’s court.354  
Assessing how reliable the content of Windecke’s chronicle is can be highly 
problematic, but he enjoyed personal contact with Sigismund and he may have been present 
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or at least have known people who were present at the sort of meetings where these issues 
were discussed. However, there is evidence from Sigismund himself which reinforces the 
idea that he was willing to use his daughter as a pawn in his drive to secure aid against the 
Turks. In a letter of 1416, for example, Sigismund himself stated that he was willing to marry 
his daughter to one of the French King’s sons if this would provide peace between France and 
England.
355
 Sigismund was willing to use his daughter in such a way as securing peace was a 
vital prerequisite for a crusade and, as Sigismund stated himself in the same letter, he needed 
peace in Christendom so that  
we may make a passagium generale against the barbarian nations and the 
blasphemers and enemies of the name of Christ and so we may set in order our 
attempted exercise and arms in the name of the lord.
356
 
In the same year Sigismund also said that he wanted the King of Poland to marry his daughter 
to the son of the Turkish Sultan, although what the King of Poland (or the Turkish Sultan for 
that matter) thought of this is unknown.
357
 As an aside, Sigismund may actually have had a 
Turkish princess at his disposal in Buda. Much like other western powers, Sigismund took 
advantage of Ottoman dynastic struggles and gave asylum to renegade Ottoman royalty.
358
 
Around 1400 he gave shelter to a branch of the Ottoman dynasty and the presence of a certain 
‘illustrious lady Katherine, daughter of Morath Beg, Emperor of the Turks of the Ottoman 
house’ in Hungary during Sigismund’s time is well attested.359 She even had her own stone 
house in Buda, although in 1419 she would have been very young or even not yet born at all. 
The Komtur’s tale then, may in fact be true.360 In short and despite a bizarre spin, the Komtur 
of Koblenz’s report reveals Sigismund’s underlying intention; to combat the infidel threat 
using whatever means possible.  
Leaving the Komtur’s bizarre twist aside, one can see that Sigismund used a whole 
range of measures, techniques and guises as the Roman King to spread awareness of the 
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Turkish threat and to generate the aid he required in order to withstand it. This did not just 
involve letter writing or marriage politics, for Sigismund’s favourite combination of dance, 
drink and ladies were also weapons in the fight against the Ottomans. 
 
2.3 Paris, Rome, Perpignan and Nuremberg: Raising awareness of the Turkish threat 
throughout Christendom 
Sigismund’s behaviour at courtly events could be highly erratic and unpredictable, 
especially when dancing, ladies and alcohol were involved. Nevertheless, the advertisement 
of the Turkish threat was a common element after 1410. One example is particularly 
instructive. In February of 1416 a certain Ulrich Meiger, a notary of Strasbourg, was 
dispatched to Sigismund in order to discuss the confirmation of various town privileges 
which only the Roman King could confirm.
361
 Ulrich was received by Sigismund in Paris one 
evening, but the King of the Romans was in no mood to talk business and wanted to only talk 
about ladies. This should come as no surprise, for ladies, while travelling in the west, in 
places as far apart as Avignon, Strasbourg and London, seemed to be the main object of his 
attention. The observation of the courtly poet and servant of Sigismund, Oswald von 
Wolkenstein (c. 1377-1445), that wer zwaiung an den frauen gelaint, wir hetten uns leicht ee 
veraint (‘if the Schism had involved ladies, we would have achieved unity sooner’) may be a 
little tongue-in-cheek, but does nevertheless point to Sigismund’s eye for the ladies.362 
Sigismund’s behaviour in Paris involved a heady mix of drunken balls, shocking audiences 
with his impromptu singing and dancing and generally dazzling onlookers with his gregarious 
and lascivious behaviour. So when Sigismund received Ulrich in his chamber he continued in 
a similar fashion, and for the benefit of Ulrich and his assembled audience he began speaking 
at length about the ladies in Strasburg and how he had never been made so happy by such a 
group of lovely ladies during his last visit to the city.  
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Ulrich had clearly come prepared. He softened Sigismund up by joining him in his 
discussion about the ladies, an action which made Sigismund ‘especially friendly’.363 He then 
revealed that he had brought with him a letter for Sigismund, a frowen brief as he called it, 
from the very ladies of Strasbourg who had so impressed the king in the summer of 1414. 
Sigismund asked Ulrich to read the letter out immediately and he took great pleasure in 
hearing its contents. Upon learning that Ulrich bore a special piece of jewellery, a piece of 
frowen cleinat as he called it, from the ladies of his town as a gift for their king, Sigismund 
went into overdrive. He commanded his servants and attendants to join him in his chamber, 
where he then proudly declared that he would make the ladies of London, whom he was 
about to go and visit, send numerous gifts to the ladies of Strasbourg.
364
 After this Sigismund 
commanded everyone to start dancing, placed the frowen cleinat on his neck and, as Ulrich 
records, launched into speech: 
now, God willing, with this jewellery I will from today for a year move against the 
Turks and whoever wishes to fight with the Turks, be it through God, through honour 
or on account of a lady, should remain for this time with me…365 
As Meiger reports, this was one of many speeches which Sigismund made that day (beschach 
vil rede da) yet it was the only one which he thought fit to record in his letter. This short 
speech is important in the context of this chapter for several reasons. It is curious that Meiger 
has been the subject of one specific study by Hans Kaiser and a significant element in the 
work of Oliver Daldrup and that his account of Sigismund’s speech about fighting the Turks 
is not mentioned in either.
366
 Daldrup has used the letters of Meiger to come to some 
interesting conclusions in a recent monograph on diplomacy and diplomatic practice in the 
Reich during Sigismund’s time. Daldrup argues that the content of Meiger’s letters reinforce 
how the political issues of the Reich never left Sigismund’s eyes.367 This conclusion is 
unconvincing. Meiger’s letters show how Sigismund’s obsession with ladies and desire to 
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advertise the Turkish threat came to the fore precisely when he should have been considering 
matters of the Reich, in this case the privileges of Strasbourg. When Meiger’s report of his 
time at Sigismund’s court in Paris is considered as a whole, a very different impression is 
gained from the one forwarded by Hans Kaiser and Daldrup.
368
 Sigismund appears less 
concerned with the Reich and more with ladies and the Turkish threat. This historiographic 
emphasis, which tends to obscure Sigismund’s focus on the Turkish threat in favour of his 
focus on political issues in the Reich is one that surfaces frequently. With Meiger’s speech 
and further examples, it is hoped that this chapter can redress this balance and restore the 
Turkish threat to the fore of Sigismund’s thinking and diplomatic activity, particularly while 
travelling in the west. 
Sigismund’s speech, as reported by Meiger, helps to underline how he was actively 
seeking to spread awareness of the Turkish through a means which historians have 
traditionally not focused upon. Sigismund was in wide correspondence between 1410 and 
1415, with everyone from kings such as Henry IV of England and Charles VI of France all 
the way down to rather junior members of the clergy in Hungary. These letters do indeed 
make a point of stressing the threat of the Turks.
369
 As well as individual letters targeting 
particular princes or prelates, Sigismund also sent a circular letter in August 1415 to, among 
others, the Kings of England, Aragon, France, Duke Ernest of Austria and the Counts of 
Savoy.
370
 Its circulation was clearly greater than its stated address list, for a copy ended up in 
Venice too. During the Council of Constance the synod itself sent letters to the various 
princes and rulers in Christendom, reminding their readers of the monstrosities which the 
Turks were daily subjecting Christians to in Hungary.
371
 Sigismund would, in fact, write 
similar letters throughout the rest of his reign. These efforts certainly did raise awareness of 
the Turkish threat and Hungary’s dire position, but they only did so among the ruling classes 
of Christendom.
372
 Sigismund’s speech in Paris as recorded by Meiger, made in the German 
vernacular, demonstrates a commitment to raise awareness of the Turkish threat beyond the 
limited circle of people that received his letters. The speech was made in late February 1416 
and it was by no means the only courtly event during which Sigismund deliberately sought to 
advertise the Turkish threat.  
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If we skip ahead twenty or so years, Sigismund was doing precisely the same thing 
but in a very different context; notably during the festivities surrounding his coronation as 
emperor in Rome in the summer of 1433. Sigismund’s sojourn in Italy culminated in his 
imperial coronation in Rome in May 1433 and its splendour and spectacle attracted numerous 
comments from contemporary observers. Of particular interest to contemporary chroniclers 
and letter writers was Sigismund’s extensive retinue of lords, prelates, knights, servants and 
hangers on, drawn from throughout his kingdoms and lands of Hungary, Bohemia, Italy and 
Germany. Some chroniclers noted with interest the Turkish representatives in his retinue and 
others, such as the mysterious Ertogod, excited some interesting comments.
373
 The town 
chronicler of Viterbo notes the presence in Sigismund’s company of ‘the Englishman 
Ertogod, who was 120 years old and who knew more about arms than a young man and who 
had never committed a carnal sin. He was a virgin and a great lord of England and was one of 
the nine leading lords of the world’.374 
 Whoever this aged and virginal expert fighter of an Englishman may have been, while 
an interesting avenue of enquiry, is not important in this context. Having these interesting 
people in your retinue got people talking and interested in what was going on. To take later 
examples, Greek refugees accompanied the Archbishop of Ravenna when he visited England 
in 1455.
375
 In another case, Ludovico da Bologna’s travels around Europe between 1460-1, 
aimed at engineering a crusade against the Turks, attracted a great deal of attention from 
contemporaries.
376
 This was mostly because his embassies were replete with some rather 
bizarre Georgian and Anatolian representatives. One group of them drew attention from one 
chronicler because together they managed to eat 20lbs of meat a day, and other 
representatives, such as the flute playing envoy of lesser Cilicia or the astrological expert 
who claimed to be an envoy of Prester John, drew equal amounts of attention.
377
 In 
Sigismund’s case, the journey of a Roman King to Rome to receive the Imperial crown was 
an event that had not been repeated since 1368 and the Holy Roman Emperor elect was 
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taking full advantage of the crowds and the spectacle.
378
 One act of ceremony, notably his 
personal baptism of Petro de Orasteia, helps demonstrate this. 
 For information on Petro de Orasteia’s baptism we are reliant on one source, Petro’s 
own supplication to Pope Eugenius IV which survives in the Registra Supplicationum and 
dated to July 13, 1433.
379
 Petro records how he had previously been of the Greek rite but on 
June 7 he had been baptised into the Catholic faith by the Holy Roman Emperor himself (per 
eundem dominum imperatorem fuit baptizatus) in a ceremony conducted in St Peter’s 
Basilica in Rome.
380
 Sigismund had been crowned as Holy Roman Emperor the week before 
on May 31, 1433, and this public baptism may have been seen as a continuation of the 
festivities and celebrations of the past few weeks.
381
 Petro’s supplication reveals that he had 
enjoyed a particularly interesting career in Sigismund’s service and a career that the Holy 
Roman Emperor would have liked to publicise for others to emulate and follow. Petro was a 
knight of Sigismund who had fought ‘for the defence of the catholic and faith and the defence 
of Christians against the most perfidious and infidel Turks and the heretical Hussites’.382 
Petro had an interesting background for a knight of Sigismund. He had clearly first entered 
Sigismund’s service some time before and while still an adherent of the Greek rite. After 
serving against Sigismund’s Turkish and Hussite enemies for several years he had 
accompanied Sigismund to Rome where he was baptised into the Latin rite. His supplication 
asked for him to be cleansed of all sin on account of his services to Christendom, a request 
that was granted by the Papacy. 
Where Petro had originally come from is hard to tell. The supplication does not 
explicitly identify Petro’s native diocese and his father’s name, Blasii de Orastiia, does not 
provide any geographical hint as to where he may have hailed from. A further supplication of 
his, however, which asks for the grant of indulgences to support the rebuilding of a church, 
dedicated to Saint Demetrius the Martyr of Thessalonica, perhaps reveals a Greek influence. 
This church, however, is stated to be in the diocese Chanadiensis, centred upon Csanád 
(modern day Cenad, in Romania) in the southern parts of the Hungarian Kingdom and is not 
likely to have been his birth place. Where Petro came from, therefore, is not possible to 
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ascertain. He could have been from the Byzantine Empire or from much closer, perhaps from 
the Orthodox populations of Serbia or Transylvania. 
As Kondor as argued, there could also be a broader significance behind this baptism, 
especially when Sigismund’s personal interest in union between the Catholic and Orthodox 
faith is considered.
383
 Sigismund interest in the Church union was well known and, contrary 
to Kondor’s view, did not necessarily present itself in fits and bursts.384 It would appear that 
Sigismund remained a strong proponent for Church union through his entire reign, even if his 
desire for union did not regularly present itself in his own correspondence. Długosz records 
the highly amusing tale of Sigismund debating the merits of the Orthodox rite while at Lutsk 
in 1429. Sigismund proclaimed that the only things separating the Greeks from the Latins 
were beards and wives (barbis duntaxat et uxoribus a nobis secreti sunt).
385
 He then went on 
to joke that the issues surrounding the clerical taking of wives was more a problem for the 
Latins, as the Greeks were content to take just one wife each, while Latin clerics usually took 
ten or more! What his fellow Latins made of this joke is anyone’s guess, but Sigismund’s 
audience, in this case a group of Ruthenian nobles, enjoyed it immensely.
386
 Sigismund’s 
firm belief in union surfaced in other situations, as is implied by a letter of Johann Karschau, 
a cleric of the Teutonic Order present at the Council of Basle. In September 1437 he notes to 
his Grandmaster how it was the ‘Kaiser’s opinion, that the Greeks be one with us Latins’.387 
Karschau reports in the same letter that Sigismund also wanted to unite the Order of St. John 
with the Teutonic Order and to place them in Hungary ‘against the Turks’ (widdir die 
Torken). Clearly then, unions were close to Sigismund’s heart. Perhaps Sigismund’s public 
baptism of Petro was to show his explicit support for Church union. Church union would, 
after all, make the organisation of a joint crusade and military effort against the Turks even 
easier. Sigismund’s successor as King of Hungary and Roman King, Albrecht II, was 
supposedly overjoyed when he heard that union negotiations were almost at an end. In a letter 
dated to September 3, 1439, and written while on campaign against the Turks, Albert notes 
how these successful negotiations are most useful for Christendom and will spur him on to 
even greater efforts against the barbarians who he was currently engaging.
388
 Sigismund’s 
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display and baptism of Petro could be said to be a rather positive symbolic action. By 
showing off a successful and triumphant knight, Sigismund was underlining the rewards and 
spiritual prizes which one could receive if they were to fight in his service against his infidel 
enemies.  
Our next case study comes, so to speak, from the other side of the struggle, and 
involves Sigismund’s display of a captured Turkish king to Iberian royalty and nobility. 
Speeches and public baptisms were not the only methods which Sigismund drew upon to 
raise awareness of the Turkish threat. In some cases Sigismund used slightly more niche 
means to underline how he struggled on behalf of Christendom against the Turks. 
Sigismund’s entrance into Perpignan in September 1415, which then was technically within 
the Kingdom of Aragon, was an ostentatious event and attended by dignitaries and emissaries 
from across Christendom.
389
 It is noteworthy that the set piece event of Sigismund’s entry 
into Perpignan involved the Roman King showing off a supposedly Turkish prisoner to the 
assembled crowd.
390
 A chronicle of John II’s reign, King of Castile and Leon (1406-1454), 
composed by Álvar Garciá de Santa María (1370-1460), reports on Sigismund’s entry in the 
most detail.
391
  
 The reason for Sigismund’s visit to Perpignan, as Garciá’s chronicle makes clear in 
numerous repetitions in the preceding chapters, was to negotiate with the King of Aragon for 
the successful ‘union of the Church, which has been in schism for 36 years…, and so to bring 
order and peace to all of Christendom’.392 As we have seen, the healing of the Papal schism 
and the fight against the Turks were, in Sigismund’s mind at least, inextricably entwined. At 
Perpignan it was clear that the Emperador de los Romanos, as Garciá calls Sigismund, 
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intended not only to lay the groundwork for the abdication of Pedro de Luna, the renegade 
Antipope Benedict XII resident in Iberia, but also to raise awareness of the Turkish threat.
393
 
Sigismund was grandly received in Perpignan by Alfonso, the crown prince of 
Aragon, and was accompanied down the streets, specially carpeted for the occasion, with 
numerous nobles and prelates of the Iberian kingdoms.
394
 With Sigismund was a large retinue 
of 300 knights, fully armed and displaying ‘the arms of the Empire’, who entered the town to 
find the celebrations in full swing, with dances and other celebrations lining the streets.
395
 
Upon arriving at his prepared lodgings Sigismund was received at the entrance by a servant 
of his. This servant was, as the chronicler reports, none other than a ‘king of Turkey, who the 
emperor had captured in battle’.396 This so called Rey de Turqía was Sigismund’s sword 
bearer, who, after drawing and presenting his sword in front of the King, escorted him into 
his lodgings amid his escort of four crossbowmen, twenty five litter bearers and the 
accompanying music of three young musicians.
397
 Sigismund was careful not to appear too 
decadent, however, as the chronicler goes on to relate how Sigismund restricted himself to 
eating off plain tableware rather than his usual silver set, on account of the ‘schism in which 
the Church was’.398  
This ceremony was performed in front of a crowd which included, among others, 
Prince Alfonso, the future Alfonso V of Aragon (1416-1458) and nobles from across Iberia 
and southern France.
399
 It is not unreasonable to suggest that in this audience Sigismund saw 
potential crusaders whom he could rally to his cause in his fight against the Turks. The 
display of a Turkish prisoner whom he had captured in battle was certainly an overt symbol 
of the struggle which he had been waging on the Danube. That the chronicler explicitly says 
that Sigismund’s Turk was captured in battle is noteworthy. 400 It implies that when 
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contemporaries viewed Sigismund’s courtly events they were reminded of Sigismund’s 
fighting of the Turks and the military efforts in which he was engaged.  
This was not the only instance, however, of Sigismund bringing Turks to his courtly 
events held outside of Hungary order to spread awareness of the Ottoman threat for he did a 
similar thing 15 years later in Nuremberg. There is an extensive literature on Sigismund's 
holding of a Reichstag in Nuremberg in the spring of 1431. It was probably the best attended 
of all Reichstags in Sigismund's reign, with envoys and diplomats from across Christendom 
and, as we shall see, from even further afield in attendance.
401
 The vast majority of studies on 
this Reichstag rely upon the documents edited by Dietrich Kerler in the ninth volume of the 
Deutsche Reichstagsakten.
402
 He was highly selective in the documents which he included in 
this edition, and saw fit only to include documents of direct relevance to the Reich and 
Sigismund's attempt to combat the Hussites. This intense focus on the Reich has obscured the 
international scope of the Reichstag. When a broader base of sources is drawn upon, it is 
clear that Sigismund s deliberately sought to use this event to not only to raise the profile of 
the Turkish threat but as a platform from which to launch an ambitious plan to deal decisively 
with the Ottomans. Only one document included by Kerler, a list of expenses incurred by the 
city of Nuremberg, references the Turks. It records the rather generous gift of 16 quarts of 
wine to etlichen herren auß der Dürkgey.
403
 An exploration of who these lords of Turkey 
were yields interesting results. 
It has been argued that these lords of Turkey were not Turks at all, but instead were 
Wallachians in Sigismund’s retinue.404 However, a rather mysterious letter, preserved in a 
codex of diplomatic correspondence compiled c. 1450 by Albrecht Achilles, Margrave of 
Brandenburg (1440-1486), suggests otherwise.
405
 In between two entries regarding Hussite 
matters, dated March 1 and 18 1431 respectively, lies a letter from a certain Korolock der 
Tartar. This letter, translated into German from the Turkish, was from a certain Qara Yuluq 
who had appointed two of his subjects, both apparently called Niclas Turcken, to deliver it to 
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Sigismund in Nuremberg.
406
 Qara Yuluq was none other than the leader of the Turkish tribal 
confederation of the White Sheep, who ruled extensive lands to the east of the Ottoman 
Empire, largely centred on the northern areas of Mesopotamia. This letter was probably a 
result of negotiations between Sigismund and the Turkish prince.
407
 In this letter Qara Yuluq 
reveals that he plans to go on the offensive against the Ottoman Turks with his allies in Asia 
Minor, Egypt and Arabia, with the implication that Sigismund should do the same in the west 
in order to deliver the fatal blow to the Turks. Seen within the context of the Reichstag at 
Nuremberg in Spring 1431, this letter reveals that Sigismund was using this meeting to not 
just organise a combined effort against the Hussites but also to plan a campaign against the 
Turks. Archival research undertaken in Berlin has revealed that the Turkish element of the 
Nuremberg Reichstag was probably far stronger that it would appear from the published 
sources. For example Claus Redwitz, in a report to the Grandmaster dated to 27 April 1431 
and sent from Nuremberg, notes the coming and going of Turkish embassies, though it would 
appear these were from Amerat (Murad II), the Ottoman Sultan himself.
408
 
Seen alongside Sigismund’s other activities in 1430 and 1431, his invitation of two 
Turkish legates to Nuremberg in spring 1431 would appear to be part of a broader effort to 
raise the profile of the Turkish threat throughout Christendom. Beckmann’s research in the 
Bayerisches Staatsbibliothek has revealed two pieces of evidence important in this respect, 
though any comments on these must be brief as he cites archival evidence which has not 
since been published.
409
 In the winter of 1430 Sigismund dispatched an embassy to the Pope 
to ask for the Papal Tenth, marked down to be used against the Hussites, to also be put to use 
in helping the fight against the Turks. In August 1431 Sigismund dispatched the Bishop of 
Augsburg to the court of the French King, Charles VII, to deliver a speech imploring the king 
to support Sigismund against the Turks and other infidels.
410 
 A month later another embassy 
of Sigismund’s, sent directly from Nuremberg, was present in Venice. This embassy similarly 
implored the Venetians to join with the King of the Romans in the attempt to combat the 
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Turks.
411
 Overall, it would appear that Sigismund’s decision to travel into his German lands 
and to base himself in Nuremberg between 1430 and 1431 was not simply about combating 
the Hussite threat or to deal with German matters.
412
 It offered him further opportunities to 
raise the profile of the Turkish threat both in his German lands and throughout Christendom. 
2.4 The Order of the Dragon, its crusading indulgence and foreign membership 
It is worth comparing Sigismund’s courtly ceremony with that of other fifteenth 
century rulers. Much has been written on Philip the Good’s Feast of the Pheasant, his Order 
of the Golden Fleece and his programme, which ultimately never materialised, to combat the 
Turks. Historians, such as Adalbert Roth, have credited Philip the Good with devising 
innovative techniques to encourage his subjects to protect Christendom against infidel 
threats.
413
 Leaving aside the giant singing pies and the fire breathing dragon displayed during 
the Feast of the Pheasant, vividly described by Olivier de la Marche (1425-1502), Roth, for 
example, underlines how Philip utilised a range of court musicians and poets to produce and 
circulate songs and ballads to make his advertisement of the Turkish threat more potent.
414
 
This was done in connection with his Order of the Golden Fleece, itself with a clear 
crusading ethos.
415
 The above case studies of Sigismund’s courtly ceremony demonstrate that 
Sigismund, while in the West, was also at pains to advertise the Turkish in various languages 
and through various means. Much like Philip and as we will explore now, Sigismund also 
used his own chivalric order, the Order of the Dragon, in the attempt to organise an offensive 
against the Turks. 
In the case of chivalric orders Sigismund went a step further than Philip the Good. 
Before discussing this aspect of Sigismund’s courtly culture, a few points must be made 
about the Order of the Dragon. While there is a growing body of literature on the Order of the 
Dragon numerous issues remain barely touched upon. The Order of the Dragon was founded 
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by Sigismund in 1408 and all members were obliged, among other things, to support its 
founder in the fight contra paganos.
416
 The Order’s general history has been well researched. 
While there is an entry for the Order in Kruse’s and Kamenz’s Verzeichnis of later medieval 
knightly and chivalric orders which takes the form of a 52 point list, it does not analyse 
Sigismund’s use of the Order with any real complexity.417 In recent years numerous 
historians have analysed Sigismund’s use of the Order both inside and outside of Hungary as 
a political instrument during his reign and they all largely say the same thing. Boulton, 
Kintzinger, Erkens, Hoensch, among others, have all explored how Sigismund used the Order 
as a political tool with which he could consolidate his power base in Hungary.
418
 More 
specialist studies, by historians such as Popović and Schwedler, have explored how 
Sigismund used the Order to solidify his political and military relations with neighbouring 
rulers in Serbia, Bosnia and Wallachia.
419
  
They are all certainly correct. The Order of the Dragon was indeed critical in 
consolidating Sigismund’s power base in Hungary and in the Balkans. However, the Order’s 
impact on the international stage has been covered in far less detail. The next section of this 
chapter will explore how Sigismund used the Order within his diplomatic manoeuvres 
throughout Christendom and demonstrate that the Order’s significance was not merely 
restricted to Hungary and the Balkans. The Order of the Dragon was a vital means with 
which Sigismund spread the ideals of crusading and sanctified warfare in the name of 
Hungary. The Order served as another vehicle to advertise the Turkish threat, as well as a 
means with which Sigismund could subtly refashion and repackage warfare in the name of 
Christ against the Turks. 
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This can be most clearly seen in 1433, when Sigismund used the opportunity of his 
Imperial coronation to request numerous privileges from the Holy See.
420
 One particular 
supplication, entered twice into separate books now known as part of Registra 
Supplicationum, is perhaps of unique significance for the history of chivalric and military 
orders.
421
 Sigismund was able to convince Pope Eugenius IV to endow the Order of the 
Dragon with a crusading indulgence. Anyone who fought personally ‘against the Turks, 
schismatics, heretics and infidels’ under the aegis of the Order of the Dragon, ‘for the defence 
of the kingdom of Hungary in support of the lord Emperor’, would gain full remission of sins. 
 While the basic premise of the indulgence is clear - that those who fight for the 
Emperor and his successors with the Order of the Dragon will gain the same spiritual rewards 
as ‘those signed with the cross in the journey to acquire (passagio acquisicionis) the Holy 
Land’ - there are problems with the source material.422 There are two versions of the grant, 
both carrying different dates (both are dated in Rome, but one is dated to July 21, 1433 and 
the other to January 21, 1433) and both with different wordings and emphasis.
423
 Why this is 
so is somewhat puzzling, although the presence of two copies does help explain why the 
printed transcriptions of the confirmation published by Fraknói in 1893 and Fedalto in 1990 
differ slightly.
424
  
The transcription of Fedalto is fraught with problems. It is only a partial transcription 
yet even his partial transcription seems to have included words or phrases (such as plenam 
remissionem) and conjunctions and adverbs which are not actually on either of the registers. 
Fraknói’s transcription seems also to be only a partial one and differs slightly to that of 
Fedalto. After an inspection of the original archival material this is not unsurprising. While 
Fedalto references both copies of the supplication, his own partial transcription, which is 
highly dubious anyway, is only drawn from one copy.
425
 Fraknói seems to use the other 
version as his base, which, given the slight differences between the two and the distortions 
added by Fedalto in his own transcription, have resulted in the two different transcriptions of 
the same document. These problems aside, both supplications were recorded by the notaries 
in the Papal Chancery and both were confirmed by the Pope. As such, they both give an 
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insight into how Sigismund, present as he was in Rome for his Imperial coronation, sought to 
supplicate the Pope in order support his campaigns against Turks and his other enemies. 
 As a result of its significance for the chapter’s arguments, the supplication which 
carries the later date of July 21, 1433 is given and translated in full below: 
Item, because, by the power of its statutes and fulfilment of its oath, whoever is 
touched by the device or the society of the Dragon is obliged personally to set forth 
against the Turks, schismatics and heretics and also infidels and to expose his own 
person and to attend to the extermination and confusion of the same [groups of 
people], the lord emperor himself therefore supplicates, that our lord should 
mercifully consider conceding in perpetuity, that the aforementioned lord emperor 
and his successors, the kings of Hungary and those of the aforesaid society and also 
all and everyone of the kingdom of Hungary and those of other foreign nations, who 
personally set out for the defence of the Kingdom of Hungary and in support of the 
lord emperor and the successors of the kings and of the aforesaid society against those 
labelled infidels, schismatics and heretics, should have full remission of sins and 
penalties, in the same way that crusaders (crucesignati), confessed and penitent, in the 
passage for the acquisition of the Holy Land, [have]. Permitted for all in the most 
blessed form.
426
 
However, the other version of the supplication is subtly different. At first sight this 
earlier version, dated to January, would appear to be a shorter and less polished version of the 
supplication dated to July. For example, the opening clause lacks any reference to the symbol 
of the Order of the Dragon (divisa seu societate draconica) present in the July version, and 
merely references the ‘aforesaid society’ (societate predicta).427 In fact, there is no explicit 
reference to the Order of the Dragon at all in the January version; merely the ‘aforesaid 
society’ is used twice. The decision to strengthen the connection between the crusading 
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indulgence and Sigismund’s Order of the Dragon may have been made in the time between 
the recordings of the two versions. Sigismund did not arrive in the vicinity of Rome until 
March 1433, so perhaps the slight alteration to his second supplication was touched upon 
during his last minute negotiations with the Pope in the spring and early summer of that year. 
On the other hand, the January version seems to contain more detail than the later, 
more polished version. Not included in Fraknói’s transcription of the January version and 
nowhere to be found in the manuscript of the July version, is the following: 
Concessum quando contra infideles dirigere hereticos contemplacis cesaree magistaris 
[majestatis?] maxime cum priviliegium istud sit terre sancte que meretur et debet 
singulari privilegio ultra ceteras decorari Beatissime gradensis.
428
 
The Latin presents problems, hence why it is given here in the original without a direct 
translation. Nevertheless, it would appear that Sigismund’s petition was ‘conceded…most 
greatly with such a privilege which should be for the Holy Land which merits and ought to be 
honoured with a single privilege above others’. 
While there are complexities involved in analysing the two versions of the crusading 
indulgence the basic point remains clear: Those who fought against the Turks under the aegis 
of the Order of the Dragon, in support of the Holy Roman Emperor and of the Kingdom of 
Hungary, merited a crusading indulgence. Of course, a ruler augmenting his own wars with 
sacral elements is nothing special, and Sigismund was just one of many who sought to do so 
in the Middle Ages.
429
 Moreover, anecdotal evidence would suggest that Sigismund’s 
commanders and soldiers in Hungary believed they were engaging in warfare which carried 
spiritual benefits anyway, which means that Papal recognition would not necessarily have 
helped further encourage his garrison troops and levies to fight the Turks.
430
 Bonfini may 
have stated that the peasants and common people in Sigismund’s armies fought merely ‘for 
hearths and homes’ (pro aris ac focis), but other sources give more complex and spiritual 
impressions behind the desire to fight the Turks.
431
 In 1400, for example, a Hungarian noble 
went to fight the Turks ‘to protect the country and Christian faith’ and the next year, he was 
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joined by another who wished ‘to fight for the country’s liberty and the salvation of his 
relatives’.432 They were clearly joined by other nobles too and in 1416 when one noble was 
reported missing on the southern frontier, he was recorded as fighting the impious Turks in 
Bosnia for the faith of the Christian people and to defend the kingdom of Hungary (pro 
christiane plebis fide et eiusdem regni nostri Hungarie).
433
 One baron who had spent four 
years in Turkish captivity during the 1420s, noted that he had not only been battling them for 
the glory of his king, but had willingly fought them for the defence of the entire faith.
434
  
However, Sigismund’s supplications to the Papacy demonstrate in a very direct way 
how the Holy Roman Emperor used his status to secure benefits for his wars against the 
Turks in Hungary. The supplications make it explicitly clear that the ‘defence of the 
Kingdom of Hungary’ was worthy of spiritual reward. Sigismund naturally believed that the 
defence of Hungary was vitally important to Christendom, labelling in one instance the 
defence of Hungary against the Turks as ‘matters of Christianity’ (sachen der kristenheit) 
when writing to the Grandmaster in 1427.
435
 Gaining Papal recognition of Hungary’s worth 
as a bastion against the Turks is significant in this context. It reveals that the conscious 
development of the idea that Hungary formed the so called antemurale et clipeus of 
Christendom, which becomes prevalent during the reign of King Matthias Corvinus and 
which, in effect, meant that anyone who fought for the defence of Hungary was in fact 
fighting for Christendom, was first encouraged by Sigismund.
436
 Kintzinger has argued that 
Sigismund used the Order of the Dragon ‘in the interests of Hungarian defence and not as an 
expression of crusading ideals’.437 This is a false dichotomy and surely misses the point. 
Sigismund’s success in securing a crusade indulgence for those who fought the Turks under 
the aegis of his Order meant that the defence of Hungary and ideals surrounding crusading 
were combined.  
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Sigismund’s Order of the Dragon is noteworthy in other respects. In a recent and 
comprehensive monograph on the Papacy and crusading in the fifteenth century, Benjamin 
Weber has commented on what was, in effect, the Papacy’s promotion of crusading, an 
eleventh century form of combat, in the fifteenth century.
438
 He concludes that the Papacy 
continually drew upon past precedents, such as using established phrases, literary topoi and 
the mechanism of indulgences, in order to publicise and support crusading efforts. Their 
crusade rhetoric and planning was primarily conservative and drew heavily upon past 
precedents in order to legitimate itself and innovation and novelty were kept to a minimum. 
Sigismund’s entries in the Registra Supplicationum, an archival deposit which Weber does 
not pay much attention to, demonstrates that the Papacy and secular princes of the fifteenth 
century approached crusading and indulgences with far more innovation than he allows. 
Attaching an indulgence to a chivalric order was another innovative method of Sigismund’s, 
who sought to use his status as Holy Roman Emperor to bring the benefits that came with 
waging sanctified warfare in the name of Christ to his struggle against the Turks on a 
permanent basis. That the primary focus of the supplication is not on the liberation of Holy 
Land also demonstrates that not all papal rhetoric was so obsessed with using past precedents 
within which to frame its crusading endeavours.
439
  
The attachment of a crusading indulgence to a chivalric order was a logical one but 
Sigismund seems to be the first one to have undertaken it. Other rulers, such as Philip the 
Good with his foundation of the Order of the Golden Fleece (1431) and Peter I of Cyrpus ( 
1358-1369) with his Order of the Sword, had sought to use chivalric orders as a means to 
raise awareness of the Turkish threat.
440
 The Order of the Sword contained similar oaths to 
the Order of the Dragon, if the account of Felix Fabri, a pilgrim visiting Cyprus in 1480 is to 
be believed. Fabri reports that he met Queen Catherine Cornaro (1474-1489), who inducted 
him and his party into the order, ‘so that one should come to defend the Kingdom of Cyprus 
when needed’, against the ‘Saracens, Turks and Tartars’.441 Yet for all of their rhetoric, no 
one until Sigismund had ever had the idea of attaching a crusading indulgence to their order, 
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incentivising both its existing members and prospective ones to uphold their oaths and fight 
the Turks.  
Over fifty years later Maximilian followed a similar policy of Sigismund, when he 
succeeded in securing privileges from Pope Alexander VI for all those who served against the 
Turks in his Fraternity of St George.
442
 Whereas Maximilian’s use of the Fraternity of St 
George impacted little upon the fight against the Turks, Sigismund’s Order of the Dragon 
was far more successful in galvanising support. It is important to emphasise, however, that 
Sigismund had used the Order of the Dragon to advertise the Ottoman Turkish threat in 
Christendom right from his election as Roman King in 1410. Kintzinger is certainly correct 
when he notes the Order of the Dragon’s role in securing Sigismund’s rule in the Kingdom of 
Hungary, but it was meant as far more than a mere facilitator of diplomatic contact, as a so 
called ‘Instrument des diplomatischen Verkehrs’.443 It was meant to gain Sigismund allies in 
the fight against the Turks, and to spread awareness of the threat which they posed to 
Hungary and Christendom. 
There is not enough space to cover the foreign membership of the Order of the 
Dragon in detail, but Sigismund’s attitude towards the nobles of Iberia forms an illuminating 
case study. As we have seen, Sigismund met numerous Iberian nobles and royalty when he 
displayed a Turkish prisoner to them during his sojourn in Perpignan in September 1415. A 
few months later Sigismund sought to strengthen his connections with the nobility of Iberia. 
On 16 February 1416 Sigismund empowered two men, the Hungarian noble and later Count 
of the Szeklers (1427-38) Michael Jakcs, and a certain Ottobonus de Bellonis, a doctor of law 
from Valence who had been in Sigismund’s service since May 1412, to tour numerous 
kingdoms and principalities in Iberia on his behalf.
444
 They were ordered to visit the ‘serene 
princes and kings of Aragon, Castile, Leon and Navarre, and indeed the illustrious firstborn 
son and other children of our aforesaid most beloved brother the King of Aragon’, in order to 
induct them into the Order of the Dragon. Though the Latin is unclear, it would suggest that 
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the King of Aragon was granted the right to confer the insignia of the Order (the dragon 
badge) to 30 other nobles of his choice.
445
  
It is clear that several members of Aragonese and Portuguese royalty joined the Order. 
In a letter of 30 March King Ferdinand of Aragon told Sigismund how he had received 50 
dragon badges and that he himself, his wife, his son, Alfonso, and Alfonso’s son Pedro, have 
been inducted into the Order.
446
 Sigismund was clearly pleased and arranged in January 1418 
for a copy of the statues of the Order to be delivered to Ferdinand’s third son, Henry of 
Aragon.
447
 The letter which arranges for the delivery of the statutes notes how they are 
destined for the ‘illustrious prince Henry, prince of Aragon and Sicily and master of [the 
Order of] St James’. The reference to the Order of St James, also known as the Order of 
Santiago, is illuminating. Despite his youth Henry was already the grandmaster of the Order 
of Santiago which commanded significant military resources. One gets the impression that 
Sigismund was targeting him at a young age in the hope that he would grow up to support 
him once he had matured. Sigismund states that he has invited Henry into the Order and that 
once he has taken the customary oath (solitum iuramentum) he should not only seek to fulfil 
the responsibilities which the Order of the Dragon requires, but aim to surpass them: statutis 
et moribus, que dicta nostra requirit societas [sic], praestare debeas.
448
  
It would seem that Sigismund’s efforts to cultivate connections with Iberian nobility 
paid off. The infante Peter, the future Duke of Coimbra and regent of Portugal, eventually 
took an army to Hungary and campaigned with Sigismund against the Turks.
449
 There is no 
evidence to suggest that Peter ever joined the Order of the Dragon, but the sources give the 
impression that Sigismund met him during his diplomatic travels in Iberia as they enjoyed 
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close links from 1416 onwards.
450
 A document regarding Peter’s marriage arrangements 
dated 8 January 1417 was copied into a codex produced by Sigismund’s scribes, which 
implies some form of contact between the two.
451
 On 22 January 1418 Sigismund wrote to 
the illustri infanti Petro to offer him the March of Treviso, an imperial fiefdom near Lake 
Garda in northern Italy.
452
 The next month Sigismund addressed another letter to the illustris 
princeps Petrus infans.
453
 This time he stated that if Peter was to make the journey to his 
court (versus curiam nostram regalem iter) then he would receive ‘the sum of twenty 
thousand ducats or florins’.454 
 Peter never did take Sigismund up on his offer of the March of Treviso but he did 
join Sigismund to fight the Turks in Hungary. Our most detailed account of his campaigning 
against the Turks comes from a biography of Filippo Scolari, a Florentine general in the 
service of Sigismund whose life will be explored in a later chapter.
455
 The biography, written 
by Poggio Bracciolini, a nephew of the more famous Jacopo di Poggio Bracciolini (d. 1478), 
notes that Peter fought the Turks in the same battle where Scolari was mortally wounded. 
Bracciolini notes that Peter travelled to Hungary per sodisfare a una vota (‘to satisfy a vow’), 
though what sort of vow this was is unclear.
456
 The idea that Sigismund may have asked this 
of him is certainly not out of the question, as in other cases he had targeted nobles precisely 
in the attempt to lure them to Hungary in order to fight the Turks. Albert of Bavaria’s letter to 
his father, Duke Ernst of Bayern, for example, records one such offer. In the letter Albert 
reveals to his father that Sigismund, appealing to Albert as ‘our noble lord the Kaiser’, had 
offered him land and title if he was to serve as his ‘captain against the Turks’.457 
Whatever the case, Bracciolini states that Peter had in his retinue ‘eight hundred men 
at arms’, who were dressed in crusading garb (‘all dressed with white cloth, everyone having 
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a red cross on their arm’).458 The size of Peter’s force given here is probably exaggerated. 
The contemporary chronicler who compiled the so called kleine Klosterneuburger Chronik 
notes that Peter had ‘300 good men’ (300 guets volckh) and this estimate seems reliable.459 
Peter sheltered near the monastery with his force so we can assume that the compiler 
witnessed the size of his force first hand.
460
  
Sigismund’s use of the Order of the Dragon and his distribution of dragon badges to 
princes and kings across Christendom was not mere tokenism as foreign members of the 
Order did make good on their vows and fight the Turks.
461
 Two foreign members of the 
order, Duke Ernest ‘the Iron’ (der Eiserne) (r. 1406-1424) of Austria and Sigismund’s son in 
law, Duke Albert V of Austria (r. 1404-1439), made good on their vows and fought the 
Turks, even if Albert did pawn his dragon badge in 1432.
462
 From a cynical standpoint, one 
could say that they needed to fight the Turks anyway. After all, their lands centred on modern 
day Slovenia were periodically exposed to Turkish raids and it was from Carniola (modern 
day Kranj) where Ernest and Albert would assemble their forces before battling the Turks.
463
 
The same cannot be said of others. The King of Poland, Władysław II was inducted into the 
Order, perhaps in 1412, and despite Sigismund’s complaints he never did participate in the 
fight against the Turks.
464
 That is not to say, however, that Władysław II never aided 
Sigismund in his fight against the Turks. Soon after his entry into the Order, a Polish knight 
known as Zawisza the Black appears in Sigismund’s service, who, as we will see in the next 
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chapter, was captured and executed by Turks while fighting on the Danube frontier in June 
1428. He was clearly not alone, as Długosz records that other Polish knights were captured 
with him during the fighting, while many other Polish knights cowardly fled.
465
 Jefferson has 
stated that Zawisza was himself a member of the Order of the Dragon, though there is no 
basis in the primary sources for this.
466
 Nevertheless, it would appear that the Order of the 
Dragon played an important role in channelling support from throughout Christendom 
towards Sigismund’s campaigns against the Turks.   
The use of the Order of the Dragon in this manner would not have been possible had 
he not been Roman King as for Sigismund, the Order of the Dragon was intimately connected 
to his status as King of the Romans. When accepting Berthold Orsini into the Order of the 
Dragon in 1412, Sigismund explicitly linked the society with his Roman Kingship, stating 
that the throne of the Roman King, the Romani regie maistatis [sic] solium, would be 
embellished by the participation and adherence of great people in his society: magnificarum 
personarum participia et coherencia exornant.
467
 The point of the Order, as far as Sigismund 
was concerned, was that the glory of being Roman King would be made greater: regnantis 
gloriam propagator.
468
 Sigismund consciously linked his attempt to spread awareness of the 
Turkish threat through the Order of the Dragon with his Roman Kingship. 
2.5 Mossen Borra at Sigismund’s court 
It would of course be very easy to dismiss the courtly events and ceremonies covered 
in this chapter as insignificant. Drabek in her study in imperial ceremony implies as much, 
when she includes dances and jousts and other similar activities under the sub-heading of 
‘festivities and distractions’.469 Perhaps Sigismund’s antics while enjoying himself in France, 
Iberia and Italy were simply that: the antics of a middle aged king enjoying himself perhaps 
too much. However, courtly ceremony and festivities did matter. The glimpses offered by the 
letters of Antonio Tallander, also known as Mossen Borra, an Aragonese knight and court 
jester who accompanied Sigismund between c.1415 and c. 1423, allow us to delve slightly 
deeper into the workings of Sigismund’s court and the importance of his courtly events such 
as dances and jousts. The alcohol and dance fuelled courtly culture of the empereur, as Borra 
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calls Sigismund, was indeed effective in generating the sort of aid which the Roman King 
desired against his infidel enemies. 
 Borra arrived at Sigismund’s court as a legate of the King of Aragon at some point in 
1415, possibly while Sigismund was holding court in southern France, and they seem to have 
become especially good friends. Borra enjoyed close personal contact with Sigismund, 
occasionally even sleeping in the same bed as him after their heavy drinking sessions.
470
 His 
three letters to Alfonso V of Aragon, striking in their humorous and down to earth style, tend 
to give the impression of Sigismund’s itinerant court as a drunken fiasco. Be it a Bavarian 
duke reduced to giggles by Sigismund’s French, his attempts (and success) at making small 
talk in Latin or his involvement in week long drinking binges, particularly in imperial free 
cities where someone else was footing the bill, the anecdotes in Borra’s letters offer an almost 
unique view of the Sigismund.
471
 Their only rival is perhaps the correspondence of Claus 
Redwitz, a Teutonic Knight in Sigismund’s service, whose letter collection and intense 
interest in Sigismund’s behaviour and mood swings will be explored in other chapters. On an 
aside, the theoretical approaches and tendencies to qualify and reduce to theoretical bite-sized 
chunks the various aspects of imperial ceremony in German historiography would do well to 
draw upon evidence such as Borra’s or Redwitz’s letters. There may have been deeper 
intentions or grander motives behind much of Sigismund’s courtly display and ceremony, 
but, to put it bluntly, much of it appears to be him getting rather drunk and going from there.  
 One particular anecdote, recorded in Borra’s last letter, sent from Ulm in September 
1418, is particularly noteworthy within the context of this chapter.
472
 In this letter Borra 
records his experiences in Strasbourg, where he sojourned with Sigismund for around one 
month between July and August 1418.
473
 As Borra reports, ‘we remained in this city for 
about a month and we danced and jousted every day and I have never seen so many pretty 
ladies and so well dressed’.474 The last dance put on by the city was particularly arduous, 
beginning at about 5 pm after dinner and lasting, in Borra’s words, tota la nit fins lendema 
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que le Sol era per tot lo monde (the entire night and until the next day and the sun was 
[shining] throughout all the earth).
475
 Borra had drunk no less than two entire casks of wine 
(II botas vi) during the evening’s festivities and his next statement, ‘I pretended I was ill’ (jo 
me fey malalt), may be wishful thinking on his part as his hangover was severe enough to 
attract the attention of Sigismund.
476
 
 Sigismund clearly cared for his loyal Aragonese companion and servant of the past 
three or so years. He allowed him to recover in his own chamber and even gave him a litter 
and a team of servants, so that the poorly knight could accompany the king about his travels. 
Borra then states that Sigismund made him an offer which, it turns out, he could not refuse. 
While Borra was in his weakened state, Sigismund asked him to remain in his entourage for 
the indefinite future so that he could see first-hand his kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, 
‘his power and his daughter, in order to tell and preach through the whole world about his 
deeds and lands’ (e sa poyssansa e sa filia per so que pus ca dire e predicar per tot lo mont 
son fet e son estat).
477
 
 Finke has stated that it is not known whether Borra travelled to the east with 
Sigismund.
478
 A perusal of Windecke’s chronicle would suggest that Borra did take 
Sigismund up on his offer to visit Bohemia and Hungary.
479
 In fact, while it would appear 
that Borra never fought the Turks, he was at least actively involved in fighting the Hussites in 
1422. He was captured during one of Sigismund’s Hussite campaigns, held prisoner for a 
year and then made his escape to the nearby town of Brno. While in prison he had heard the 
rumour that the captain of the city guards of Brno intended to turn the town over to the 
Hussites. Upon his arrival he successfully cooperated with the town council to uncover this 
conspiracy, after which he was sent back to Sigismund in Buda, weighed down with 
numerous gifts from grateful city elders. If Borra did compose literary works about 
Sigismund’s kingdoms and power while under his patronage then none have survived. 
Nevertheless, the fascinating glimpse into court life which Borra’s letters offer, reveal that 
the link between Sigismund’s drunken antics in the west and his combating of the infidel 
threat in the east were not so far removed as one may think.  
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2.6 The Council of Basel and the spectre of the Ottoman threat 
Before concluding, Sigismund’s attitude to the Council of Basle and his plan to host a 
great event in Buda, which unfortunately only ever existed on paper, will be explored. Before 
doing so, however, it is worth making the point that for many clerics at the Council 
Sigismund’s acts of public ceremony were interpreted as being detrimental to Christendom’s 
efforts against its enemies, in this case the Hussites. Sigismund, contrary to the opinions of 
Erik Fügedi, was an avid jouster, and this fondness even earned him a reprimand from a 
group of clerics at the Council of Basle, who believed his time and effort would be better 
spent on tackling the infidel threat.  
In January 1434, according to Johannes de Segovia, a group of clerics discovered that 
Sigismund was planning on participating in a special tournament to be held at Constance in 
honour of his Imperial coronation. They advised him, that 
things of this kind should rightfully be condemned, since they exist solely for people 
to show off, and since at that time the faithful of Pilzen were besieged by the infidels, 
and suffering such great oppression, it was not right for the faithful to go around 
playing with spears [hastis ludere], but would instead be better if the great cost of 
these events, which were dedicated to men showing off, were instead dedicated to 
fighting the infidels.
480
 
 
The clerics continued to emphasise the importance of their request, stating that it 
would be far better if Sigismund thought about ‘the shunning of tournaments for the reward 
of converting the infidel’, and instead spent the money on raising 400 soldiers to help relieve 
Pilzen.
481
 Sigismund was not convinced, and after stressing that great tradition of these 
tournaments, he commented that ‘he himself would not participate with them in the 
tournament, but, if it was possible, he wanted to go to watch, because he had never seen one, 
and for that reason it should not be stopped.’482 If Sigismund was somewhat blasé about 
fighting the Hussites during the Council of Basle, then the same cannot be said of his attitude 
to the fight against the Turks. 
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Between December 1436 and July 1437 Sigismund was seemingly obsessed with 
transferring the Council of Basle to Buda.
483
 Sigismund, first as Roman King and then Holy 
Roman Emperor, had been highly influential in convening the Council of Basle and he was 
now attempting to use his influence to move it to Hungary. To move the entire Council to 
Buda was a rather big ask and Sigismund knew it, so he came up with numerous arguments, 
some convincing and some not so, in order to support his request. One such argument, 
notably that John VIII Palaiologus (1416-1448, as co-emperor with Manuel II Paleologus, 
1416-1425) had visited Buda previously in 1424 so he already knew the way, was a good 
start.
484
 Sigismund maintained that the Greeks wanted to come to Buda and perhaps this was 
the case.
485
 The sea route to Italy and then northwards to Basle was long and dangerous, and 
a Byzantine ambassador had perished on his way to Venice when his ship sunk in the 
Adriatic in 1397.
486
 The route through Hungary, however, could be just as hazardous. After 
all, a Byzantine delegation were robbed while taking the land route through Hungary to Basle 
in 1434.
487
 They were deprived of all of their possessions, Turkish rapiers included, and had 
to borrow money once they reached Buda in order to reach their destination.
488
 Perhaps the 
least convincing reason Sigismund could come up with was the idea that the delegations from 
the Spanish, French and English nations would find it much easier to get to Buda than they 
would Basle.
489
 It was easy, so Sigismund maintained, for they could arrange to meet their 
colleagues currently at Basel in nearby Ulm, and then it was just a quick (actually, a 500 
mile), inexpensive ship ride down the Danube.
490
 
However, before any of the reasons given above, Sigismund stressed that holding the 
Council in Buda would be of the greatest help in fighting the Turks. Sigismund stated that 
there were many ‘peoples of the Greek faith’ (gentes de fide Grecorum) within the confines 
of the Hungarian Kingdom who would happily gather in Buda for the celebration of an 
ecumenical council, which itself would help increase the chances of union.
491
 Furthermore, 
many of these had themselves experienced Turkish rule and, were they to see the council 
moved to Buda, would be inspired ‘to rise up against the tyranny of the domination of the 
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Turks’.492 The council would simply not have the same inspirational pull on those of the 
Greek faith, Sigismund maintained, if it was not held near the areas of Turkish rule.
493
 
Sigismund was also planning a major campaign against the Turks, a passagium ad sepulcrum 
dominicum, and it would be of great organisational help if the council was convened in 
Buda.
494
 Then his campaign could be more effectively organised as it could be done in 
tandem with the legates of the Byzantine Emperor. 
It is clear that this idea was close to Sigismund's heart as he would repeatedly mention 
it until a few months before his death. He even took the trouble to have his ideas read out to 
the Council of Basel and sent letters supporting the above arguments to his fellow German 
princes.
495
 Sigismund even went to trouble of getting someone to count every dwelling in the 
four districts of Buda (967 of them, it turned out) in order to prove that he had enough 
lodgings to house the delegates.
496
 He even claimed to be stockpiling grain, wine and other 
foodstuffs in and around Buda to provide for the delegates once they arrived.
497
 As we will 
consider in other chapters, Sigismund’s intention to fight the Turks during the last year of his 
reign was not just mere rhetoric. A joint Hungarian, German and Czech force, in effect a 
military force drawing upon three of Sigismund’s four kingdoms, launched a stunning 
incursion into Ottoman territory in the summer of 1437 and inflicted considerable damage on 
the Turkish fleet based on the Danube and Morava.
498
 Sigismund’s rather eccentric plan to 
use his status to move the council to Buda in support of his Turkish campaigns was one of his 
last acts. His plan, of course, never came to fruition and on his death bed a few months later 
bed he lamented that he was about to die, having never made good on his vow to visit the 
Holy Land.
499
 
In conclusion, it is clear that Sigismund’s courtly ceremony and events were designed 
with the advertisement of the Turkish threat in mind. Be it speeches in Paris, baptisms in 
Rome or the display of Turkish prisoners in Perpignan, Sigismund, one of the first major 
European rulers forced to deal with the Ottoman threat, sought to raise awareness of his 
kingdom’s plight throughout Christendom. He sought to bring the issue of the Turkish threat 
to the fore of European politics, attempting to turn political assemblies which he was wholly 
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or partly responsible for convening, such as the Nuremberg Reichstag of 1431 and the 
Council of Basle, into platforms where the struggle against the Turks could be discussed. His 
advertisement of the Turkish threat foreshadowed the activities of later rulers such as Philip 
the Good of Burgundy and Maximilian.
500
 More importantly, he bequeathed to his successors 
a legacy of appropriating crusade ideas and language which became directly linked to the 
defence of Hungary and their struggle against the Turks. This was a legacy upon which his 
successor Matthias Corvinus (1458-90) built upon, and something which Corvinus would 
arguably exploit more successfully than Sigismund.
501
 Sigismund’s courtly ceremony and 
rhetoric was only one facet of his response to the Turkish threat as Roman King. Importantly, 
he not only made good on his promise made in Paris in 1415 to fight the Turks, but, as we 
will see in the next three chapters, was able to convince many other of his subjects as Roman 
King to join him. 
Chapter 3. Sigismund and the Danube: Naval and Riverine Warfare and the 
Ottoman Turks 
 
This chapter will explore Sigismund’s drive to secure naval and riverine expertise in order to 
combat the Ottoman Turkish threat. While the Kingdom of Hungary’s coastline was minimal, 
the southern frontier which Sigismund shared with the Ottomans was almost entirely 
composed of rivers and waterways, notably the river Danube. The Danube, which runs for 
around 1800 miles from its source in the Black Forest to the Black Sea, was and remains a 
vital artery for trade, transport and communication in Europe.
502
 The Danube also acts as the 
parent river for numerous other river systems, notably the Drava, Sava and Great Morava. It 
was vital to control the Danube and its tributaries if the Kingdom’s security was to be 
ensured. As this chapter will demonstrate, Sigismund systematically used his status as King 
of the Romans and then as Holy Roman Emperor in order to secure naval and shipbuilding 
expertise to strengthen his hold on the Danube. In doing so, this chapter will also show that 
the historiographic focus on Sigismund’s fortress building and land campaigns has obscured 
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the overriding importance and significance which Sigismund attached to the naval aspect of 
his efforts against the Ottomans. 
 Despite naval power playing an important role in the wars against the Ottoman Turks 
in the Danube region, being vital in breaking the Ottoman siege of Belgrade in 1456 for 
example, little research has been undertaken on how Sigismund sought to counter the 
Ottoman Turkish threat on the water.
503
 Elemér Mályusz only discusses Sigismund’s conduct 
of naval warfare once in his otherwise very detailed monograph,
504
 while Gustav Beckmann 
largely concerns himself with Sigismund’s desire for naval aid from Venice in the context of 
crusade negotiations.
505
 From a general perspective, the historiography of medieval naval 
warfare has been dominated by studies of Mediterranean galley warfare and the development 
of naval warfare in the North Sea in the later Medieval period.
506
 Thus a study into how 
Sigismund sought to use naval power to defend his southern frontier does not just offer new 
perspectives on how he sought to combat the Turkish threat, but also on the development of 
naval warfare in general. 
3.1. Sigismund and the importance of the Danube  
Sigismund’s interest in securing the Danube is a theme which receives little mention 
in current historical scholarship, with the focus generally upon Sigismund’s land campaigns 
and fortress building programmes. His interest in naval warfare receives only cursory 
mentions in the work of Veszprémy and Mályusz, and it is rarely considered alongside 
Sigismund’s programme of fortress building.507 Mályusz notes, for example, that 
Sigismund’s defence against the Ottoman Turks was based upon fortresses, and concentrates 
exclusively on the development of his ‘Festungssystem’.508 This defensive system was based 
upon the Danube and contemporary sources make the connection explicit. A document of 
1437 which lists the castra of the Hungarian realm collates Sigismund’s Danubian fortresses 
not by banate or by owner, but under the heading of castra inferiora cis Danubialia.
509
 
                                                          
503
 CDPRHA, pp. 383-4 (nr 518). 
504
 Mályusz, Kaiser Sigismund. See p. 147, for the only reference to ships and naval power on the Danube in his 
39 page chapter on Sigismund’s defensive policies. 
505
 Beckmann, Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds, pp. 5-8. 
506
 Recent works continue to exhibit this emphasis. See, for example, Susan Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, 
1000-1500 (London: Routledge, 2002). 
507
 Veszprémy, ‘Militärtechnische’, pp. 290-91;Mályusz, Kaiser Sigismund, p. 147; Szakály ‘Border Defense 
System’, pp. 141-58. 
508
 Mályusz, Kaiser Sigismund, pp. 145-6. 
509
 DL 13137. See Ţeicu, Banat, p. 92. Not ‘castra inferiora cisdanubiana’, as in Csánki, Magyarország 
történelmi, ii. 96. 
102 
 
However, these fortresses formed only one aspect of the effort against the Turks, as 
Sigismund conceived of the defence as also involving naval warfare. This was implied in 
1427 when Sigismund requested military experts from the Teutonic Order in order to advise 
him on his Turkish campaigns. The fact that they needed to be knowledgeable in matters of 
krieg zuwasser und zuland highlights how Sigismund’s attempt to secure the Danube 
involved a dual effort of land and naval campaigning.
510
 Sigismund’s interest in naval 
warfare and expertise surfaces in numerous sources, such as diplomatic correspondence, 
chronicles and middle English poetry to name but a few. Overall, the impression is that the 
securing of the Danube waters was just as important to Sigismund as securing the river banks 
with his fortresses and castles.  
This chapter will therefore demonstrate the importance which Sigismund attributed to 
securing naval expertise by first exploring Sigismund’s attitude towards naval warfare on the 
Danube, before underlining how he used his status as Roman King in order to secure naval 
and riverine expertise from the Teutonic Order for service against the Ottoman Turks. It will 
then underline how he was able to use his connections as Roman King and, after 1433, as 
Kaiser, in order to draw upon naval expertise from throughout Christendom, be it through the 
personal recruitment of experts while travelling in the Reich or by encouraging his subjects as 
Kaiser, such as the Duke of Austria, to contribute ships to his Turkish campaigns. 
In order to fully understand the reasons behind Sigismund’s intense interest in 
acquiring naval aid and expertise we need to understand the importance of the Danube in 
military terms. While Hungarian kings had certainly launched campaigns along the Danube 
and fought enemies in the river basin before, it is during Sigismund’s reign and the growth of 
Ottoman power that this frontier becomes a heavily fortified zone which saw regular 
campaigning.
511
 The intensification of warfare in this area, particularly in the hundred or so 
kilometres between the fortresses of Belgrade and Turnu Severin where the Ottoman pressure 
was most acute, heightened the strategic and tactical importance of controlling the river 
Danube and its limited crossing points. Fundamentally, it was around the Danube that 
Sigismund’s defensive policies revolved. In April 1427 Sigismund sent a letter to Henry, 
duke of Bavaria-Landshut, where he spoke about his plan to campaign against the Turks. His 
aim was, in his own words, mit der hilfe gotes die Tunaw wider einczunemen (‘with the help 
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of God, to recapture the Danube’).512 The importance of the naval aspect of Sigismund’s 
warfare against the Turks was not lost on his fellow princes. In August 1427, for example, the 
Duke of Milan noted with sorrow the news that Sigismund had suffered a defeat against the 
Turks on the Danube, noting in particular how the loss of ships (arreptione naveam et 
galearum) distressed him.
513
 When discussing the placement of the Teutonic Order in 
Hungary in February 1429, Sigismund explicitly stated that he wanted to place them bi der 
Tunaw.
514
 On some occasions Sigismund expressed a more ambitious interest in blocking the 
straits of Gallipoli, which would have impeded the Ottoman Sultan’s ability to reinforce their 
military efforts on the Danube frontier with resources drawn from their Anatolian domains.
515
  
 
 
 
3.2 Sigismund, Venice, and the waging of naval warfare against the Ottoman Turks 
 Some of our most detailed insights into Sigismund’s attitudes towards defending the 
waterways on his southern frontier come from a particularly detailed letter written by the 
Senate of Venice and sent to the king in August 1427.
516
 The letter was delivered by Marco 
Dandolo (1362-1444), who was given the difficult task of visiting Sigismund in Hungary and 
convincing him to make peace with Venice. The terms under which the Venetians would be 
willing to make peace with Sigismund were included in Dandolo’s letter and are highly 
relevant to this chapter. Their terms for peace include detailed offers of naval aid and this 
allows us to grasp Sigismund’s military priorities from a Venetian perspective.517 
Dandolo arrived in Hungary in October 1427, accompanied by his motley crew of one 
notary and his assistant, a bursar, a cook, an interpreter, four armed escorts and four valets 
and with the rather precise budget of seven ducats for each day to cover all of their 
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expenses.
518
 His offer of peace began with the usual Venetian request and the usual stumbling 
block in the negotiations between Venice and Sigismund. The Venetians were willing to 
conclude a peace of either 5 or 10 years with Sigismund, but they would require him to 
recognise Venetian possessions on the Dalmatian coast.
519
 This was something that 
Sigismund could not even think about considering.
520
 Nevertheless, the Venetians attempted 
to sweeten the deal by offering him an unprecedented range of military kit, technical 
expertise, logistical support and money - even a free passage to Italy should he want to come 
and claim his imperial crown in Rome - to aid in his campaigns against the Turks.  
Of the most relevance for this chapter is the Venetian offer of naval support as it 
allows us to grasp how Sigismund conceived of his naval effort against the Ottoman Turks. 
The Venetians clearly knew that Sigismund wanted shipbuilders and were willing to give 
them to him. If Sigismund were only to ask, the letter states that he would be sent ‘masters 
capable of making galeas, cochas and naves’.521 In fact, ‘whenever he would wish for 
masters suitable for these things, [namely] the construction of cochas, naves and galeas to go 
against the Turks, he could have them for his service, placed under him.’522 Naves, meaning 
ships, and galeas, galleys, usually propelled by sails and oars, are relatively clear terms. It is 
difficult to ascertain precisely what is mean by cochas. It could possibly be a form of ship 
influenced by the northern European cog, and more adapted to the rougher waters of the 
Atlantic.
523
 Clearly then, Sigismund wanted sufficient expertise in order to be able to 
construct a variety of vessels which would be able operate in a variety of different waters.  
But what did Sigismund want these ships for? Here again, the letter is useful. It 
contains discussions of what the Venetians would be willing to do with their fleet on behalf 
of Sigismund and what they would not be willing to consider. As has already been stated, the 
letter and its proposals appear to be well thought out and geared towards pre-empting 
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Sigismund’s possible requests. As a result, they offer a reliable insight into Sigismund’s 
naval thinking, or at least into what the Venetians perceived as Sigismund’s aims.  
Of most importance, at least to the Venetians, was the crossing across the 
Dardanelles.
524
 The Venetians offered to hold the critical stretch of sea around Gallipoli at 
their own expense, whenever Sigismund campaigned against the Turks in the regions of 
Romania, the so called partibus Romanie.
525
 While left unstated, the aim behind this was 
presumably to keep any Ottoman forces in Asia Minor trapped there. The Venetians were 
careful not to guarantee that they could hold the sea passage near Gallipoli. In order to set the 
difficulty of defending the crossing at Gallipoli in a context which Sigismund could easily 
understand, the letter advises Dandolo, that 
if the said lord king should ask about the blocking of the passage of Gallipoli, we say 
the same as we would say of the passage of the Danube, so you should respond, that 
considering the short distance of Gallipoli as far as the Danube, it may be impossible 
to prohibit the said passage.
526
 
As a result, the Venetians were willing, with reservations, to guard the straits near 
Gallipoli. The Danube, perhaps being further away and more difficult for the Venetian fleet 
to get to, could not be defended by them in any circumstances. Nevertheless, the prospect of 
Sigismund asking for Venetian aid in manning the Danube had been raised by him before and 
the authors of the letter were clearly of the opinion that Sigismund might ask for this again.
527
 
As a result, if Sigismund raised the issue of manning the Danube, Dandolo was curtly advised 
that ‘the Danube is not to be mentioned’.528 
If we were to summarise Sigismund’s naval priorities then they would be roughly as 
follows: Sigismund wanted the ability to be able to build his own vessels and the capability of 
controlling the Danube and Gallipoli crossings. Nothing ever came of these negotiations and 
it is tempting to argue that Sigismund’s quest for naval aid and expertise to buttress his 
efforts against the Turks ended in failure. One gets this impression from Gustav Beckmann’s 
work on Sigismund’s plan to lead Christendom on a great campaign against the Turks. 
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Beckmann notes how Sigismund’s efforts to secure naval support in his plans to combat the 
Ottoman threat in the 1400s and 1410 were fruitless.
529
 In a similar vein, Otto Schiff 
expresses exasperation at Sigismund’s inability to reconcile with Venice. After all, so Schiff 
argues, if Sigismund truly wished to combat the Ottoman threat, then he would have done 
anything to win the support of Venice in order to gain access to their fleet, even if that meant 
giving up Hungarian Dalmatia.
530
 Kintzinger has highlighted how Sigismund so dearly 
desired naval support from Venice and the Order of St John, support which he never 
received.
531
 
3.3 Sigismund and his appeal to the Teutonic Knights to defend the Danube frontier 
This is far too simplistic a conclusion. Historians have so far neglected to recognise 
that there was another source of naval aid and expertise upon which Sigismund could draw 
upon; notably his subjects who owed allegiance to him as Roman King. As this chapter will 
now demonstrate, Sigismund was indeed successful in marshalling naval resources from his 
subjects in the Reich for service on the Danube frontier against the Turks. There are two 
reasons why this source of naval aid has not been explored by historians before. Firstly, 
historians of naval warfare usually focus on the navies of Italian states so it has seemed 
natural and logical to explore Sigismund’s quest for naval aid by focussing upon his 
relationship with polities such as Venice and Genoa. Nevertheless, western kingdoms and 
states were able to contribute ships and naval expertise to the fight against the Ottoman Turks 
later in the fifteenth century. Take, for example, the exploits of the Burgundian fleet during 
the Crusade of Varna, as described by Jehan de Wavrin in his chroniques.
532
 This chapter will 
demonstrate that western and northern kingdoms and states were aiding Sigismund in the 
naval effort against the Turks, except that this aid was being filtered through different 
channels than in the 1440s. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the majority of the 
relevant archival material has not been published.  
Our best insight into Sigismund’s attitudes towards defending the waterways on his 
southern frontier comes from a particularly detailed series of diplomatic correspondence and 
                                                          
529
 Beckmann, Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds, pp. 10-12. 
530
 Schiff, Sigmunds italienische Politik, pp. 105-6. 
531
 Kintzinger, Westbindungen, p. 247. 
532
 Jehan de Wavrin, Recueil des chroniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, a present nomme 
Engleterre, ed. William Hardy, 5 vols (London: 1864-91), v. 19-23, 30-41, 44-119. For a translation of sections 
of Wavrin’s account, see Colin Imber, The Crusade of Varna (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 107-66. See also, 
Vladimir Agrigoroaei, ‘Literary Leakings into Wavrin’s Danube: Three Strongholds and a Broken Bombard’, in 
Extincta est Lucerna Orbis: John Hunyadi and his Time, ed. Ana Dumitran, Loránd Mádly and Alexandru 
Simon (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Academy, Center for Transylvanian Studies, 2009), pp. 51-66. 
107 
 
memoranda produced in the later 1420s and which survive today in the Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv, Berlin. The most striking document and the one which must form the starting 
point for the discussion in this chapter is a letter, not yet published, sent by Sigismund to the 
Grandmaster Paul von Rusdorf in September 1427. Now available under the archival 
signature of Ordensbriefarchiv 4759, this letter is vitally important for two reasons.
533
 Firstly, 
it gives us an unparalleled insight into Sigismund’s own military priorities and the resources 
which he felt he needed in order to defend his frontier. Secondly, it shows most clearly how 
Sigismund successfully used his status as Roman King to encourage one of his subjects, in 
this case the Grandmaster of the Teutonic Order, to support him militarily against the Turks. 
Throughout his letter Sigismund continually emphasises themes of vital importance which 
run throughout this thesis. He takes pains to stress how he and his people are struggling 
against the Turks and how the Turkish threat is a concern for all of Christendom. Moreover, 
he emphasises his kingship of the Romans and how his subjects are under obligation to help 
him defend Christendom against the pagans and heretics.  
Written in the German vernacular, the letter begins with a report on Sigismund’s 
efforts against the Turks. Sigismund stresses that both he and ‘his people’ (sein volk) struggle 
daily against the Turks and intend never to cease fighting. With considerable exaggeration 
and imprecision, Sigismund claims that he has overwhelmed the entire length of the Danube 
until it reaches the sea, presumably the Black Sea (sin gnad hab dann die tunaw biß in das 
mer gancz geweltigt), and that he foresees more fighting in the area next summer.  
This is then followed by a call for aid, where Sigismund stresses how the Turks are a 
matter which concerns the entirety of Christendom and how the Grandmaster is obligated to 
help his Roman King in the effort to combat the pagans: 
Therefore his royal grace requests of you and the entire Order, that you come to help 
and support him in these matters of Christendom…, and that you will in this case not 
leave him in his business, for his grace trusts that you are obligated  to him as Roman 
King, and to help him equitably against the pagans.
534
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One gets the impression that Sigismund is deliberately emphasising his status as Roman King 
as he mentions it so frequently throughout the letter. Furthermore, in a letter covering three 
sides of parchment (roughly 1600 words once transcribed) his status as King of Hungary is 
not mentioned once. The only reference to Hungary comes when Sigismund notes how he 
wishes to spread the Order’s influence both in the New Mark in Eastern Brandburg and ‘in 
his lands of Hungary’ (in sinen landen zu ungern).535 Aside from that Hungary is not 
mentioned once, not even in the dating clause. In this respect the letter’s heading is highly 
instructive: unsers herren des romischen kunigs begerung von unserm herrn dem hoemeister 
und dem orden (‘our lord the Roman King’s desire regarding our lord the Grandmaster and 
the Order’).536 Israel is right to note that Sigismund’s plan to use the Teutonic Order 
represented the coming together of crusading ideals and imperial thoughts, but it was much 
more than this.
537
 This was also a letter from the Roman King to his subject, with a request 
for help that the subject is obligated to fulfil. We have seen in the previous chapter how in 
1412 Sigismund wanted the Order to help him against the ‘unbelievers’ (ungleubigen), ‘out 
of which much good will come for Christendom’.538 Sigismund had then underlined how the 
Order was not just ‘a strong shield of Christendom in Prussia, but also for us, the Reich, to 
which the same order belongs’.539 Sigismund’s opinions had changed since 1419, when he 
was recorded as saying that he was unsure whether the Order stood under the authority of the 
Reich or the Church.
540
 By 1421 he was in no such doubt about the Order’s relationship with 
the Reich.
541
 Sarnowsky notes that the Teutonic Order and Sigismund were ‘allies’, a word 
which does not do justice to their relationship.
542
 Sigismund was in fact the leader of the 
leader of the Reich, and, as this letter shows, he believed that bringing the Order to his lands 
to defend against the Turks was his right as leader of the Reich.
543
 Sigismund had finally 
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come round to translating his words into action fifteen years after he had first seriously 
fleshed out his idea of using the Order against the Turks. 
What follows these rhetorical flourishes is a detailed exposition of the various military 
resources and fields of expertise, from military advisers to fishermen, which Sigismund 
needed in order to defend his frontier against the Turks. Sometimes these requests for 
particular resources are integrated into paragraphs where their intended use is explained but 
in other cases they are merely written down in the form of a list. As a result the letter both 
reads rather bizarrely and looks rather bizarre, with the lists of military posts and kit required 
set alongside extended paragraphs of rhetoric. Sigismund’s most distinct priorities are clear. 
While he is particularly concerned with securing managerial and administrative expertise to 
manage his frontier, a theme we will explore in a later chapter, his overriding concern is for 
naval expertise and resources.
544
 Sigismund wanted twenty shipbuilders (czweinczig 
schiffmacher), who were to come to the Danube with their own equipment.
545
 Importantly, 
Sigismund stipulated that they should be able to build ships that could operate both on inland 
waters and also on the sea. Sigismund wanted captains (schifhouptleute) to operate them as 
well as sufficient men to operate them. Sigismund wanted ‘1000 or 800… sailors 
(schifkinder) or as many that your grace [the Grandmaster] allows.’546 
That Sigismund intended to use these people to support his fight against the Turks is 
clear, though it is unclear whether Sigismund intended the shipbuilders to build ships for him 
or to maintain ones that Sigismund already had or which he intended to source himself. When 
taken in its context, one suspects that it is the latter, as this paragraph situated below the 
request would suggest: 
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and that they [the shipbuilders, captains and sailors] should be by his grace 
[Sigismund] in the month of August, when our lord has a few finished and 
strengthened galleys and intends to purchase [zukoufen meynt] a seaworthy ship.
547
 
Sigismund clearly foresees here that the naval experts of the Teutonic Order will arrive when 
(wann) he has access to ships, which implies that they were to help him maintain and man 
them, and not necessarily build them. Sigismund then continues that the shipbuilders and 
sailors will be used against the Turks (gen den Turcken) and that he wishes specifically ‘to 
use [them] on the Danube and on the sea’.548 In the case that the sailors were to take any 
booty or captives while fighting the Turks, the profits would belong to Sigismund. Overall, 
one gets the impression that Sigismund already has some sort of fleet or intends to source 
ships using his own channels. He does not require the Order’s physical resources and 
materials but their expertise in maintaining and outfitting ships. 
 It is worth mentioning that this letter, dated to September 1427, was not the first 
which Sigismund sent to the Grandmaster regarding naval aid.
549
 The letter which seemed to 
have formally indicated Sigismund’s desire to settle the Order in Hungary is OBA 4738, 
dated to 9 April 1427.
550
 In this letter, Sigismund makes Rusdorf aware of his desire to bring 
the Order to Hungary including schiffmacher and schiffkinder though he does not explain 
why. It would appear that OBA 4759 was produced after Sigismund wrote his letter of 9 
April 1427 as it contains explanations of why Sigismund wanted aid from the Order and how 
he intended to use it. It would appear that OBA 4759 was delivered to Rusdorf by Caspar 
Schlick, Sigismund’s chancellor, who was dispatched to Marienburg after Sigismund sent 
OBA 4738 in order to arrange the transfer of the Order to Hungary. Zimmermann and Israel 
are right to highlight OBA 4738 as Sigismund’s letter of invitation, but they seem unaware of 
OBA 4759, the document which reveals how Sigismund conceived of the transfer.
551
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We can delve even deeper into Sigismund’s military thinking as we are fortunate to 
have an eyewitness account of Sigismund as he first decided to make the requests contained 
in OBA 4759, a letter which was previously discussed in the first chapter. Claus Redwitz, a 
Teutonic Knight present in Sigismund’s court perhaps as early as 1421, informed Rusdorf in 
a letter dated April 11 1427 of Sigismund’s plan to invite the Order to Hungary in order to 
serve as a bulwark against the Turks. Redwitz stresses the worry which Sigismund felt upon 
hearing that the Ottomans had moved 11,000 men from Asia into Europe across the 
Dardanelles, and the Sultan  and his forces were said now to be between the Sea of Marmara 
and the Danube (czwischen dem sleben mer und der tunow).
552
  
 When seen in this context, Sigismund’s desire for naval expertise appears 
understandable. He was clearly worried by the build-up of Turkish forces beyond the Danube 
and the solution was simple: stop them from crossing. Sigismund alludes to this in his 
aforementioned letter to Henry, Duke of Bavaria-Landshut, in which he stated that his 
planned campaign against the Turks specifically involved holding the Danube.553 After all, 
holding the Danube would provide numerous benefits to Sigismund. If the Turks could be 
stopped from crossing the Danube then his subjects would be safe from Ottoman raiding and 
aggression. There would be no need to devise measures to counter Ottoman numerical 
superiority, as they would not need to engage significant Turkish land forces north of the 
Danube because they would not be able to cross in the first place.
554
 A strong naval force 
could also prevent the Turks from transporting the men and materials which they needed over 
the Danube in order to conquer or subdue any of Sigismund’s fortresses between Belgrade 
and Turnu Severin. Ottoman armies had, for example, crossed the Danube in force before and 
inflicted substantial damage to settlements as far north as Temesvár in the 1390s, and they 
would do so again in Transylvania in 1438 when they forced a crossing at the Iron Gates near 
Turnu Severin.
555
 
 Strengthening his fleet would also allow Sigismund to offer more support to his 
Wallachian allies. Very few sources mention the naval conflicts which the Wallachian 
Voivodes engaged in towards the mouth of the Danube but chance glimpses occasionally 
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survive in the mix of correspondence present in the Ordensbriefarchiv. In June 1432 
Švitrigaila, the Grand Duke of Lithuania (1430-32), penned a letter to Rusdorf, to which was 
attached a report upon the conflict between the Voivode of Wallachia and a marauding force 
identified as der bessern herrn, probably from Moldova.
556
 The marauding force was laying 
waste to the Voivode’s territory with a fleet of 66 ships (sechs und sechczik schiffe zu wassir) 
and in response the Voivode mobilised his own. The decisive battle was most likely a naval 
one as it took place ‘on the water’ (off dem wassir) and the Wallachian Voivode defeated the 
marauding fleet so well ‘that not one of them survived’ (das nyrkeyner von en entkamen).  
Sigismund wanted vessels capable of not just patrolling the Danube but also the sea 
(das mere) and it is worth considering his motives.
557
 He had toyed with the idea of installing 
Teutonic garrisons in the cities of Caffa on the Crimean and Akkerman in Moldova before 
and perhaps now, with the help of Teutonic naval expertise and sea going vessels, he could 
achieve this.
558
 An undated manuscript which concerns Sigismund’s negotiations with the 
Teutonic Order in the later 1420s and which will be explored in more detail later, reports how 
Sigismund wished to ‘to speak about Caffa’ with the Order.559 The status of the Black Sea 
was clearly on Sigismund’s agenda during the late 1420s.560 If Ghillebert de Lannoy’s 
account can be trusted, then the status of Caffa was also a priority of the Ottoman sultan 
during the 1420s.
561
 Therefore, Sigismund may have wanted to increase his naval strength in 
the effort to resist Turkish advances in the Black Sea. Furthermore, the desire to project naval 
power beyond the mouth of the Danube basin and into the Black Sea may seem an outlandish 
plan on Sigismund’s part but it certainly was not when seen within the context of the time. 
Other Christian states had holdings in the Black Sea and it was an active campaigning theatre 
for the Genoese, as demonstrated by Carlo Lomellino’s attempt to strengthen Genoese 
lordship in the Crimea with a force of 5,000 men at arms and 3,000 auxiliaries in 1433.
562
  
3.4 Hansen von Ratibor, the Grandmaster’s Bleidenmeister  
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 Sigismund’s desire for naval and riverine aid has left a significant paper trail in the 
Ordensbriefarchiv, but one particular figure, a certain Hansen von Ratibor, stands out in 
particular. Hansen was a career engineer in the Teutonic Order and a specialist in building 
bridges. Sigismund claimed to require his unique services on his frontier for service in his 
military campaigns. Hansen’s career is easy to follow as he is referred to in the manuscripts 
by his name and not some generic plural military term.
563
 His brief spell in Sigismund’s 
service serves as a good example of how Sigismund used his status as Roman King to draw 
upon expertise and aid to support his Turkish campaigns to which he would not otherwise 
have had access. 
Sigismund first mentions Hansen in a letter to Rusdorf dated 9 October 1428.
564
 In 
this letter Sigismund again requests a range of Teutonic military specialists for service on the 
Danube frontier, with the stated reason of helping him to secure and fortify several castles, 
such as Belgrade, which had recently come into his possession. Sigismund expands upon his 
predicament and continues that ‘we have so many great buildings and works before our hands 
on the Danube and for these we dearly require skilled people [künstrichter lute]’.565 
Sigismund then goes into specifics, and states that he particularly desires those who ‘are able 
to make bridges over great waters’. It would appear that Sigismund knew that the 
Grandmaster had just the person for the job, as he then states in the same letter: 
‘We have now understood that you have master Hansen of Ratibor,566 your 
bleidenmeister…, who we have wanted for a time [to serve] us on this our frontier 
[unser grenicz], to advise and help us in our matters and such things. Therefore we 
desire from your grace and request with diligence, that, when you send the aforesaid 
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brothers of your order, you make agreement with the same master Hansen, so that he 
then comes with them to us.’567 
Once he arrived Hansen was to remain in Sigismund’s service for half a year, a length of time 
that Sigismund presumably thought was long enough for the specialist to ‘help and advise in 
these things’ to the king’s satisfaction.568 
 Hansen is described as a bleidenmeister (sometimes with variable spellings such as 
blyden/bliden), a term which describes an expert in matters relating to military engineering 
and technology. Strictly speaking, its literal meaning (an amalgamation of the words blide 
and meister, literally ‘master of trebuchets’) implies a person with expertise in siege 
machinery, but it is clear that in this case and in others which will be explored later, that 
bleidenmeister can be used to denote range of military abilities.
569
 That being said, it is clear 
that Hansen’s particular specialism was in bridging stretches of water for men and material to 
cross and his status and the value of his services are clear as he is the only Teutonic military 
specialist to be requested by name by Sigismund. Sigismund’s correspondence with the 
Teutonic Knights often contains a range of requests for different types of specialists. These 
include demands for workmen (werkluten), whose precise roles are hard to ascertain, to very 
specific ones, such as for brick makers (zigelstreicher), both of which will be explored in 
subsequent chapters. However, Hansen and his skills are requested specifically and by name 
by Sigismund, a request which Sigismund had to make again several times in 1429 as the 
bridge builder’s arrival at his court in Bratislava was delayed. 
 The next mention of Hansen by Sigismund comes in a letter of 3 February 1429, 
where his skills and intended application on the Danube frontier is spelt out in more detail.
570
 
In this letter Sigismund reminds Rusdorf, that ’we have previously written to your grace on 
account of master Hansen blidenmeister’, and requests that he sends him to him as soon as 
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possible.
571
 Sigismund states that he requires Hansen’s presence because ‘we should have a 
bridge, and we must [have him] now to raise this’. It is clear that Hansen had a particular skill 
which was instrumental to Sigismund’s plans. A couple of months later Hansen was in direct 
contact with Sigismund and clearly on his way to Bratislava, where Sigismund was based. A 
letter sent by Sigismund to Rusdorf in April 1429 records that, ‘yesterday the master 
bleidenmeister answered us in his letter’, after which Sigismund thanks the Grandmaster for 
‘having sent Hansen to us’ and promises to keep him safe.572 
Just why Sigismund wanted Hansen so much is clear from another manuscript 
preserved in the Ordensbriefarchiv.
573
 This curious document, which lists a whole manner of 
things relating both to the Teutonic management of the Danube frontier and contemporary 
political matters, begins with the heading, ‘So is our lord Roman King’s opinion regarding 
the gift of the castle district’, presumably to the Teutonic Order. It is not an item of 
correspondence and it bears no seal or dating clause. It would appear to be some form of 
memorandum, perhaps produced by a Teutonic Knight or a scribe of Sigismund’s during the 
negotiations for the transfer of the Order to the Danube. The document can be dated to 1428 
or very early 1429, as it notes the coronation of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Witold and the 
ceding of the New Mark as topics of discussion, both of which occurred in early 1429.
574
  
Included in this document is a detailed description of the various personnel and 
materials that Sigismund wished the Teutonic order to send to the castles now under their 
own control, which can only mean the dozen or so fortresses which the knights were given 
between Belgrade and Turnu Severin.
575
 Hansen is included in this list too, with the 
document implying that he was to act as some sort of advisor in the construction of bridges 
made out of boats on the Danube: ‘The lord Roman king desires master Hansen the 
bleidenmeister, to instruct here how one makes bridges over the Danube on ships’.576 It is 
clear then that Hansen was destined for the region of the Danube between Belgrade and 
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Turnu Severin which Sigismund was so concerned with defending and, once there, he was to 
undertake a very specific task. 
3.5 Hansen von Ratibor, Golubac, and the military challenges of the later 1420s  
While Hansen’s skills as a bridge builder would have made him a useful asset to any 
medieval king, Sigismund’s request for the engineer has to be seen in the context of the 
changing military requirements that he was experiencing in his campaigns against the 
Ottomans in the later 1420s. As we have seen, Hansen is first mentioned in an item of 
correspondence in October 1428, a document which also discusses Sigismund’s military 
commitments on the Danube frontier. In this letter Sigismund reveals to Rusdorf, that ‘your 
grace knows well, that since the death of the Despot [of Serbia] we have accepted Belgrade 
and also from the Danube to Turnu Severin we have many good castles by the grace of God 
on both sides of the Danube.’577 This transfer of Serbian fortresses to Hungarian control was 
agreed in the Treaty of Tata in 1426, where, upon Lazarević’s death and in return for 
recognising Lazarević’s nephew, George Branković, as the successor to the Serbian 
Despotate, Sigismund would receive a string of fortresses along the Danube, including 
Belgrade and Golubac among others.
578
 Hitherto, Sigismund’s defensive line of castles had 
been on the northern, Hungarian side of the river, but with the extension of his line into 
Serbia and across the river Danube, the importance of being able to bridge the river assumes 
a new importance. It was now vital to be able to bridge the river easily so as to ensure that the 
fortresses of Belgrade, Golubac and others on the southern side of the river, could be 
supported and supplied in peace time and during times of conflict.
579
 
 Sigismund would pay a dear price for learning the importance of being able to 
transport his forces across the Danube. In June 1428 Sigismund was attempting to seize the 
critical fortress of Golubac with a Hungarian force supported by Polish, Lithuanian and 
Wallachian contingents. After a short and unsuccessful siege Sigismund was forced to retreat 
to the northern side of the Danube but many of his men were left stranded on the southern 
side and slaughtered by the Turks. It was probably this experience, and his plan to retake 
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Golubac, which prompted his request for Hansen.580 Golubac, despite the terms of the Treaty 
of Tata, was not transferred to Hungarian control and was instead sold by the Serbian 
commander to the Ottomans in the summer or autumn of 1427, who then promptly installed a 
garrison.
581
 Golubac, whose loss according to Bertrandon de la Broquière ‘was a great 
damage for the Christians’, was a strategically vital fortress that was essential for Sigismund 
to control.
582
 As a result, Sigismund committed to this siege one of the largest and most well 
equipped armies in his reign, including Genoese crossbowmen, galleys armed with cannon 
and other types of artillery and a force of Polish and Lithuanian knights.
583
 Sigismund had 
crossed the river with his army, presumably in the same galleys that would later bombard the 
fortress by the 27 April and soon encircled the fortress.
584
 A large Ottoman force arrived to 
lift the siege but around 3 June,
585
 and in a decision that would draw both criticism from 
contemporaries and modern historians, Sigismund decided not to risk a battle and instead to 
make a truce with the Turks and withdraw to the northern side of the river.
586
 
Despite assurances that his army would be allowed to make the time-consuming 
crossing back to the northern side unmolested, Sigismund’s forces were treacherously 
attacked and their orderly withdrawal turned into anarchy.
587
 A significant force of soldiers, 
including Sigismund himself, was left stranded on the southern side and in grave danger, with 
only a few boats able to ferry soldiers across at a time.
588
 Luckily, at least for Sigismund, and 
after apparently two days of fighting,
589
 Zawissus the Black, the leader of the Polish knights, 
fought a rear guard action which allowed him to cross the river and escape unharmed.
590
 
Nevertheless, this act of heroism resulted in the Pole’s death and the deaths of a significant 
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number of soldiers, although Broquierè’s estimate of 6000 Wallachian casualties dying in the 
rearguard action is probably exaggerated.
591
  
 The above account is reliant on printed material but it must be said that the two most 
informative accounts of the Siege of Golubac and Sigismund’s retreat have not yet been 
published. Aside from the two accounts of the siege sent by Witold to Rusdorf and the Master 
of Livonia respectively in August 1428, the other sources for the brief campaign were written 
much later and the details of the battle have been distorted.
592
 Under the signature 
Ordensbriefarchiv 4954 there are two illuminating accounts of Sigismund’s Golubac 
campaign, though only one carries details which are most relevant for this chapter. This 
particular letter was dated in Buda on the vigil of the feast of Peter and Paul (28 June) (datum 
Bude in vigilia beatorum apostolorum petri et pauli anno etc xxviii°), by someone who would 
appear to be a diocesan official in Wrocław (Breslau) (magister Sefridus Degenberg 
cancellarius Wratislavensis).
593
 Sefridus’ account largely agrees with the other accounts of 
the battle but it gives us precious more detail regarding Sigismund’s retreat. Sefridus notes 
Sigismund agreement of a peace with the Turkish sultan and how ‘he withdrew from the 
siege of the castle of Golubac [castri tarobenburg] with his people [gente bellica] and 
crossed over the river Danube’.594 However, he was forced to abandon some of his soldiers 
on the shoreline surrounding the castle propter navium carentiam et destinam (‘on account of 
lack of ships and support’).595 Before long the Turks attacked the remainder of the army, 
killing many and capturing others, including Zawissus whom they later executed. Sefridus’ 
mention of Sigismund’s lack of ships and naval transport is significant here. With additional 
naval support from the Teutonic Order and the services of a bridge builder such as Hansen, 
Sigismund would have been able to invest Golubac far more easily. It has been argued that 
the defeat at Golubac scarred Sigismund and that afterwards he took little personal interest in 
the defence of the Danube.
596
 Sigismund’s efforts to secure the services of Hansen would 
suggest otherwise. 
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It would genuinely appear that campaigning across the Danube posed logistical 
problems and that the ability to erect temporary bridges, whether with pontoons or, in 
Hansen’s case, by using a chain of ships, would have been a vital strategic and tactical asset 
to Sigismund. The remark of Stephen Rozgonyi, the count of Temesvár (1427-1438), to 
Lászlό Töttös, the captain of Belgrade, in a letter of 1427 reinforces just what an asset this 
could be. Rozgonyi could only imagine prolonging the campaign against the Turks ‘if the 
water of the Danube was to freeze over’, presumably because he could think of no other 
viable means to cross the stretch of water.
597
 That the act of bridging the Danube was an 
important consideration for Sigismund and the Teutonic knights during their settlement of 
frontier is clear as it appears in other documents. For example, an undated list of forts with 
their Teutonic garrisons on the Danube, probably compiled between 1428-9, records good 
points to cross the river, stating at one point that, ‘between both [fortresses] known as Saint 
Ladislaus and Požeženo is a good crossing (gute feere)’.598  
That Sigismund planned to use Hansen in an attempt to conquer Golubac is supported 
by a letter which the Roman King sent to Frederick, the Margrave of Brandenburg, in 
November 1428. In this letter Sigismund makes it very clear to the Margrave that his 
kingdom is struggling with the Turks and the pagans and requires his aid in order to wrest 
Golubac from Turkish hands.
599
 In aid of this Sigismund asks for ‘ a few Bleydenmeister, one 
or more’, and in particular people with the ability to make bridges and ladders (‘prechen 
und… steygen’).600 Hansen was just one part of a much broader plan of Sigismund, where he 
sought to use his connections as Roman King in order to mobilise the resources he needed to 
successfully prosecute his campaigns against the Turks. 
It has been suggested by Katalin Szende that Sigismund could not have used Hansen’s 
skills on the Danube in the region between Belgrade and Turnu Severin as the river there was 
too wide.
601
 Szende’s research has underlined how Sigismund attempted to bridge the 
Danube around Bratislava in the 1430s, a feat which was only accomplished in 1439 by 
Sigismund’s successor, Albert.602 Albert constructed his bridge using a chain of ships, which, 
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as we have seen, was precisely Hansen’s area of expertise.603 Therefore, it is not out of the 
question that Sigismund intended to use Hansen’s skills around Bratislava and not against the 
Turks. In my opinion, however, it is highly likely that Sigismund intended to use Hansen’s 
skills on the Danube around Belgrade. The report of a certain Paschale de Sorgo on the state 
of John Hunyadi’s army on the eve of the Battle of Kosovo provides supporting evidence. De 
Sorgo was a Ragusan in the service of the Serbian Despot, George Branković (ruled 1427-
1456), and he wrote a detailed report on almost all aspects of Hunyadi’s army while present 
in the Serbian war camp in September 1448. His letter was copied by the humanist Cyriac of 
Ancona and now survives in a single copy in the Biblioteca Universitaria Allesandrina.
604
 It 
has been published with numerous errors and omissions by M. Kostić,605 but historians who 
have covered the 1448 campaign, including Halil Inalcik, Kenneth Setton and Oliver Jens 
Schmitt just to name a few, seem unaware of it.
606
 
De Sorgo describes Hunyadi’s siege train and equipment in detail, and notes his 
‘immense number of disconnected ladders and bridges and many other wonderful and clever 
instruments of war’.607 These ladders and bridges were a critical part of Hunyadi’s army and 
allowed de Sorgo to credit Hunyadi’s army as one of the best resourced which he had ever 
seen. A campaigning army which needed to cross the Danube or other waterways in the area 
needed to have various options. Seen in this light, Hansen would have been useful to 
Sigismund on the Danube in the later 1420s and early 1430s. 
3.6 Hansen von Ratibor and his spell at Sigismund’s court  
 The extent to which Sigismund realised his ambitious plans to install the Teutonic 
Order in Hungary has been debated by historians. János Bak, for example, has stated that 
little or no evidence exists to suggest that Sigismund’s plans to use the Teutonic Order were 
converted into reality.608 This issue will be dealt with more broadly at a later point, but there 
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exists concrete evidence that Hansen did spend time at Sigismund’s court and serve him 
militarily. Firstly, a scrap of parchment which survives in the Hungarian National Archives 
demonstrates that Hansen did visit Sigismund and even drew a stipend.
609
 Fortunately for the 
year 1429 a list survives, which details the arrivals and departures of Sigismund’s servants in 
‘the tent of the lord King…in the castle of Bratislava’.610 One of the entries runs Item 
magistro Johanni pontiparo, who is probably Hansen but with his name and profession spelt 
in Latin. Hansen is the diminutive German form of Johannes and pontiparo (a combination of 
the noun pons and verb paro) certainly means bridge builder or bridge preparer.  
 Whatever the case, alongside this footprint left in Sigismund’s administration lie two 
letters which attest to Hansen’s brief spell in Sigismund’s service. While serving Sigismund 
Hansen himself wrote two letters to Rusdorf. The letters, dated to 6 November 1429 and 9 
February 1430 and both sent from Bratislava, imply that he was in the kingdom for at least 
half a year.
611
 Both letters are rather uninformative in the respect that they shed little light on 
what he actually did for Sigismund, though they do give an interesting view of the king. The 
first letter is difficult to interpret as it is defaced by a large hole through its centre, but it 
largely revolves around the worries which Hansen had for his adoptive son, who appears to 
be a schoolmaster.
612
 In the second letter Hansen expresses his desire to return home, but it 
would appear that Sigismund was rather pleased with Hansen’s services over the winter and 
was encouraging him to remain in his court. Hansen reports that Sigismund had spoken to 
him several times and had even asked him to send for his wife, presumably so that he could 
make his home in Hungary.
613
 Perhaps Sigismund asked him to do this when he was drunk. 
Hansen goes on to report that the Grandmaster should be aware that many of his servants, in 
particular a certain martinus, were erring as they were appearing in Sigismund’s court and 
delivering letters to him wen her eyn loter ist und eyn trunkenbolt (‘when he is loose and a 
drunkard’). Sigismund had been seriously ill over the winter of 1429/1430 but clearly he was 
feeling better.
614
 Regarding all other matters Hansen states that he will wait and inform 
Rusdorf by mouth (euwern gnaden wol muntlich sagen und vorezden).
615
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 It is highly unlikely, however, that Hansen’s spell in Sigismund’s service involved 
campaigning against the Turks. This is because Sigismund’s truce agreed with the Turks at 
Golubac eventually evolved into a three year peace with the Sultan.
616
 Peace on the Danube 
frontier would have been beneficial for both rulers, considering that Murad had considerable 
resources already invested in the siege of Thessalonica and Sigismund a great desire for a 
peaceful southern frontier given his wish to travel to Rome to be crowned Holy Roman 
Emperor.
617
 However, attached to Hansen’s first letter is tiny scrap of paper, a so called 
zettel, which reveals that Hansen was probably used by Sigismund not in any campaign 
against the Turks, but in actions against the Hussites. Hansen notes in the zettel that he was 
on his way to wngerissche brode, modern day Uherský Brod in Moravia, a town which had 
been seized by the Hussites the year before.
618
 Hansen notes that after conquering the town 
his plan was to head deeper into Moravia, before moving north to Breslau in Silesia 
(Wrocław, in modern Poland). There exists a draft copy of a letter from Rusdorf to Hansen 
which was drafted on 21 December 1429, in which Rusdorf notes how Hansen was moving 
against the heretics (die ketczer).
619
 Perhaps, in the case of Hansen, Sigismund was 
deliberately using the spectre of the Turkish threat to gain resources from the Teutonic Order 
and then putting them to other uses. However, this was not the case for other resources which 
Sigismund garnered from the order, as these were clearly put to use on the Danube frontier 
against the Turks.  
A broader analysis of the Teutonic Order’s activities on the Danube frontier will 
follow in the next chapter, but it is clear that at least some portions of Sigismund’s plans to 
use the Order’s naval expertise were converted into reality. Sigismund implied in his letter to 
Rusdorf in September 1427 (OBA 4759) that he did not necessarily intend to build his ships, 
but that he already had galleys though he did intend a sailing vessel capable of operating on 
the sea. Whether he himself purchased them or not, by 1431 Redwitz had an 80 strong fleet 
stationed on the Danube between Regensburg and Buda. In a letter of August 1431, Redwitz 
notes that he has a fleet of ships, 80 strong (attzig houptschiff), on the Danube and that he has 
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been able to ‘send people and all necessities to the houses [in Hungary]’, meaning the 
fortresses now under Order control.
620
 
 Whether these ships were ever deployed to the area of the Danube between Belgrade 
and Turnu Severin is hard to tell. In this respect the Teutonic Order’s accounts, drawn up to 
record the expenditure which they were incurring in their Hungarian fortresses, provide some 
importance evidence.
621
 The accounts suggest that they only operated a fleet of smaller, oar 
powered ships and never the larger sea going fleet that the king had also desired. Overall, the 
accounts reveal that the Teutonic knights deployed 44 nazaden and employed 480 men 
dedicated to serving in them. These boats would appear to be some form of rowed vessel as 
they were allocated 10 rowers each, although the accounts also contain an entry for the 
payment of these boatmen which records not 480, but 1100 in Teutonic service, so the real 
number of men to each boat could likely be higher.
622
 This roughly tallies with the manpower 
which Sigismund desired to man his ships in previous correspondence with the Order.
623
 The 
reliability of the Teutonic Order’s accounts has been questioned, but seen in this light some 
of the figures contained within can partly be relied upon.
624
 The longer term impact which the 
Teutonic Knights had on the development of Sigismund’s navy is debatable, as, after 
suffering a defeat in 1432, they were relieved of their command.  Little is known about this 
campaign in 1432 but a few lines in an aforementioned letter, sent by Švitrigaila to Rusdorf 
in June 1432, are instructive.
625
 The letter describes how the Turks were laying waste to 
Hungary and killing many Hungarian lords umb eyseryn Thor (‘around the Iron Gate’).626 
The fact that the Teutonic Knights were unable to defend the crossing at the Iron Gates would 
imply that the naval force which they had at their disposal was either not that significant or 
ineffective in repulsing Turkish attacks. 
3.7 Sigismund’s broader efforts to source naval resources from the Reich 
However, the Teutonic Order was not the only source of naval expertise which 
Sigismund could draw upon as Roman King. From a broader perspective the Teutonic 
Knights were simply one source of many upon which Sigismund could draw upon after his 
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election as Roman King in 1410. As the remainder of this chapter will now demonstrate, the 
opportunities which Sigismund had to recruit naval and riverine expertise to support his 
efforts against the Ottoman Turks radically increased after 1410. His diplomatic travels 
throughout Austria, Germany, France, England and Aragon between 1414 and 1419 gave him 
the chance to recruit the very best naval expertise which western Christendom could offer.  
Before exploring Sigismund’s recruitment while engaged on his foreign travels, a few 
brief comments on Sigismund’s efforts to combat the Ottoman threat on the Danube as King 
of Hungary before 1410 are required. While Sigismund’s predecessors, such as King Louis 
(1342-82), had certainly used ships in their military campaigns in the Adriatic Sea, it would 
appear that it was only in the 1390s that the use of ships on the Danube river started to 
warrant serious consideration.
627
 The presence of ‘captains of the galleys’ in Sigismund’s 
retinue in 1389,
 628
 implies that Sigismund had the use of some ships from the start of the 
reign and his correspondence with the Venetians during the preparations for the Nicopolis 
campaign demonstrates that he envisaged the use of Venetian naval expertise in his crusade 
against the Turks.
629
 Venetian aid was not forthcoming but Sigismund’s method of escape 
from the battlefield of Nicopolis proves that he had sea-worthy vessels on the Danube. One 
source reveals that the defeated king sailed from the battlefield to Constantinople with his 
barons in galleys across the Danube, the sea and numerous rivers,
630
 where at one point, 
according to Schiltberger, Sigismund was taunted while sailing past the Turkish garrison at 
Gallipoli.
631
 
The beginnings of the development of naval organisation in Hungary is revealed by a 
command of Sigismund, dated to 11 June 1396 and perhaps stimulated by the transportation 
needs of the crusader army crossing through northern Hungary around that time.
632
 In this 
request, the town of Bratislava is asked somehow to source or build ‘six great ships’.633 These 
vessels appear not to be the galleys or ships needed to ensure that Sigismund could dominate 
the river Danube but horse transports, as the letter states that the ships ‘should be able to 
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bring across to the other side of the river Danube forty horses and riders at any time’.634 
Where these ships were to come from is unclear, with the letter simply stating that ‘without 
delay, three should be established from that part and the remaining three from the other part 
of the Danube’.635 Their sourcing or construction was to be overseen by so called homines 
navigatores and contractors (conductores), although the letter gives no indication as to from 
where they were to be drawn from. The letter also foresees the creation of some sort of 
colony of seamen in the city, as the councillors and clergymen of the cathedral were to 
cooperate in bringing together sailors, although from where precisely is unclear, and then 
entering them into a census.
636
 Whether Bratislava did succeed in fulfilling Sigismund’s 
wishes is unclear. While this command does demonstrate that Sigismund was not content 
with depending on the mercantile trading community for his naval needs but was attempting 
to develop his own institutions and networks, there is little evidence to suggest that his orders 
were ever put into action.
637
 
In fact, it was only after Sigismund’s election as Roman King that we see plans such 
as those above translated into practice. Election as Roman King made Sigismund the secular 
head of western Christendom and with this authority Sigismund summoned a great council of 
ecclesiastical and secular leaders to Constance, in order to resolve the schism of the Church. 
This political act, which Sigismund was able to initiate by virtue of being King of the 
Romans, required him to travel extensively throughout Europe. While conducting diplomacy 
across western Europe Sigismund came into contact and used sailing vessels to a much 
greater extent than before and it was precisely this experience that helped him to develop a 
Danube fleet during the latter half of his reign.  
For example, Sigismund is reported as arriving at Constance by ship and he clearly 
planned on conducting many of his other future travels by ship too.
638
 On 19 October 
Sigismund sent Heinz Wyn, a citizen of Frankfurt, to his home town on the Main with the 
materials to build more sailing vessels to facilitate further travel. Wyn was to raise the 
required amount of ‘carpenters and other necessities’ and to ensure that the ‘ships were made 
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and prepared without delay’.639 Frankfurt was not the only source of naval expertise which 
Sigismund drew upon while travelling. It would appear that Sigismund took advantage of his 
geographical position in the west of the Reich and recruited rather widely. Windecke notes in 
his chronicle, how  
Here [in Constance] the King had ships, which he had built in Constance with 
Zealanders which he had brought from Zealand. Therefore he had brought some 
[shipbuilders] from a number of lands, from Catalonia, from Provence, from France, 
from England, from Flanders, from Brabant and from other lands and with these the 
king had built ships.
640
 
 A letter of Sigismund’s preserved in a fifteenth century copy book now in Vienna 
supports Windecke, a chronicler whose reliability is often questioned. In a letter dated 13 
April 1417, Sigismund thanks an unknown prince (illustris princeps)
 
for allowing him the use 
of some of his magistros et opifices galliatarum
641
 As the document is written in Latin it is 
highly likely that the recipient was not of a German speaking land. In this case then, 
Sigismund was recruiting outside of his base of subjects as Roman King. Nevertheless, it was 
precisely Sigismund’s election as Roman King which enabled him to convene the Council of 
Constance and which offered him opportunities to recruit shipbuilders such as these.  
It would appear that Sigismund had a genuine interest in naval matters and warfare 
while travelling abroad. 642 A Middle English poem written in the 1430s, The libelle of 
Englyshe polycye, purports to record a conversation between Sigismund and Henry V, King 
of England (1413-1422), while they were together during the summer of 1416. Of all the 
things which the anonymous author could have made Sigismund and Henry talk about, they 
talk about the security of the waters around Calais and Dover.
643 
In the poem, Sigismund 
advises Henry to safeguard Calais and Dover just as he would safeguard his own two eyes, 
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for as long as he held the two towns the sea crossing would be secure and Henry would be 
able to make war abroad and safeguard his reign in France.
644
 
The end result of Sigismund’s recruitment is recorded in the account of his arrival at 
Constance in 1417, written by the Teutonic Knight Heinrich Streler and sent to Frankfurt’s 
council. Streler was struck by Sigismund’s method of arrival and the seafaring qualities of his 
vessels, stating ‘that our gracious lord the King has arrived at Constance, made in eight such 
ships, the same as ships in the sea, which are called galliots’.645 While Sigismund’s 
recruitment of shipbuilders was designed not to support his fight against the Turks but to 
make his diplomatic travels along the Rhine easier, they still represent how Sigismund put his 
connections in the Reich to use in order to provide him with a fleet. The ships mentioned by 
Streler were clearly not taken with Sigismund back to Hungary as several years later 
Sigismund notes in a letter his intention to sell five of them in Cologne for 180 Rhenish 
Gulden, though this sum is rather small and amounts roughly to £24 sterling.
646
 Moreover, 
there is concrete evidence to show that Sigismund brought many of his recruits back with him 
to Hungary to build a fleet on the Danube. 
3.8 Sigismund and his recruitment of Flemish shipbuilders while at Constance 
That Sigismund took a team of Flemish shipbuilders back with him to Hungary is 
clear from a letter of safe passage, dated to 23 November 1418 in Passau. This letter ensures 
their safe passage to Bratislava and then to Buda. This letter, sent by Sigismund from Passau 
to the count of Bratislava on 23 November 1418, implies that these shipbuilders 
(navifactores) had been in Sigismund’s presence since their recruitment in Flanders and were 
now being sent ahead from the Passau to Buda.
647
 These shipbuilders could be the same 
magistros et opifices galliatarum mentioned in Sigismund’s employ in his letter to a certain 
illustris princeps, though it cannot be known for certain. 
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Sigismund had clearly given some thought to how these shipbuilders were to be 
employed as the document details how they should be treated, where they should be stationed 
and who should be responsible for them. These ‘shipbuilders of Flanders’ were, ‘as soon as 
possible to arrange and build our ships to the number of twenty two’, and were first destined 
for Bratislava.
648
 Upon arrival they were to report to Peter Kapleno, the count of Bratislava. 
Sigismund’s order, notably that Kapleno should equip the shipbuilders with ‘suitable sailors 
and experts’ in Bratislava, implies that king’s aforementioned requests to the city in 1396 had 
been followed to some extent.
649
 Once ready, the letter states that these shipbuilders ‘should 
be safely led to [build] the same ships in Buda and assigned to Noffry, our chamberlain of 
Buda’.650 Once in Buda, Noffry would then provide or purchase the relevant materials for the 
shipbuilders and they could finally get to work.
651
  
The number of 22 is worthy of comment. In the spring of 1395 Sigismund had desired 
25 galleys from Venice in order to pursue war against the Turks on the water, though whether 
he wanted to use them in the Aegean or on the Danube is unclear.
652
 Sigismund never did get 
the ships he wanted from Venice, but the opportunities that he enjoyed as Roman King 
allowed him to recruit his own shipbuilders and use them to build the fleet which he desired. 
Moreover, Bertrandon de la Broquière’s account of his visit to Hungary in 1433 would also 
imply that Sigismund recruited other experts to conduct work on the Danube in Buda while in 
France between 1415 and 1417. Broquière records that Sigismund had hired six or eight 
families from France with the express purpose of building a tower capable of extending a 
chain across the river to the south of his palace.
653
 It is clear then, that Sigismund’s 
recruitment of shipbuilders was part of a broader platform of seeking foreign experts who 
could help secure his hold on the Danube waters. 
Sigismund’s recruitment of these Flemish shipbuilders perhaps explains the wording 
of Sigismund’s requests to the Grandmaster roughly a decade later where he implies that he 
had ships, but he needed help in maintaining them. While there is no conclusive evidence, it 
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is highly probable that these Flemish shipbuilders did build Sigismund a fleet of ships which 
saw service against the Ottoman Turks.
654
 Perhaps after the fleet had been built his band of 
Flemish shipbuilders had disbanded, hence his request for shipbuilders from the Order who 
could help him maintain the fleet which they had left. Whatever the case, after Sigismund’s 
recruitment of Flemish shipbuilders in 1419 we encounter mentions of naval combat and the 
use of vessels in operations against the Turks with increasing frequency. That is partly 
because our source material is richer for the 1420s and 1430s, but, nevertheless, it would 
appear that after the early 1420s Sigismund and his barons had access to a class of naval 
vessel which they did not have access to before. 
It is clear that Sigismund’s attempt to seize Golubac in 1428 involved a heavily armed 
fleet of ships as the sources for this battle are particularly rich, largely because one of the ship 
captains excited a fair amount of attention. Remarkably, one ship was commanded by 
Countess Cecilia Rozgonyi, husband of Stephen Rozgonyi, the count of Temes (1427-1438). 
Her audacity and fearlessness in fighting the Turks must have left a deep impression on 
Sigismund, as he commemorates her actions in a charter dated to 1435.
655
  
In this charter, Sigismund notes how the fleet transported his forces across the Danube 
in order to allow them to besiege Golubac. That Cecilia was in command of unam 
galeam…inter caeteras (‘one galley among others’) implies that Sigismund had the capability 
to mobilise at least several ships to support his siege.
656
 These must have been sizable ships 
too, as they were complete with cannon, ballistae and other siege engines (pixidibus, seu 
bombardis, balistisque et aliis ad id conquisitis ingeniis).
657
 The ships in question had clearly 
been adapted to suit the required conditions, as the artillery in question was not for transport 
and deployment on the other side of the river, but had been mounted onto the vessel for 
firing. They were able to inflict considerable damage, breaking the walls and smashing some 
of the towers of Golubac castle.
658
 The damage which the cannon on Sigismund’s ships 
inflicted on the fortress may have been worsened by firing at close range. One charter notes 
how Cecilia’s ship fired her cannon from within arrow shot of the castle, though even this did 
not scare her in the slightest.
659
 Nevertheless, these were clearly naval vessels with strong 
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enough cannon to damage stone masonry and on a par with the vessels outfitted by 
Sigismund’s contemporaries in England and France.660  
It would appear that these ships were constantly mobilised as well, with Broquière 
noting how Sigismund permanently maintained 6 galleys and five galliots outside Belgrade 
for the defence of the fortress.
661
 A document from 1434 notes how Sigismund employed a 
certain Jacob in Bratislava, qui custodit naves domini Imperatoris, who may be the same 
Jacob as Sigismund’s master carpenter, a figure briefly explored in the next chapter.662 Other 
references to ships on the Danube, such as in 1435, when ‘the ships of the same royal majesty 
towards Belgrade’ are mentioned in a letter between two barons, reinforce both how the 
Turkish threat necessitated the maintenance of a permanent naval force and how Sigismund 
now had the capability to do so.
663
 
3.9 The naval expedition of 1437 
A campaign waged against the Turks by a group of Hungarian barons in the summer 
of 1437 reinforces how Sigismund could use his status as Roman King to support his naval 
efforts against the Turks. This expedition led by Frank Tallóci, the captain of Belgrade and 
Ban of Severin, was a campaign aimed at burning the Ottoman fleet on the Great Morava 
(Velika Morava) in modern day Serbia
 664
 The expedition comprised a fleet of ships, heavily 
armed with cannon, siege weaponry and with a force of infantry and cavalry.
665
 The fleet set 
sail from Požeženo, on the river bank opposite Golubac, whence it sailed up the Great 
Morava. Here they burnt a fleet of Turkish ships (naves et galee), before continuing to sail 
upstream where they laid waste to Turkish possessions in Kruševać and burnt more Turkish 
vessels.
666
 On the way back the force landed and risked battle with the Beg of Vidin, whom 
they defeated.
667
 This campaign reinforces the importance of naval warfare on the Danube 
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frontier. After all, their central aim was to burn Turkish ships and thus neutralise their 
presence on the Danube waters. One can perhaps emphasise the success of this campaign too 
much. After all, the taller, heavier European vessels generally triumphed against the Ottoman 
Turkish craft in naval battles throughout the later medieval period so the achievements of 
1437 can be overplayed. Broquière notes in his report, for example, that the Hungarians 
operate galleys and galiots on the Danube while the Turks the smaller and lighter fusta.
668
 
Nevertheless, the campaign garnered mentions in a range of sources and news of the success 
was enthusiastically received in Constantinople and Basle.
669
 
These significant successes were only made possible because of Sigismund’s status as 
Roman King, as much of the naval support was drawn from Vienna. Sigismund therefore had 
taken advantage of his connections with Albrecht II of Austria, his subject as Roman King as 
well as his son-in-law, in order to source the ships he required for this ambitious expedition.  
Our source for this is a letter of Sigismund to the town council of Sopron (Ödenburg), 
sent 29 March 1437.
670
 In this letter Sigismund notes how he intends to source twelve ships 
from Vienna, vulgo hochnawer dictas (‘called high ships in the vulgar tongue’), and that he 
requires money from Sopron in order to outfit them.
671
 Sigismund continues that the ships 
will have arrived in Bratislava by 19 May, where George Rozgony, the Count of Bratislava, 
will supply three men to each ship to act as captains and navigators before they sail to 
Belgrade. Before departing, however, the ships were to take on board some important 
passengers. Sigismund notes that the ships will be transporting a capitaneus Taboritarum 
cum suis Taboritis.
672
 Sigismund foresaw then the deployment of a company of Hussite 
Taborites against the Turks on the Danube frontier.
673
 Sigismund was therefore drawing upon 
another of his kingdoms, the Kingdom of Bohemia, in order to support this campaign against 
the Turks. To be fair, Sigismund’s letter to Sopron indicates only his intentions, but further 
evidence suggests that Sigismund converted these ambitious plans into reality. The chronicle 
of Bartošek z Drahonic (died. c. 1443) notes how the force assembled for the campaign in 
1437 was composed of Hungarians, Czechs, Moravians and Poles, who together overcame 
                                                          
668
 Broquière, Le Voyage d’Outremer, p. 214-5. 
669
 Hoensch, Kaiser Sigismund, p. 440. 
670
 Palacký, Urkundliche Beiträge, ii. 475-6 (nr 985). 
671
 Ibid., ii. 476. 
672
 Ibid., ii. 476. Tresp, Söldner aus Böhmen, pp. 44-5. 
673
 It has been speculated that the commander of the expedition was Jan Jiskra. See, Hoensch, Kaiser Sigismund, 
pp. 339-40; Martyn Rady, ‘Jiskra, Hussitism and Slovakia’, in Confession and Nation in the Era of 
Reformations: Central Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Eva Doležalova and Jaroslav Pánek (Prague: 
Institute of History, 2011), p. 60. Tresp thinks it unlikely, Söldner aus Böhmen, p. 45. 
132 
 
many Turks in battle. (Uhrů, Čechů, Moravanů a Poláků… přemohla v bitvě mnoho 
Turků).674 News of this campaign spread to Constantinople, where a certain John of Ragusa 
noted in a letter of August 1437 how an army of Hungarians and Bohemians had triumphed 
against the Turks.
675
 
Sigismund ruled numerous kingdoms and Jefferson has speculated, that if 
Sigismund’s plan was ‘to bring the forces of his various realms to bear against the Turks, it 
was a policy the elder monarch would never realise’.676 Frank Tallóci’s raid demonstrates that 
Sigismund did realise this plan, drawing together naval expertise from the Reich and men 
from Hungary and Bohemia together for a joint campaign against the Turks.
677
 One could 
make the argument that it would have been quite easy for Hungarian lords to use ships from 
Vienna in their military campaigns against the Turks and that Sigismund’s status as Roman 
King was not important. After all, Vienna enjoyed trading links with Hungarian towns such 
as Bratislava and Budapest and Viennese councillors did occasionally sell ships in Bratislava. 
In the summer of 1456, for example, a citizen of Bratislava wrote a rather amusing letter to 
the Burgermeister of Vienna. In this letter he stated that he had not sold the Burgermeister’s 
ship as he had been asked to do, but that he had in fact lent it to a group of crusaders who 
were heading south the fight the Turks.
678
 However, Sigismund’s status as Roman King was 
important in making the expedition of 1437 possible. Ships were mobilised in the Duchy of 
Austria in 1440 for defence against the Turks, for example, but they did not cooperate with 
Hungarian forces further down the Danube. The raid on Kruševać and the wide geographical 
base of expertise upon which it drew was made possible only because of Sigismund, who 
united several kingdoms in his one person. 
Before concluding, it is worth stressing that Sigismund, as the King of Hungary, was 
by no means unique in having to recruit outside of his subjects in order to gain access to 
specialised naval and riverine expertise. Contemporary to Sigismund Venetians employed 
Greek shipbuilders in their arsenal, who were able to build ships with different characteristics 
than which Venetian shipbuilders could offer.
679
 Similarly, Philip the Good used a Portuguese 
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shipbuilder, João Alfonso and his four servants, to help build his caravels.
680
 It is not the fact 
that Sigismund is recruiting from outside of his Hungarian subjects that is important, but how 
he is recruiting. The examples in this chapter show very clearly how Sigismund was using the 
channels available to him as King of the Romans in order to gain access to naval and riverine 
expertise. As an added bonus, by using his status as their nominal overlord Sigismund was 
also able to gain access to much of this expertise for free. 
Sigismund was able use his status as Roman King to draw upon naval and riverine 
expertise in various ways. Sigismund could demand from his subjects as Roman King that aid 
be sent to him, such as in the case of his relationship with Rusdorf and the Teutonic Order. In 
other cases, he personally recruited the experts which he needed. His diplomatic travels in the 
Reich and throughout western Christendom, themselves necessitated by his election as 
Roman King, allowed Sigismund to directly recruit the experts he needed in order to support 
his naval efforts against the Ottomans. 
Sigismund’s recruitment of naval expertise and conduct of warfare on the Danube has 
deeper implications. When seen in the context of this chapter, Sigismund’s failure to secure 
naval aid from Venice seems far less significant than before, though it is true that in the past 
people had turned to Venice for ships.
681
 His securing of the Roman Crown in 1410 gave him 
other means with which he could gain support in order to tighten his hold on the Danube and 
fight the Ottoman threat on the water. Sigismund’s interest in securing naval expertise 
reinforces the importance which he attached to the naval aspect of his efforts against the 
Turks. Much has been written on Sigismund’s development of a chain of fortresses which 
lined in some parts the very banks of the Danube and which buffered his southern frontier 
against Turkish attacks. However, the fact that this was accompanied by a systematic drive to 
defend the waters of the Danube has received little recognition from historians. In order to 
defend against the Ottoman threat Sigismund needed to combat the Turks on both water and 
land. This he implies himself when requesting military advisors from the Teutonic Order in 
1427, as Sigismund stipulated that they should be knowledgeable in krieg zuwasser und 
zuland.
682
 Of course, that is not to say that he did not value the building and maintenance of 
the chain of fortresses which guarded his southern frontier. As we will see in the next chapter, 
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his construction and maintenance of his chain of fortresses was helped significantly by his 
status as Roman King.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Defending the Frontier: Stonemasons, Cannon Masters and Workmen 
 
This chapter will explore how Sigismund used his status as King of the Romans and, after 
1433, Holy Roman Emperor, to secure the expertise he required in order to fortify and defend 
his Danube frontier against the Turks. It will draw attention to how the status and 
opportunities afforded to him after his election as Roman King in September 1410 were put 
to direct use in securing construction and gunpowder expertise in order to support his efforts 
against the Turks. In doing so, this chapter seeks to shed light on one of Sigismund’s 
supposed ‘failures’, notably his inability to organise another crusade against the Turks after 
the debacle at Nicopolis in 1396.
683
 Historians such as Veszprémy, DeVries and Kastritsis 
have automatically assumed that Sigismund wanted another crusade after 1396. This view is 
perhaps understandable, especially when seen alongside the orations which Sigismund made 
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at the Council of Constance for a passagium generale.
684
 The impression that one gets from 
the archival material, however, is very different indeed. When Sigismund’s reign as Roman 
King is viewed in its entirety, it can be seen that it was not a large crusading army which he 
prized most, but specialist help in areas where his kingdom of Hungary was lacking 
militarily.  
Of course, that is not to say that Sigismund did not value the advantages of being able 
to field large forces and contemporary sources do emphasise how important the size of the 
force which Hungarian rulers could muster was. Even though it is probably fictional, 
Długosz’s tale of Władysław I of Hungary’s (1440-1444) meeting with Vlad Dracul in 1444 
is amusing and instructive in equal measure.
685
 Shortly before losing his head at the battle of 
Varna Władysław boasts about the great size of his army. Vlad retorts that the Ottoman 
Sultan, even when he is just going hunting, does so with more men than Władysław has 
currently raised (qui cum maioribus potentiis venationes ferarum exercere consuevit), and 
begs him not to attack the Turks.
686
 While raising force on a significant scale was important 
for Sigismund, by the 1420s his banderial system was able to provide a sufficient number of 
men to satisfy basic requirements.
687
 His most acute military needs, therefore, were felt not in 
the realm of numbers but in the realm of skills and it is here where he used his Roman 
Kingship to great effect. In the broader context, this chapter hopes to contribute to 
historiographical debates surrounding military development in later medieval and early 
modern Europe. Generally, when historians have studied military organisation in these 
contexts, they have focused on the scale with which rulers could extract resources from their 
subjects and on the size of the military force which they could maintain, an approach which 
has its problems, as Gunn admits.
688
 This chapter will demonstrate how Sigismund was not so 
concerned with the scale of the resources which he could draw upon from his subjects in the 
Reich, but their type. It was specific experts he was interested in raising from his subjects in 
the Reich, not great numbers of men. 
 
By far the best evidence for Sigismund’s application of construction expertise from 
the Reich on the Danube frontier comes from the later 1420s and early 1430s during his 
dealings with the Teutonic Knights. The letter collection of the Order, the Ordensbriefarchiv, 
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is a particularly rich resource and it preserves letters in which Sigismund explicitly links his 
requests for building expertise from the Order with the struggle against the Ottomans on the 
Danube. However, this chapter, by drawing upon unpublished material from a range of 
archives throughout Austria and Germany, will attempt to offer a more complete picture of 
how Sigismund secured construction expertise throughout his reign. Historians, such as Ernő 
Marosi and Volker Liedke, have written on Sigismund’s use of German and French 
construction expertise in Hungary.
689
 Their contributions have only been of article length and 
have restricted themselves to only a few examples and they do not interpret these within the 
broader context of Sigismund’s use of his status as Roman King to secure the aid he required 
in order to combat the Turkish threat. Moreover, they have not made use of the rich archival 
resources available in Vienna, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin for the study of this theme. As a 
result this chapter will survey Sigismund’s recruitment and use of construction and building 
expertise and underline how his status as Roman King was a vital pre-requisite in gaining 
access to much of this expertise.  
After setting the context, this chapter will begin with looking at Sigismund’s 
recruitment activities while travelling through France and Germany in the 1410s. After a brief 
discussion of some pertinent issues related to the archival material and the terms used in the 
documents, Sigismund’s relationship with the Teutonic Order will be explored. The scope 
will then be expanded by briefly examining queen Barbara’s desire for construction 
expertise.
690
 This will require an examination of her relationship with the Teutonic Knights 
and the Burgermeister of Vienna during the 1420s. After some historiographic discussion 
archival finds in the Archivo Segreto Vaticano will then be used to offer some brief 
comments on Sigismund’s use of Bohemian construction experts before concluding. 
4.1 Sigismund’s recruitment in the France and Germany during the 1410s 
While Sigismund was officially crowned as King of the Romans in Aachen in 
November 1414, he had in fact been the Roman King elect since September 1410. Sigismund 
wasted little time in putting his newfound status to use for his personal advantage and was 
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enjoying many of the privileges which came with being Roman King even before his 
coronation. In July 1414, for example, and while on the way to Aachen, Sigismund enjoyed 
the hospitality of Strasbourg, an imperial free city that held their privileges directly from their 
Roman King. His entry certainly caused quite a stir. The town chronicle notes how 
Sigismund danced through the streets half-naked, with over 100 young ladies in tow, who, 
upon arriving at the Rathaus sat the 49 year old king down and provided him with a pair of 
shoes, jewellery and beer all at the city’s expense.691 Judging from these sort of events it 
would appear that the soon to be Roman King did not have his mind on securing aid for the 
fight against the Turks at all. Nevertheless, Sigismund did in fact make good use of his 
foreign travels between 1412 and 1419 and his status as Roman King in order to secure 
building expertise for Hungary. 
At first sight Sigismund’s activities in Paris in the summer of 1416 would not support 
the impression of him as a king, hungry for knowledge and expertise. Sigismund behaved 
appallingly in Paris and his antics, usually focused around dancing, ladies and alcohol, have 
amused many modern commentators.
692
 Many of his antics, one of which involved him 
sitting in the King’s seat at the Parisian Parlement and disrupting the proceedings with 
various spoken interjections made in Latin met with controversy. Jean de Montreuil, a 
confidante of the French king, notes in a letter to Charles VI (1380-1422) how Sigismund 
behaved ‘as if he had been born with horns’ and the general ‘amazement with his folly’ that 
was present in Parisian circles.
693
 Perhaps worse was his behaviour at a special ball held in 
his honour, to which 120 of the most noble ladies in Paris had been invited.
694
 There the king 
managed to offend more people, where ‘well fed and drunk, he walked before the tables in 
the manner of an actor’, dancing and singing along to the songs which he recognised.695 It 
was a quite a spectacle and Montreuil concludes that ‘he supposedly delayed the guests from 
eating or at least forced them to divert their eyes because of the shame.’696  
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The Monk of Saint-Denis notes Sigismund’s poor behaviour at the Parlement and the 
Ball, but then reveals a very different area of activity which Sigismund engaged himself in. 
The chronicle reveals that Sigismund did not just spend his time singing, drinking and 
dancing because while in Paris ‘he often seriously spoke about the notable things which he 
saw in the kingdom’.697 The chronicle states that Sigismund, ‘supposedly judging and 
preferring the masters of mechanical works (artifices mechanicorum operum) over all 
others.., thought to assemble from Paris and elsewhere 300 of the more skilled, [which] he 
sent to Hungary, so that they could instruct his compatriots in the aforesaid works.’698  
A letter authored by Stephen Rozgonyi, a Hungarian baron following Sigismund in 
his retinue, expands upon Sigismund’s recruitment activities while in Paris.699 This letter, 
dated to 14 March 1416, notes the baron’s own experiences in the city, stating at one point 
that so ‘much beautiful merchandise and work is being discovered in this city’.700 Sigismund 
was struck by what he saw too and Rozgonyi, mirroring the account in the Chronicle, records 
‘that our lord king is sending across several masters to Buda, goldsmiths  and other masters’, 
as well as a number of ‘large dogs’.701 It would appear that once in Hungary this mixed band 
of specialists and large dogs would liaise with Noffry (Onofrium), the chamberlain of Buda, 
who as we have seen in previous chapters was responsible for equipping other specialists 
which Sigismund had recruited in the west.
702
 
Sigismund’s intentions, so clearly expressed by the Monk of Saint-Denis and in the 
letter of Rozgonyi, were at least partly converted into reality. Sigismund presumably wanted 
the dogs for hunting but whether they made it to Hungary can only be guessed at, but it is 
clear that many of the French specialists did get there.
703
 The account of Bertrandon de la 
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Broquière reveals that many of these specialists were recruited precisely to build a fortress.
704
 
While passing through Buda in 1433, Broquière records that Sigismund had hired six or eight 
families from France with the express purpose of building a tower capable of extending a 
chain across the river to the south of his palace.
705
 That these French masons had specific 
skills which Sigismund did not have access to in Hungary is implied by Broquière’s 
admission that the tower remained incomplete because the masons had died and that there 
was no one else capable of finishing their specialised work.
706
 
Paris was not the only place in which Sigismund was on the lookout for skills to send 
back to Hungary and the familiar themes of dancing, fraternising with ladies and securing 
building expertise is visible during Sigismund’s sojourn in Avignon. Sigismund stayed in 
Avignon between 22 December 1415 and 13 January 1416 and was fascinated by what he 
saw there.
707
 As well as being very taken with the ladies of Avignon, whom he collectively 
gave a diamond ring at a dance on 9 January, Sigismund was most struck by the Papal 
palace.
708
 This should come as no surprise as John XXIII had invested a considerable amount 
of money into the repair of the palace.
709
 It had sustained heavy damage from Catalan attacks 
and the payments for repairs, which survive in the Registra Avenionensa, reveal that John 
XXIII had teams of men working on the palace’s walls, galleries, towers, chambers and 
arches.
710
 The palace was clearly striking and this helps explain the ‘request of the lord king 
of the Romans’, entered into the Registra Avenionensa, for one painter and a stonemason to 
take detailed drawings of the palace, including its ‘towers and walls and ceilings and the 
height, thickness and extent of other buildings’.711 That this information was to be recorded 
and a copy (exemplar) dispatched to Sigismund would suggest that Sigismund wanted to 
replicate what he saw in Avignon in his own palaces in Hungary or elsewhere.
712
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A similar request from Sigismund exists for Siena.
713
 In May 1414 the city councillors 
received a letter from the King of the Romans, who had clearly been impressed by the 
Ospedale Santa Maria della Scala during his sojourn in the city a few months earlier. Citing 
its beauty and its utility for the poor and pilgrims, Sigismund requested its dormitories, 
monasteries and chambers be depicted by painters and for their drawings to be sent to him.
714
 
Sigismund’s recruiting activities and desire for technical information indicate that there was 
another aspect to his travels in the west aside from his diplomatic negotiations and 
manoeuvres. While in the west Sigismund demonstrated an intense interest in technology and  
in the buildings and structures which he encountered and a desire to secure the means with 
which he could reproduce these in Hungary. 
Sigismund was given the opportunity to recruit the French specialists in Paris and to 
collect drawings of notable structures because he was travelling through the kingdom in the 
attempt to solve political disputes that could hinder the success of the Council of Constance, 
which he had convened as King of the Romans. It was his new status as the secular head of 
Christendom and the resultant expansion of his political horizons which brought him into 
contact with the new technologies and skills which he was so struck by in Avignon and Paris. 
Mályusz, when assessing Sigismund’s political manoeuvres in the west, has labelled them as 
without any relevance to Hungary. Leaving the question of how relevant his political 
activities were to Hungary aside, Sigismund’s actual diplomatic travels were directly relevant 
to Hungary for he used them as opportunities to recruit expertise which could be used to 
strengthen Hungary. This theme will now be expanded upon in greater detail with the aid of 
the rich archival resources which survive in the Haus, Hof und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. 
 
4.2 Sigismund and his recruitment of building specialists at Augsburg in October 1418 
 
Alongside Sigismund’s rather opportunistic and spontaneous acts of recruitment in 
Paris and requests for technical information in Avignon and Siena lies a far more concerted 
effort to recruit building and construction expertise. The best case study for this is 
undoubtedly Sigismund’s holding of court in Augsburg in October 1418. This case study 
demonstrates how Sigismund was drawing upon his status as the wearer of the Roman Crown 
precisely to raise resources in his German lands for use in Hungary. Sigismund’s 14 days 
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spent in Augsburg was a most German affair. Holding court as the King of the Romans in an 
imperial free city, Sigismund was joyously received by the people of Augsburg. As the town 
chronicle makes clear, the civic authorities held parties and dances in honour of their king, 
placed the Rindermarkt and the Mayor’s house at his disposal and gave him numerous 
gifts.
715
 Dancing and fraternising with the city’s ladies were, as usual, a major factor in 
Sigismund’s itinerary and the town chronicler records at least one dance, during which the 
king in his customary style gave a ring to the city’s maidens.716 A perusal of the 
Reichsregisterbücher, however, reveals that there was another important element to 
Sigismund’s time in Augsburg as during his stay the Roman King embarked on a 
conspicuous recruitment drive.  
The indentures and agreements produced during this recruitment spree survive only 
because they were copied by scribes in his imperial chancery and composed into large 
registers in book form. These large registers, now known as the Reichsregisterbücher and 
held in the Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, record the correspondence, debts and 
transactions of the King of the Romans or the Holy Roman Emperor. The first substantial 
fragment to survive comes from 1348, during the reign of Sigismund’s father, Charles IV, but 
by Sigismund’s time much more survives and the Reichsregisterbücher, from E to L, appear 
to offer full coverage for the years 1411-1437.
717
 As Gerhard Seeliger notes in his study, 
however, the Reichsregisterbücher formed only a small part of the total administrative output 
of Sigismund’s chancery and the surviving material should not be regarded as 
comprehensively covering the king’s administrative activity.718 Furthermore, many aspects of 
their composition, such as the manner in which the documents were registered, the dates of 
the entries and the ways in which they were used and organised by contemporaries remain 
unclear. It would be otiose to discuss these problems in great detail, for Seeliger in his 141 
page article discusses many of these at length. Whatever the case, Reichsregisterbuch G has 
preserved a range of material which enables a glimpse into Sigismund’s recruitment in 
October 1418. In terms of sheer quantity, Sigismund’s recruitment of stonemasons and 
carpenters easily outnumber his other cases of recruitment and it would appear that he was 
most concerned with gaining building and construction expertise while in Augsburg. 
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The entry in the register for Master George of Tübingen (Görgen von Tubin), dated to 
6 October, reveals without a doubt that he was destined to serve in Hungary and draws 
attention to the numbers of builders which Sigismund desired.
719
 The entry states that George 
‘shall bring twenty appropriate servants to Hungary, also stonemasons, who should work 
there all year’.720 This entry is repeated on the next folio for a certain Stefan Holl of Stuttgart 
(Steffano Holl de Stuckgarten), also a stonemason, who was to serve Sigismund with twenty 
servants in the same capacity as George of Tübingen.
721
 Sigismund did not just stop at 
recruiting 42 stonemasons as there is a particularly long entry for the recruitment of a group 
of carpenters. The brothers Erharten und Lienharten, identifying themselves as carpenters 
(czymmerluten), were to work for Sigismund for one year.
722
 For their year of service they 
were also to employ six servants (sechste redlicher zymer gesellen) who were also to work 
and to carpenter (arbeyten und czymmern) alongside them. 
In the case of Erhart and Lienharten von Vyngerlin there is no explicit mention to 
indicate that they were to serve in Hungary. However, an entry in the previous register noting 
a payment to her Lÿenhart von Jungingen would imply that at least one of the brothers had 
been in the service of Sigismund previously.
723
 There exists no entry of an indenture for 
Lienharten until 1418 even though he was clearly drawing money from the ‘yearly pay of the 
King’s chamber’ as early as 1414.724 This would support Seeliger’s assertion that the 
Reichsregisterbücher only represent a small amount of the paperwork produced by 
Sigismund’s imperial chancery for Lienhart’s earlier contracts were never copied. This entry 
would also imply that Lienharten had been in Sigismund’s service for some time and that he 
was one of the many who made up Sigismund’s travelling retinue of servants.  
Sigismund also recruited cannon masters during his stay in Augsburg for service in 
Hungary.
 725
 Meister Adam den Buchsenmeister was recruited on 6 October, and Sigismund 
stipulated that he was to serve him for an entire year with two servants. During his period of 
service he was to receive 200 Hungarian gulden and 100 in Rhenish, and was to both work on 
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founding pieces of artillery and on building dwellings (uf unser czug und behusunge gyessen 
und arbeyten).
726
 On the same day Martin, a cannon master from Stuttgart (Martino 
buchsenmeister de Stúkgarten) was recruited under the same terms.
727
 On 25 October 
Sigismund recruited Otto buchsenmeister von Munchen with his two journeymen for a year, 
though this contract is more vague than the others, and comments only that he was to produce 
and work upon hantwerkes. For his labour he was to receive 300 Hungarian gulden, the first 
half of which he would receive upon his arrival in Hungary (wann er in Ungern komet).
728
 
One gets the impression that there were many more Buchsenmeisters of German 
origin in Sigismund’s service for whom no recruitment document survives in the 
Reichsregisterbücher. Master Werner, a cannon master of Strasbourg is recorded as being in 
Sigismund’s service in July 1418 only because the king sent Strasbourg a letter informing 
them of this.
729
 Johannes Gansar de Argentina from Strasbourg, for whom no recruitment 
document survives, seems to have enjoyed a particularly long, successful career as a gunner 
in Sigismund’s service. He is first mentioned in a royal charter of 1421, where he receives 
certain lands in a place called Cothze.
730
 More detail can be gleaned from the original 
document and it would appear that this land grant was particularly generous, as he was also 
given the ‘rights to the wool from Cothze’, ‘cultivated fields’ and all of the rights that had 
belonged to the previous owner, a certain John Reno.
731
 These rights were also to go ‘to his 
heirs and successors’, permanently establishing him and his family in Hungary and allowing 
them to continue as royal servants.
732
 The reason for this generosity is clear, as Johannes is 
yet another German skilled in gunpowder weaponry, with Sigismund describing him as a 
‘distinguished...cannon master of our majesty’.733 Sigismund’s land grant succeeded in 
keeping Johannes and his prized skills as a gunner in his service, as he appears nine years 
later in another document, only this time he is recorded as the ‘master of royal guns’.734  
With the exception of Johannes Gansar, these cases of recruitment have been known 
since the 1890s when they were first calendared in Altmann’s Regesta Imperii. As we have 
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seen, an examination of the original Reichsregisterbücher has revealed more important 
details regarding Sigismund’s recruitment and his intention to bring them to Hungary. 
However, it is worth reflecting on the nature of the source material in question here, as these 
instances of recruitment have been mentioned by historians before but with little or no 
analysis of the source material.
735
 As has already been stated, these indentures and cases of 
recruitment survive only because they were copied by scribes in the Imperial chancery. In 
other words, Sigismund recruited these men into his service in his capacity as the King of the 
Romans. Yet many of these instance of recruitment were meant to serve in Sigismund’s other 
kingdom, his kingdom of Hungary. That these cases of recruitment for service in Hungary 
were recorded as official imperial business demonstrates without a doubt how Sigismund was 
using his second kingdom and the privileges and institutions that came with it in order to 
support his first kingdom. 
There is some evidence to suggest that Sigismund utilised not just the crown of the 
Romans but his status as King of Bohemia, as the holder of the Crown of St Wenceslaus, in 
order to secure building and construction expertise for his Hungarian realm. A charter issued 
by Sigismund in 1430 to ‘our distinguished Jacob of Bohemia, master of our carpenters’, 
helps demonstrate this.
736
 The charter makes it clear that Jacob was being rewarded with a 
house and an income for his specifics skills, which the document details as, ‘the arrangement 
of the work of our court and of our mechanical art..., [namely] the fastening of wood, 
composed in an amazing manner, in several of our forts and machines, from many heaps of 
wood and also for the conclusion of the erection of clear and pleasing works in the same 
place’.737 Jacob’s place of residence was Bratislava but his supplication to the Pope, which 
will be discussed below, would suggest that he most likely travelled with Sigismund as one of 
the many servants that followed him. More biographical information about Jacob can be 
gleaned from documents in the Vatican archive. Jacob was clearly an important member of 
Sigismund’s retinue for he accompanied the king on his journey to Rome in 1433 and while 
there he petitioned the Pope for spiritual privileges.
738
 In his supplication, Jacob identifies 
himself as ‘Jacob of Brno of the diocese of Olomouc, the master of carpenters of the lord 
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emperor’.739 His appellation, ‘of Brno’, identifies him as coming from Moravia, a constituent 
part of the Bohemian crown lands which remained largely loyal to Sigismund and his son in 
law, Albert of Austria, during the Hussite religious wars. 
 
4.3 Sigismund’s use of expertise sourced from his lands in the Reich in context 
 
The argument could be made that the recruitment of German builders and workmen 
for service in other kingdoms is nothing new and that Sigismund is merely yet another 
example of a ruler putting expertise of German origin to use in his lands. Archival research in 
The National Archives, London, for example, has revealed that King Henry VI of England 
(1422-1461, 1470-1471), a contemporary of Sigismund, used German builders on his 
estates.
740
 Henry VI’s use of German building expertise was mirrored by his subjects too, 
with German builders and architects at work in Norwich and East Anglia.
741
 As research by 
Jens Röhrkasten has showed, Germans specialists can be found in many walks of English 
commerce and trade where a specialised skill was required.
742
  
The same could be said for Sigismund’s recruitment of cannon masters. Sigismund 
was by no means unique in recruiting cannon masters of German origin, even within the 
Kingdom of Hungary. The account book of Bratislava, which begins in 1414 and records the 
city’s armaments and acquisitions, is particularly illuminating. Bratislava’s first artillery 
sergeant appears in 1414,
743
 and was known as ‘Henry the cannon master’, but his entry into 
the manuscript as Heinrich der Puchsenmayster, which, in German and using German 
technical vocabulary, implies a significant German influence.
744
 In fact, the German influence 
on the production of gunpowder weaponry in general cannon was dominated by Germans. 
The Byzantine historian Kritovoulos (c. 1410-1470) specifically notes in his work how 
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cannon were believed to be an invention of the Germans.
745
 Whether Heinrich der 
Puchsenmayster came from Germany or not is debatable, but his appearance in court because 
of issues surrounding a loan that he sent back to his home implies that his place of origin was 
not Bratislava.
746
 Holl has stated that the cannon masters in Hungarian towns, such as 
Bratislava and Sopron, were usually recruited from nearby towns or were drawn from local 
smiths or craftsmen.
747
 This is unlikely for Bratislava at least, as Henry was clearly not a 
local and the surnames of his successors indicate that they were foreigners also. His 
immediate successor was, with a name like Hanns von Brünn (Brünn being the German for 
Brno), probably from Moravia and the next master with a geographical place as a surname, 
Hanns von den Krems, master between 1440-1444 was likely from Austria (from modern day 
Krems an der Donau).
748
 Most of the masters with only forenames or with non-geographical 
surnames before 1440 would seem to be German as well, with names such as Hanns 
Schedrich, Albrecht Geltler, Frantz and yet another Hanns, all sounding distinctly 
Germanic.
749
 Wenzla, active in the city as a cannon master between 1439-1442, is likely a 
Czech. 
Nevertheless, it is the manner in which Sigismund got the specialists mentioned above 
which is important. German specialists can be found in any corner of Europe during the 
fifteenth century but Sigismund had secured many of his recruits by using his status as 
Roman King. This theme can be strengthened further when we examine Sigismund’s 
relationship with the Teutonic Knights, an aspect of his reign which we will examine later in 
this chapter. 
It is worth noting that Sigismund’s recruitment of gunpowder specialists while in the 
Reich appears to be one of great success. There is no concrete evidence that the artillerymen 
which Sigismund recruited at Augsburg were used against the Turks, but the king’s 
deployment of cannon against the Turks on his southern frontier during the 1420s certainly 
leaves a great impression on his contemporaries.
750
 It would be reasonable to assume that his 
recruitment in the Reich played a role in this. Sigismund’s wish to attack the Turks with 
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80,000 horse and many cannon (ahtzigtusent pfert und vil búhssen), recorded by an inhabitant 
of Strasbourg in January 1420, may have been wishful thinking as for the large army of 
horsemen, but he certainly had access to cannon.
751
 The account of Sigismund’s military 
preparations in 1428 by Walter von Schwarzenberg, noted in particular the numerous cannon 
(fille geschücze) which the king had at his disposal.
752
 Sigismund’s use of artillery clearly had 
an impact on their intended targets. Aşikpaşazade records the Sinan of Vidin complaining in 
the 1420s that he had had enough of hearing the guns of his enemy.
753
 Their horrible noise 
had, apparently, not only petrified his horses but had also turned his ears most deaf.
754
  
Other sources would suggest that the entries contained in the Reichsregisterbücher 
were only a small part of a much larger recruitment drive and a recruitment drive which 
Sigismund had begun from the very beginning of his travels in the west. The case in 1414 of 
Dietrich, a stonemason in Sigismund’s service, would support the idea that Sigismund’s 
Reichsregisterbücher do not comprehensively record Sigismund’s recruitment and that they 
should be regarded as more selective records of his recruiting activities.
755
 In December 1414 
a certain Dietrich was staying in the town of Regensburg and, for some unknown reason, was 
arrested and placed in prison for a period of time.
756
 Upon his release Dietrich witnessed and 
sealed a document which confirmed that he felt no ill will towards the town council. In this 
document Dietrich identifies himself as ‘master Dietrich, stonemason of my noble lord the 
Roman King and King of Hungary, most serene prince’. Dietrich was not travelling alone 
and, judging from the list of his ‘dear friends and servants’ contained in the document, was 
actually in charge of an entire construction team.
757
 Aside from the stonemasons Heinreichen 
Pair von Swann and Hannsen Vogler von Leibczk, whose surnames make identifying their 
place of origin difficult, the rest of his party were drawn entirely from Cologne, Herrenberg 
(in Swabia) and Geisenham (in Hessen). Overall and including himself, Dietrich’s party 
consisted of six stonemasons, two carpenters and one leadworker (pleidekcher).
758
  
Their locations of origin would suggest that Sigismund recruited them while he 
travelled through Swabia and Hessen and then along the Rhine in the summer and autumn of 
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1414 as he was heading to Aachen.
759
 Whatever the case, Dietrich’s letter makes it clear that 
they were in Sigismund’s service and while not explicitly stated, they were most probably 
journeying to Hungary. This is implied by their area of origin, the Rhineland, and Dietrich’s 
site of arrest, Regensburg. A common route to Hungary through Germany was to travel up 
the Rhine and then to head overland in an eastward direction until reaching Bavaria, where 
Dietrich was actually imprisoned. Then one could travel south until they reached the Danube, 
at which point they could board a ship that could take them directly to cities such as 
Bratislava, Buda and Belgrade.
760
  
Sigismund’s recruitment drive while travelling through the Reich and France has 
certainly left its mark in a variety of sources. However the context in which many of these 
building specialists were recruited would suggest that they were not necessarily to be put to 
military uses. As the entries in the Reichsregisterbücher make clear, Sigismund recruited 
stone masons and carpenters at the same time as fountain makers and other specialists and it 
is likely that many would have been put to work to improving and renovating his palaces, 
though it is not until the later 1420s that Sigismund’s palace building, particularly in 
Bratislava, began in earnest.
761
 However, it must be emphasized that Sigismund’s southern 
frontier had been under pressure since the beginning of his reign and became particularly 
acute after 1415, when after roughly a decade of civil war, a resurgent Ottoman power in the 
Balkans began to go on the offensive once again.
762
 While at the Council of Constance 
Sigismund had been receiving bad news from his barons in Hungary throughout 1414 and 
early 1415 and there were even rumours that Sigismund was considering abandoning the 
council and heading home to support his beleaguered kingdom.
763
 Sigismund clearly had the 
defence of his lands in the east on his mind throughout his western travels. In fact, Sigismund 
began building new fortresses on the Danube the very year he returned to Hungary, The 
fortresses of Drencova, Stanilowcz and Pojejena, for example, were erected in 1419, and it 
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would not be unreasonable to suppose that many of his acts of recruitment had defensive 
motives in mind.
764
 
It must be emphasised that many of Sigismund’s recruits, who would appear at first 
sight to have few or no skills applicable to military activities can be found performing 
military tasks. Put more simply, the division between a civil skill and a military skill was not 
one that existed in the fifteenth century. Many of his recruits during his western travels could 
have easily been put to military uses as well as to palace building and decoration. In fact there 
is clear evidence that they did do both and two examples will suffice. 
The literary work, Novella del grasso legnaiuolo, by Antonio Manetti discusses the 
tale of a hard-up Florentine who sought his fortune in Hungary.
765
 The tale revolves around 
Grasso, a wood carver, who ends up achieving fame and renown in the service of Filippo 
Scolari, a baron of Sigismund who has been discussed in a previous chapter. Though the 
novella is fiction, it does point to the varied roles which experts could be put to performing. 
Despite being a woodworker, the novel explains how Scolari employed Grasso as his ‘master 
engineer’ (maestro ingegneri) and ‘led him into the field when he went on campaign’ (e 
menavaselo seco in campo, quando egli andava negli esserciti).
766
 When not on campaign 
Grasso was employed as a woodcarver and his skills were put to use in building Scolari’s 
palace at Ozora. 
One of Sigismund’s own military specialists, a certain Hans Felber von Ulm, helps 
reinforce this theme. Hans Felber, hailing from the free city of Ulm in modern day Baden-
Württemberg, was a jack of all trades and documents produced during his life time describe 
him variably as a fountain maker, a master of works, a cannon master and building master.
767
 
His life was so varied that Diakonus Klemm has posited that he may in fact be two different 
people.
768
 The figure of Felber, though he is identified in the sources as a cannon master 
(buchsenmeister), underlines the varied roles which those with skills such as him could 
undertake. Felber’s career demonstrates that there was little or no division between civil and 
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military skill. He built churches and installed fountains in cities, improved town walls and 
fortifications and took part in military campaigns against the Hussites. First as a cannon 
master on campaign in 1427 and secondly as a master of works in 1430 and 1431, where he 
worked in Nuremberg in order to supply their contingent of soldiers with wagons and 
cannon.
769
 It is reasonable to assume then, that Sigismund’s recruits in the west could have 
easily been put to military uses and have contributed to the fight against the Turks. Just 
because many of Sigismund’s experts were put to use in Bratislava, does not mean that they 
were not used against the Turks, as some of Sigismund’s officers who were ostensibly based 
there were put to use against the Turks. Sigismund’s castellan of Bratislava, Sigismund 
Lapispatak, had fought in diverse and numerous campaigns, both against the Turks and the 
Hussites.
770
 
Sigismund, as well as his leading barons such as Scolari, maintained often extensive 
retinues which would have included builders and craftsmen such as Hans Felber. Sigismund 
clearly had figures such as Hans Felber in his employ for contemporary accounts make it 
clear that the king could erect and improve fortresses while on the move. In 1422, for 
example, Sigismund was able to erect his own fortification (eyn gar grose basteye) in front of 
Ostrava in Moravia while campaigning against the Hussites in the region.
771
 In a similar case, 
Sigismund built a fortification (buwet dovor ein pasti) before a certain place called 
Steinitz.
772
 Examples can be found for the Danube frontier. In 1427, for example, Redwitz 
authored a report for the benefit of his Grandmaster about Sigismund and his campaign 
against the Turks in Wallachia.
773
 Among other things, Redwitz notes Sigismund’s 
strengthening of a Wallachian fortification with moats and wooden walls to help resist the 
Turks (mit graben und planck durch enthaldung der Torken) while he held court in a nearby 
town while heading to the Danube.
774
  
4.4 Sigismund and the use of the Teutonic Order’s construction expertise  
Nevertheless, the purposes behind Sigismund’s recruitment of building and 
construction expertise can frequently be unclear. Throughout his reign Sigismund 
commissioned large scale building projects in Hungary, not all of which were specifically for 
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defensive purposes. Many of the instances of recruitment mentioned so far could have been 
put to any use. In the case of Sigismund’s relationship with the Teutonic Knights, however, 
Sigismund’s recruitment was clearly for defensive purposes and specifically to strengthen his 
fortresses on his southern frontier against the Turks. Sigismund’s relationship with the 
Teutonic Knights will now be explored and placed in the context of his military commitments 
in the latter years of his reign. 
As Sigismund makes clear in several letters, the summer of 1427 marked the 
beginning a particularly important point in his effort to secure his frontier against the Turkish 
threat. In a letter dated to 27 September 1427, Sigismund informs Cardinal Beaufort of the 
Serbian Despot’s death and of his consequent success in securing several castles in Serbia.775 
By far the most important of these was the former Serbian capital, Belgrade, labelled ‘the 
pass and key to the kingdom of Hungary’ by Sigismund, although the king also drew 
attention to his garrisoning of several other castles in Serbia.
776
 
It was at this precise time that Sigismund entered into negotiations with the 
Grandmaster of the Teutonic Order, Paul Rusdorf, and it would appear that the king intended 
to use Teutonic building expertise on his frontier.
777
 Sigismund’s detailed request for 
Teutonic aid in his campaigns against the Turks, discussed at length in the previous chapter, 
was produced by his chancery in 1427 and was delivered to Rusdorf by Caspar Slick, his 
secretary, in September of the same year.
778
 The document contains, among others, a request 
for ‘two good Bolwerkmeister’.779 What precisely a Bolwerkmeister is or does is difficult to 
ascertain but it is probable that their area of expertise lay in fortress building and 
construction.  
Contemporary correspondence from the Ordensbriefarchiv which makes reference to 
a Bolwerk identifies it either as the wall of a fortress or an aspect of the fortification itself.
780
 
Martin Ehrenberg’s report to Rusdorf in 16 April 1428 on Hussite incursions in Silesia would 
support this.
781
 In fact Ehrenberg’s comment, that after seizing a stronghold the Hussites 
‘occupied and strengthened [it] with Bolwergkin and other fortifications’ as best they could,   
                                                          
775
 RTA, ix. 72-4 (nr 61). For an English translation see, Norman Housley, Documents on the Later Crusades, 
1274-1580 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), pp. 120-3 (nr 40). 
776
 RTA, ix. 73, ‘passu et clave regni Ungarie’. 
777
 For background see the previous chapter. 
778
 OBA, 4759. See folio 2v for the dating clause. RhdOSMT, i, i. nr 4789. 
779
 OBA, 4759. ‘Item czwene gute Bolwerkmeister’. 
780
 Or variations, such as bolwerg, bolwergkin etc. 
781
 Palacký, Urkundliche Beiträge, i. 611-3 (nr 515). 
152 
 
would seem to imply that the addition or strengthening of a bolwerk was an important step in 
making a site defensible.
782
 Other references make it clear that the bolwerk was part of the 
fortress or stronghold in question, as Johannes Frauenberg demonstrates in his account of the 
siege of Hoyerswerda in Saxony, dated to 7 July 1468.
783
 The bolwerk was clearly one of the 
more important parts of the fortification as it was precisely his blowing of a great hole (eyn 
grosz loch) in it that encouraged a local priest to sneak out secretly from the fortress the next 
day to inform the besiegers of the despair within the besieged settlement.
784
 
Whether Sigismund ever received these two Bolwerkmeister to aid in repairing his 
existing fortresses in Hungary or his recent acquisitions in Serbia is not clear. The 
negotiations for the transfer of the Teutonic Knights between September 1427 and October 
1428 have left only a slight paper trail. The lack of correspondence is probably on account of 
Sigismund conducting the negotiations not through correspondence but through diplomats. 
For example, in his letter dated to 9 April and which marks the beginning of the negotiations, 
the king informs Rusdorf that he has empowered his secretary, Caspar Slick, to arrange for 
the transfer of Teutonic expertise to Hungary.
785
 This pattern continued and in July 
Sigismund informed Rusdorf that he has dispatched Nicholas Stocks, ‘to tell you our 
opinion’, and to discuss with the Grandmaster what he needed in order to begin sending aid 
to Hungary.
786
  
The dispatch of diplomats was not just one way, and by the end of 1427 a certain 
pfleger von Ortelsburg had been dispatched by Rusdorf to the Roman King’s court. 
Ortelsburg’s agenda for his negotiations with Sigismund survives in the form of a rather 
battered piece of parchment, folded four times in order to make a small booklet and covered 
with handwriting that has frequently been crossed out and corrected.
787
 It reveals that he was 
to discuss, in particular, ‘the answer to the lord Roman King’s embassy’ and ‘to answer the 
articles advertised by Caspar Slick’, as well as other pressing matters, such as the mysterious 
Herr Nimpsch whose penchant for openly criticising the Teutonic Order and imprisoning 
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various burgers from the Ordenstaat as they visited Hungary was clearly beginning to 
annoy.
788
 
If the limited amount of correspondence and Ortensburg’s memorandum can be taken 
to be representative of the negotiations during 1427 then it would appear that Sigismund’s 
desire for Bolwerkmeister rather slipped in priority for they are only mentioned once.
789
 The 
requests which Sigismund make in his correspondence of 1427, which are only brief and 
usually preface the introduction of a diplomat empowered to discuss the issue further, usually 
revolve around naval and mercantile expertise.
790
 In this respect, Ortelsburg’s memorandum 
to discuss only the ‘order brothers, merchants [and] sailors’ would imply that the transfer of 
construction expertise to the Danube frontier had been displaced by the more urgent need of 
Sigismund to secure naval aid.
791
 Sigismund’s great need for assistance in securing the 
Danube waters has been explored in previous chapters and it is no surprise that he prioritised 
securing assistance in this matter during the summer of 1427. That naval aid was his priority 
at this time is supported in his letter in April 1427 to Henry, Duke of Bavaria-Landshut, in 
which he revealed that his plan to take the fight to the Turks sought in particular, ‘with the 
help of God, to recapture the Danube’.792 
However, Sigismund’s desire for construction and fortification experts from the 
Teutonic Order resurfaces in October 1428 and remains an issue until the summer of 1430. 
This change in heart is understandable when Sigismund’s campaigning in the summer of 
1428 is considered. It is important to emphasise that Sigismund was not only gaining control 
of new, existing fortresses but also building new ones. After his failure to seize the Ottoman 
held fortress of Golubac in June 1428, a strategically key fortress which lay on the southern 
side of the Danube, Sigismund decided to erect a new one nearby.
793
 This fortress, named 
Lászlóvará and apparently sited and built with ‘the advice of his Hungarian lords’, was 
placed on the northern bank of the river directly opposite Golubac.
794
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By 1428 it was clear to Sigismund that his military commitments on his southern 
frontier had increased even further and his letter, dated to 11 October 1428 and sent to 
Rusdorf, draws attention to his predicament. In this letter Sigismund claimed that he had 
taken ‘by God’s grace on both sides [of the Danube] many good castles’, situated between 
Belgrade and Turnu Severin and that he was daily having to struggle with the Turks.
795
 ‘For 
this’, he continued, ‘we have dearly wanted to deploy such order, organisational activity 
(ampter wirtschafft) and handling, as is practiced in your order in the houses, castles and 
courts and other places’.796 This clause likely refers to the Teutonic Order’s skill in running 
and operating a military frontier but Sigismund’s later admission, that ‘we have so many 
great buildings and works before our hands on the Danube and for these we dearly require 
skilled people’, suggests that he needed them for their building skills too.797 
It is clear that Sigismund felt that he needed the Teutonic Order’s aid in helping 
consolidate his chain of fortresses on the Danube as from this point on and for several years 
he would repeatedly request the dispatch of teams of builders. For whatever reason the term 
bolwerkmeister never appears in the correspondence again. Instead, it is replaced by demands 
for werkleute. Two items of correspondence between Rusdorf and the Master of Livonia 
support the idea that Sigismund needed the Order’s building expertise within the context of 
his recent gains in Serbia. The original letters do not survive but the rough copies produced 
by the Order’s chancery, both scruffily written and heavily damaged, do allow us to partly 
reconstruct how the Grandmaster conceived of his Order’s mission in Hungary and of what it 
involved at the time of their composition in late spring 1429. 
The first letter sent by Rusdorf, dated to 23 April 1428, was clearly meant to inform 
the Master of Livonia of contemporary events throughout central Europe and contains a 
wealth of detail.
798
 Of relevance for this chapter is Rusdorf’s admission to the Master that 
Sigismund intends to deploy ‘our order in Serbia in one castle and the deserted land’, for 
which he reports that he will soon dispatch Claus Redwitz, so that he can ‘accept 
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(ufftzunemen) the aforementioned castle and land’.799 In the second letter, datable to early 
May, Rusdorf admits that such a task, ‘namely to accept castles and estates situated on the 
Danube between Hungary, Serbia and Wallachia with their responsibilities [is a] very hard 
and great exhortation (irmanunge)’ to pursue.800 As a result, Rusdorf orders the Master and 
his officials to collect a sum of money, in Hungarian Gulder, to be given to the Treasurer at 
the Order’s headquarters in Marienburg.801 This money was to be used precisely to support 
the dispatch of ‘our brothers of the Order and several werglute’ to serve Sigismund.802 
What werkleute did precisely is difficult to ascertain as they can be found in a variety 
of different roles. Numerous items of correspondence would imply that the term werkleute 
was in fact a general term for a class of servants with various skills and not just those with 
expertise restricted to building. In the context of Sigismund’s service, for example, they can 
be found aiding cannon masters and shipbuilders but these instances have been explored in 
previous chapters. In the context of Sigismund’s relationship with the Teutonic Order they 
were most likely meant to aid in the construction and fortification of sites. The figure of 
Hansen Bleidenmeister, who was explored in a previous chapter, once used a team of 
wokluthen to build a series of ditches and canals in March 1426.
803
 Their acquisition was 
clearly high on Sigismund’s list of priorities and it would appear from other contemporary 
sources that werkleute were particularly valuable. In a letter of 1386 to the Grandmaster for 
example, the dukes of Stettin, particularly concerned with the Polish kingdom aiding the 
Lithuanians, decide to highlight in particular the werg und werglute which the king is 
supplying.
804
 The dukes argued that the Lithuanians would be able to strengthen themselves 
considerably with this aid, especially as the likes of these specialists, apparently, ‘had never 
been in the land [of Lithuania] before’.805 This aid clearly worried the Teutonic Knights as 
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they report on the Polish dispatch of werkmeister to Lithuania in similar tones in 1397 and 
1398.
806
 
A rather peculiar document, probably drafted by a Teutonic knight as an aid for 
negotiation or as a memorandum in 1429, reveals the very specific areas of expertise that 
Sigismund desired for his frontier.
807
 Several of the examples contained within have been 
discussed in detail in previous chapters, but one section for the document states, ‘also one 
[should] send such werklewte’, and lists afterwards ‘ship builders, foresters (walthouwer), 
holczfliesser, fishermen and brickmakers’.808 If this document can be taken to be 
representative of what the term werkleute meant during the negotiations, then Sigismund’s 
demands for werkleute were in fact demands for a whole range of expertise and not exclusive 
to those skilled in building and fortification. Whatever the case, other items of Sigismund’s 
correspondence demonstrate how Sigismund intended to deploy Teutonic werkleute in a 
construction context. 
A letter of 17 April 1429, for example, reveals very clearly Sigismund’s intention to 
use Teutonic building expertise. The letter itself, addressed to Rusdorf, only mentions the 
Order’s planned activities in Hungary very briefly in the middle, when Sigismund states, ‘that 
your grace should send us your order brothers and werklute, who we have wanted to 
deploy’.809 The letter was sent, however, with a Zettel, an additional item of correspondence 
produced by Sigismund’s chancery which contains further encouragement for Rusdorf to 
dispatch the aid which the king desired.
810
 In this Zettel Sigismund informs Rusdorf that he 
has been made aware that the Order are about to send to him a number of brothers 
accompanied with wergluten, and ‘that it would be most helpful and good’ if he was to send 
them soon.
811
 In particular, Sigismund desired that they come with speis holcz gepewe und 
ander werk (‘supplies, wood, buildings and other works’), so that the Order would be able 
support their new fortresses with ‘such supplies, fish, wood and all such necessary things for 
the castles as per the custom and order [of the] Order’.812 Sigismund went on the say that he 
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wanted the experts to serve him for an entire year and warned the Grandmaster that he would 
not be able to begin his defensive works until they arrived. His statement, that ‘we reckon in 
particular, not to begin with building until the Berglute come’, could be exaggeration on the 
part of Sigismund, in order to speed the dispatch of the Teutonic experts.
813
 When assessed 
within the context of other contemporary correspondence, such as the letter of Sigismund’s 
queen to Vienna in 1426 which will be discussed later, there is little reason to doubt that 
Sigismund’s statement accurately reflects the predicament which he faced on his frontier.  
Sigismund lacked the adequate expertise and skilled manpower which he required in 
order to adequately defend his frontier which in this case meant the construction of 
fortifications. The King in this instance was using his status as the wearer of the Roman 
crown to encourage one his German subjects to give him a particular type of expertise which 
was not as easily available to him in Hungary. Sigismund would repeat his request once more 
in July 1429. In this letter he writes to Rusdorf enquiring as to the location of the ‘brothers of 
the Order, with more brothers, werkluten and other necessary persons’ whom he states the 
Grandmaster has promised to send.
814
 In this letter Sigismund refers not just to how he is 
patiently waiting for the Teutonic Knights and their werkleute but also to his wife, who is 
expecting them too.
815
 
 
 
4.5 Barbara and the use of her influence as Queen of the Romans 
Barbara’s desire for Teutonic expertise can in fact be expanded upon. Other items of 
correspondence held in the Ordensbriefarchiv reveal that she, as the Roman Queen, was also 
keen to secure Teutonic building expertise to support her fortresses. The admission in the 
aforementioned memorandum, that ‘our lady the queen is so greatly desirous of a brickmaker, 
that [one could] not well refuse her’, is not the only instance in which Barbara was using her 
status as the wearer of the Roman crown in order to secure specialised expertise.
816
 That 
Barbara was an important figure in her own right is without doubt. Writing in 1418, a certain 
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Hans Stadler even took the time to describe Barbara’s disposition to the Grandmaster, 
presumably because her opinions were important.
817
 As a result, it is unsurprising that that 
Barbara was negotiating directly for Teutonic aid with the Grandmaster directly, as the Grand 
Duke of Lithuania states in a letter to Rusdorf in January 1429 that he has enclosed two 
letters, one from Sigismund and one from the Queen.
818
 This chain of correspondence did not 
just go in one direction. A peculiar manuscript of several folios  survives from May 1429 and 
it records the fellow knights who accompanied Redwitz to Hungary and the various 
possessions and items in their inventory.
819
 Included in Redwitz’s collection of letters and 
correspondence were ‘two letters to the queen’.820 It is clear that Barbara and Rusdorf were in 
direct communication, even if no text of the correspondence between them has survived. 
That the letter mentioned by the Grand Duke contained requests for specialised 
expertise is highly probable for this was not the first time that Barbara had tried to use her 
status as queen of the Romans in order to secure building expertise from her subjects in the 
Reich. Another example survives in the form of a letter dated to 13 March 1425 and which 
survives in the Stadt und Landesarchiv, Vienna. In this letter Barbara, ‘by God’s grace 
Roman Queen and of Hungary’, requests the dispatch of workmen from Hans Holczler, the 
Burgermeister of Vienna.
821
 In a strikingly straightforward letter Barbara informs the 
Burgermeister ‘that we have taken hold of and have quickly begun to build up (zepawen) our 
castles in Hungary, and particularly our seat at Etzelburg’.822 To help with this Barbara 
needed something very specific, identified in the letter as Czigelprenner (Brickbakers). This 
request mirrors very closely her aforementioned demand for czigelstreicher, but this case 
contains more details as to their intended use. She desired two ‘maister der Czigelprenner’, 
who should be able to bake bricks just ‘as they bake them in Vienna’ and who should not 
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only be capable of producing several thousand bricks (von den Tausent geben sollen), but 
roof tiles and other bricks also (dach Czigel und auch ander Czigel).
823 
A close analysis of the original document reveals an interesting clause. Barbara, when 
justifying why she needs these two czigelbrenner, states darzu wir Czigelprenner, alhie ze 
lande nicht mügen gehaben (‘for this we need brickbakers, for [one] may not have [them] in 
this land [Hungary]).
824
 Barbara assured the burgermeister that she would provide for the 
workmen what they needed (‘Huts and wood’, among other things) and that their service 
would greatly please her.
825
 Barbara thus had the adequate material resources at hand to 
fortify her castles, but not the adequate expertise. As the Roman Queen, however, she could 
draw upon the far richer base of skills available in her pool of German subjects. The point, 
that the Hungarian kingdom lacked native officials competent enough to run their mines and 
mints has been made before, and Barbara’s letter suggests that this lack of expertise spread to 
the realm of fortress building in particular contexts.
826
 
 
It is worth reflecting on the date of the request too. Barbara’s request is a specific one. 
She asks for two specific masters of a certain skill who, as the letter specifies, need to be able 
to produce particular bricks ‘according to the custom’ of Vienna.827 The letter was dated and 
sealed in Tothans, modern day Tata in north-western Hungary, but it is highly likely that 
Barbara had been in Vienna that winter, accompanying Sigismund who had convened a 
Reichstag there.
828
 The argument has been made that Sigismund’s travels in the west, his 
stays in Paris and Avignon, introduced him to new technologies and opened his mind to new 
things.
829
 Perhaps Barbara’s letter to Hans Holczer reveals that her travels in Vienna had a 
similar impact, and demonstrates an intention to bring the very best of what she saw in the 
west back to Hungary, to help defend her estates against the Hussites and the Turks. 
It is clear then, that both Sigismund and Barbara sought to use their links with the 
Teutonic Knights to secure construction and building expertise. It is worth making the point 
that an inspection and close reading of the original documents has revealed how specific and 
detailed their requests are. Recent research on the Teutonic Knights and their activities in 
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Hungary has not considered the ramifications of this point. Both Jurgen Sarnowsky and 
Matthias Thumser have surveyed how the Teutonic Knights contributed to the fight against 
the Turks during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and their articles draw attention to 
how Sigismund needed the Order and its knights in order to defend the most vulnerable 
section of the Danube.
830
 However, in the context of Sigismund’s defensive plans (as well as 
other contemporary plans which involved the Teutonic Knights) they both interpret what the 
Order could contribute in terms of the amount of men that they could bring to the fight. A 
close study of the original correspondence would suggest that this was not the attitude that 
Sigismund held. Sigismund did not want battalions of fighting men but particular people for 
specific reasons. In other words, he did not want men with strong sword arms but men with 
special skills.  
4.6 The Teutonic Knights and the fortresses on the Danube frontier 
The extent to which Sigismund received what he wanted from the Teutonic Order in 
the later 1420s and early 1430s is, however, debatable. While aspects of the transfer of the 
Teutonic Knights to the Danube frontier were dealt with in the previous chapter, there still 
remains something to be said for the transfer of building and construction expertise. In this 
respect the Teutonic Order’s accounts, drawn up to record the expenditure which they were 
incurring in their Hungarian fortresses, provide some importance evidence. However, these 
accounts are difficult to interpret for various reasons.
831
 While they take the form of accounts, 
with lists of men, equipment and strongholds and the expenditure required to support them, 
much of the number work appears speculative. The accounts probably date from start of their 
period of tenure in the Banate of Severin, and perhaps reflect an assessment of their holdings 
when they first arrived in 1429. Upon their arrival in Bratislava in July 1429, Sigismund 
noted in a letter to Rusdorf that he was sending Redwitz in the name of God to take the 
castles under his control (nu senden wir sie itczunt in dem namen gotis sich der slosser czu 
underwinden).
832
 The most probable date for the creation of these accounts is the second half 
of 1429. That is perhaps why they appear incomplete in some areas, and do no record castles 
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which came into their possession later.
833
 The castle at Borzafő, for example, was held by the 
Teutonic Knights but it is not recorded in any of the lists contained in the documents.
834
 
Four czimmerleuten and two smiths are recorded in the garrison of Severin, for 
example, and the accounts would suggest that the Order were building and improving 
fortresses in the region.
835
 In some cases the accounts reveal only the intention of the Order to 
install new fortresses. For the section regarding the fortress of Sinicza, the accounts record 
that ‘between Sinicza and Pecz one should look for where one may build a fort (veste) and 
one may also build a meierhof’.836 
The Order did not just wish to install a new fortress and a meierhof, a large building 
usually used as a centre of administration, but to improve existing fortresses. These 
improvements, unlike the intention to install a new fortress near Sinicza, come with financial 
entries for their cost. The phrasing of the accounts often makes it unclear whether these 
financial entries record expenditure already made or estimated expenditure for improvements 
which were to be made in the future. Whatever the case, these entries reveal that the Teutonic 
commanders responsible for drafting these accounts had put a great deal of thought into the 
fortification of their new territories. For the fortress of Orsova, for example, a fortress on the 
Danube near Severin, there exists an entry for 20,000 florins for its repair.
837
 The exact 
wording, that ‘one has estimated [this amount] this year to build the castle’, would imply that 
this entry was an assessment for expenditure to be incurred in the future. A further 4,400 
florins had been set aside for the ‘building up of the house’ around Mihald, a fortress a few 
dozen miles north of Orsova.
838
 Other comments, such as that Sinicze is a castle and ‘one 
must improve it’, would imply that the Order were acutely aware of the state of their 
fortresses and intended to improve them where necessary.
839
  
Perhaps the fact that Sigismund’s requests for workman from the Order cease after 
1430 imply that the appropriate expertise had arrived in Hungary. Sarnowsky, drawing upon 
the material published by Joachim, has argued that the Teutonic Knight’s position in Hungary 
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was a weak one and that the Order had difficulty in supplying their distant contingents on the 
Danube.
840
 Sarnowsky’s main source for this conclusion are the numerous complaints and 
issues raised by Redwitz, the Teutonic commander in Hungary, in his letters to the 
Grandmaster. Even a perusal of the printed material would not justify this conclusion. One 
letter authored by Redwitz and printed by Joachim would imply that the Order was able to 
marshal the resources they needed for their possessions on the Danube. In August 1431, for 
example, Redwitz writes from Nuremberg that he has a fleet of ships, 80 strong, on the 
Danube between Regensburg and Buda.
841
 He had been able to ‘send people and all 
necessities to the houses [on the Danube]’, though he admits that he is having trouble in 
paying the men, presumably the men in the houses in Hungary.
842
  
Redwitz’s letter of 7 March 1432 does indeed stress the difficulties which he was 
experiencing in fighting the Turks, but this should not be taken as representative of the 
Order’s entire experience on the Danube.843 As we will discover in the next chapter, even if 
the incomes promised to the Order were not forthcoming, Redwitz was able to raise sums of 
money from his own contacts in Hungary. However, in the context of this chapter, a closer 
exploration of the correspondence between Redwitz and the Grandmaster is warranted.  
Other items of correspondence, penned by Redwitz but not printed or mentioned in 
Joachim’s article, give a different if an occasionally bizarre impression of life on the Danube 
frontier in the service of Sigismund. A long and detailed letter penned by Redwitz, undated 
but probably written in the later months of 1430, comes from the initial period of the Order’s 
tenure in Hungary.
844
 This letter discusses a whole range of issues, including English defeats 
in France, the fight against the Hussites and the case of a rather unfortunate notary of the 
Polish king who had been locked out of the chancery in Buda. Regarding the situation in 
Hungary, Redwitz makes no explicit complaints abouts the Order’s position, implying that 
the workman and fellow knights with whom he had travelled to Hungary with were sufficient 
to defend the Order’s new possessions. He is far more concerned to  underline Sigismund’s 
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anger at some of the Grandmaster’s subjects in Livonia and the king’s reluctance to confirm 
the Order in their possession of the New Mark.
845
 
In terms of supplies and men, the only things that Redwitz required from the 
Grandmaster were various items of clothing, which apparently needed to ‘be good and well 
coloured’.846 Redwitz’s only complaints were of a pestilence in Hungary, which was killing 
many and ‘which no one in Hungary had not heard of’ and the botched delivery of a special 
dog.
847
 This special dog was meant as a gift for the Ottoman sultan but somehow ‘the dog 
was lost on the way’ (one wonders how) and two birds, also meant as gifts, were ‘both dead’ 
(beyde dot).
848
 In other correspondence where Redwitz does make requests of the 
Grandmaster they are usually for money or for advice, and as he does not request werkleute it 
would be reasonable to assume that he had a sufficient amount in his service in Hungary.
849
 
Taken together, the building activity noted in the Teutonic accounts, Sigismund’s cessation of 
appeals for Teutonic workmen and Redwitz’s correspondence would imply that the building 
expertise which Sigismund desired from the Order did eventually arrive in Hungary.  
This chapter has demonstrated how Sigismund used the opportunities that came with 
being the Roman King in order to secure building and construction expertise. Much of this 
expertise, especially in the early stages of his Roman kingship, was recruited on an 
opportunistic basis as he was travelling through the west. Whether his recruits here were 
expressly meant to help him combat the Turks remains unclear. Nevertheless, his 
correspondence with the Grandmaster brings into sharp relief the military requirements which 
Sigismund faced on the Danube frontier and the effective measures which both he and his 
wife could take, as wearers of the Roman crown, in order to bring balance to his frontier. It 
also reinforces how Sigismund was searching for very specific sources of expertise. It was 
not men or groups of soldiers that he was so interested in recruiting, but specialists who could 
fulfil particular roles in supporting his campaigns. As we will see in the next chapter, this 
trend of using specialised forms of expertise was present in Sigismund’s attempts to manage 
his military campaigns and support them economically. 
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Chapter 5. Mines, Merchants and Dogs: Military organisation, Economics and 
Diplomacy 
Sigismund’s defensive commitments on his southern frontier required a thorough reform of 
the Kingdom of Hungary’s military organisation, but ensuring that he had the adequate 
manpower and skills at hand to defend against the Turks was only one part of the solution. 
The financial and economic structures which underpinned his fortress building programmes 
and which ensured that his forces were paid and supplied, from the guards and banderia of 
his bans to the rowers in his galley crews, also needed to be addressed. This chapter will 
demonstrate how Sigismund drew upon financial, logistical and administrative expertise from 
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his subjects in the Reich, in order to support his efforts against the Ottoman Turks. In doing 
so, it will demonstrate how Sigismund explicitly linked economic development with the 
defence of his frontier.   
 Many of Sigismund’s reforms aimed at improving the ability of the kingdom of 
Hungary to resist the Turks were largely restricted to the Kingdom itself and have little to do 
with his Roman Kingship. However, even though they are not strictly within the scope of this 
thesis, it is worth highlighting Sigismund’s attitude to administration and the centralisation of 
economic and military resources in the face of the Turkish threat. Two trends are worth 
highlighting, as they directly foreshadow Sigismund’s attempt to apply Teutonic 
administrative and economic expertise to the management of the Danube frontier in the later 
1420s. These two trends are the revenue drives in the royal mines and the desire to 
concentrate the responsibilities for the defence against the Turks in particular men, notably 
the Florentine condottieri Filippo Scolari. 
 Leonardo Bruni, in his Historiae Florentinae published in 1442, noted that Sigismund 
was rather bad with money and that he gave so much away that he hindered both his 
administration and his waging of wars.
850
 This is unfair, and throughout his reign Sigismund 
was well aware of the need to raise as much income as possible in order to support his wars 
against the Ottoman Turks. It is in the Hungarian salt trade, which the Hungarian crown held 
as a monopoly, where the drive to secure a greater income can be most clearly seen. It is 
worth making the point that the incomes associated with the mines during Sigismund’s reign 
could be immense and attracted the attention of foreign visitors. Walter von Schwarzenberg, 
while visiting Sigismund near Buda in August 1426, notes in a letter to Frankfurt the 
significant sums involved in one of Sigismund’s recent financial dealings.851 
Schwarzenberg’s remark, that der konig hayd syn bergwerg vorsast vor seßwer hundit tüsend 
gulden, would seem to imply that Sigismund had mortgaged (vorsast) the ownership or the 
income of his mines (bergwerg) for the rather large sum of 600,000 gulden.
852
 Walter adds 
that Sigismund had so far only received one third of this sum (ýme werdint eczünd czwerrzud 
hündirt tüßend gulden), though even this amount, if it is accurate, remains a princely sum 
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within the context of Hungarian royal finances.
853
 Sigismund was able to procure such a 
princely sum from his mines on account of almost twenty years of reform and 
reorganisations, which will be discussed now.  
 There exists a significant amount of research on the Hungarian salt mines and on the 
royal management of the salt trade in Hungary. Kubinyi has linked attempts to raise the 
income from the Hungarian salt chambers in 1513 with the Turkish threat and Sigismund’s 
reforms to the salt chambers in 1397 should be seen in the same light.
854
 Sigismund enacted 
important reforms to the salt mines in October and November, precisely the same time as the 
diet of Temesvár, which contained important provisions for the kingdom’s defence. In 1397 
Sigismund appointed Peter Veréb, the vice voivode of Transylvania, as count of all of the salt 
chambers in Transylvania. Sigismund empowered Verebi to found more salt chambers and to 
spend the sum of 6,000 florins in building or improving lodgings for the labourers, carters 
and sailors involved in the process of mining and moving the valuable commodity.
855
 Salt 
was a vital resource and source of income for the Hungarian kingdom and could be sold, 
either within the kingdom or to foreign traders for export, given to royal creditors in return 
for acquittal of crown debt or given to soldiers as a form of pay, the so called sale 
exercitantuum or sale exercituantibus.
856
 By the 1430s the rights to the salt mines were being 
explicitly given to border lords precisely to help them support armies which could support 
fortresses such as Belgrade against the Turks.
857
 As a result, the reform of the salt mines 
could and did feasibly help Sigismund in his fight against the Turks. 
 As István Draskóczy argues, however, the management of a project as big as the 
Hungarian salt chambers required specialised knowledge and it would appear that Sigismund 
could only find this specialised knowledge from recruiting outside of his subjects as King of 
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Hungary.
858
 As a result, the man who would eventually hold responsibility for the operation 
of every salt chamber in Hungary was not a native Hungarian, but Filippo Stefano Scolari, a 
native of Florence. As early as 1397 Sigismund had taken Scolari, a Florentine trader resident 
in Buda, into his service. His entry into Sigismund’s service would mark the beginning of a 
career which lasted until his death in 1426, and the varied activities which Scolari undertook 
during his career demonstrate how his skills and expertise as a merchant were vital in 
allowing Sigismund to tackle the Ottoman threat. 
5.1 Filippo Scolari and the defence against the Turks, c. 1400-1426 
 There exists a significant amount of historical writing on Scolari and on his career in 
Hungarian royal service.
859
 Sigismund’s recruitment of foreign servants, including Scolari, 
has been seen by some historians, such as Mályusz, as an attempt to counter the power of 
Hungarian barons and to aid in his consolidation of power.
860
 Mályusz, and other historians 
such as János Bak and Jörg Hoensch, have recently come to more positive conclusions 
regarding Scolari’s recruitment, stressing, for example, how his skills were invaluable to 
Sigismund and his political activities.
861
 Nevertheless, recent work, such as that by Katalin 
Prajda, has continued to underline how Sigismund’s recruitment of foreigners, such as 
Scolari, was ‘part of Sigismund’s greater strategy of building a new loyal elite at the royal 
court’.862 The argument that Sigismund could not fully trust his Hungarian barons, many of 
whom had proved rebellious in the past, and that he therefore recruited foreigners in order to 
administer and run his kingdom certainly has some merit. As Faro has underlined, however, 
Sigismund’s recruitment and use of Scolari must be seen within the broader context of the 
king’s desire for skills and expertise.863 Scolari’s true utility becomes clearer when seen 
within the context of the Turkish threat and the increasing demands on governance that it 
entailed. 
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 There exist a range of sources available for the study of Scolari. Scolari’s remarkable 
career in Hungarian royal service, first as an administrator and later as a military commander, 
has left a great paper trail. Moreover, his diplomatic activities in the run up to the Council of 
Constance as well as the brutal tactics which he used during his invasion of Venetian territory 
in 1412 provoked discussion among contemporaries and made him a well-known figure in 
cultural and literary circles. The contemporary Italian proverb, ha più fede in lui che gli 
ungheri nello Spano (‘to have more faith in him than the Hungarians do in Spano [Scolari’s 
nickname]’), was well known enough for Niccolo Machiavelli to deliberately misquote it for 
comedic purposes in Mandragola, his play of 1518.
864
  His character of Nicia demonstrates 
his stupidity by stating instead, ‘Come, se mi pare? Io tornerò qui in uno stante, ché ho più 
fede in voi che gli ungheri nelle spade’ (‘How do I appear to you? I will return because I have 
more faith in you than the Hungarians do in their swords’). Scolari proved a popular figure in 
Florentine literary circles and there exist several biographies, penned by Florentines such as 
Jacopo Poggio di Bracciolini (d. 1478), the nephew of the famous humanist Poggio, and 
Domenico Mellini (d. 1620), which document his life in Hungarian service.
865
 By the 1450s 
his reputation had sufficient fame and renown for numerous Florentines to feature Scolari in 
their works. The Florentine painter, Andrea del Castagno (d. 1457), included Scolari in his 
uomini famosi, a series of panel paintings commemorating great figures from Florence’s 
recent past and Leonardo Bruni, in his Historiae Florentinae, ranked Scolari second only to 
Julius Caesar in military genius.
866
 
 Sigismund took Scolari into his service around 1397 and Bracciolini, Mellini and the 
anonymously authored ‘La Vita di Meser Philippo Scholari’, probably written before 1442, 
offer different versions of how Scolari and Sigismund met.
867
 While their versions may differ 
and be overly dramatised, they all give the impression that Sigismund was genuinely 
impressed by Scolari’s financial and accounting skills. Bracciolini reports that Scolari, as a 
young man, worked with his master, a certain Luca Pecchia, in Buda during the 1390s. One 
day Scolari’s mercantile activities brought him to ‘the treasury of king Sigismund’ to discuss 
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business and where Sigismund, who happened to be present, after ‘seeing the young man in 
the arranging of the objects, and in the holding, accounting and the discussion, prestigiously 
doing everything with a dexterity and genius given by nature; demanded with many prayers 
to the merchant, that if he would yield [to his service], he would have and hold him like his 
son.’868 
 The reason why Sigismund was so keen to have a man such as Scolari in his service is 
reinforced by another anecdote from Bracciolini’s biography, which demonstrates how the 
Florentine’s skills were of direct use when dealing with the Ottoman threat. One day, when 
Sigismund and his barons were discussing the ‘custody and guard of the Danube, for the 
defence of that land from the assaults of the Turks’, they were struggling to work out the pay 
and materials necessary to supply 12,000 horsemen.
869
 For an Italian with a mercantile 
background it was easy, and ‘Filippo, taking his pen, by that fact itself, did the counting with 
such a swiftness that all those surrounding were amazed by it, and they greatly praised 
[him]’.870 
 A similar tale comes from the anonymously authored biography, which records 
Scolari coming to the aid of the Archbishop of Esztergom. The archbishop was unable to 
keep coherent accounts but Scolari, apparently with some form of double entry book keeping, 
‘drew the sums with little confusion and difficulty between one part and the other’.871 This 
was a skill which apparently ‘stupified the Archbishop to amazement’ and, after discovering 
that his servants could not copy Scolari’s accounting procedures, the prelate promised to put 
Scolari in charge and place him above all his other servants and friends.
872
 
 While the stories surrounding Scolari are certainly embellished, these stories reflect 
the milieu of Italian traders in Buda.
873
 They reflect how the sophisticated financial and 
accounting skills that Scolari and other members of the European mercantile classes had were 
not present in the Hungarian court. In the context of fourteenth and fifteenth century Europe 
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however, Sigismund was by no means unique in using Italian mercantile expertise within his 
administration. Italian merchants frequently dominated the conduct of trade and commerce 
throughout Europe and the case was no different in Hungary.
874
 Many Italian traders settled 
in their countries of business for extended periods of time and became involved in the 
administration of state finances and it would appear that the Kingdom of Hungary, and the 
states of eastern Christendom in general, do not form exceptions to this trend during the 
fifteenth century.
875
  
 However, a study of Scolari and his direct successors, the Tallóci, a group of four 
brothers from a Ragusan merchant family, complicate this trend. Scolari and the Ragusan 
Tallóci brothers went far beyond the standard merchant in royal service, eventually becoming 
barons and bearing responsibility for the raising and victualing of armies and their command 
in battle. Scolari and Matcó Tallóci became great barons in Hungary and Matcó, with his 
brothers Petro, Franko and Jovan also coming to hold significant lands and commanding their 
own Banderia in battle against the Ottoman Turks.
876
 Scolari and Franko Tallóci would both 
die in battle, the first outside Golubac commanding a joint Hungaro-Serbian and Portuguese 
force in 1426 and the second at the head of his banderium at the Second Battle of Kosovo in 
1448. Matko Tallóci campaigned extensively in Hungary against the Turks and their Bosnian 
allies towards the west of Hungary until his death in 1445 and Jovan Tallóci, as the Prior of 
the Knights Hospitaller in Hungary, had significant military responsibilities. In fact, it was 
Jovan who successfully defended Belgrade against the attack of Murad II in 1440 and, if the 
account of Jan Długosz is to be believed, the Hungarians owed their victory almost 
exclusively to his tactics and leadership.
877
 Sigismund and Scolari appeared to have been 
good friends too and as a sign of his affection, Sigismund buried Scolari in the cathedral of 
Székesfehérvár, alongside the traditional resting place of Hungarian kings.
878
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 Scolari and the Tallóci brothers served Sigismund in various capacities and roles, as 
merchants and traders, diplomats, administrators and military commanders and as such, they 
do not fit the stereotypical pattern of merchants in royal service. Nor, with their careers in 
trade and finance, do they fit the pattern of condottieri, a term with which Scolari is 
frequently labelled and one which some scholars, such as Ioan Haţegan, are aware does not 
adequately describe Scolari, when he states that ‘compared with many other contemporaries 
who specialised in the art of war, Scolari was detached from mere condottiere’.879 Scolari and 
the Tallóci brothers form an administrative and governmental condottieri, or, to borrow a 
term coined by Rady, military enterprisers.
880
 Their mercantile expertise and skill at fighting 
made them the ideal people to both administer and defend the southern frontier of Hungary, 
processes which were becoming increasingly complex as more resources were being 
committed to the frontier in order to defend it against the Ottomans. 
 The accolades which Scolari receives for his financial expertise in his biographies 
clearly had grounding in reality, as the Florentine quickly rose to prominence in the 
Hungarian royal administration. None of his biographies provide a precise date detailing his 
entry into Sigismund’s service, but the first grants of land made to Scolari and his brother, 
Matteo, to survive, are dated to 1398.
881
 It would not be unreasonable to suggest that 
Sigismund recruited Scolari, a skilled Florentine financier, to aid him in his drive to reform 
his kingdom’s finances which he embarked upon at the Diet of Temesvár in 1397.882 In 1397 
Sigismund rewarded Scolari with the wardenship of Simontornya, a town roughly 100 miles 
to the south of Buda, where Scolari presumably met and married his wife, the Hungarian 
noblewoman Barbara of Ozora.
883
 Scolari’s recruitment needs to be seen in the context of 
Sigismund’s attempts at garnering more economic resources, because as early as 1399 
Sigismund had appointed Scolari as ‘the count of our city of Kremnica’,884 where a royal 
mint was based, and by 1401 he was in charge of the salt chambers, a major source of royal 
income, as a document refers to him as ‘the count of the royal salt chambers’.885 
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 In 1403 however, Scolari proved to Sigismund that he was not just an able 
administrator but a competent military commander too. Ladislaus of Naples (d. 1414), a 
claimant to the Hungarian throne, attempted to usurp Sigismund in 1403 and his invasion 
received the support of several Hungarian barons. However, Scolari remained loyal, raised an 
army and helped to drive Ladislaus and his supporters out of Hungary.
886
 Upon the 
stabilisation of his rule in 1404, Sigismund made Scolari a baron of the Hungarian realm and 
appointed him to rule the strategically important County of Temesvár, which, lying around 
100km the north of the Danube, could oversee the critical stretch of the Ottoman frontier 
between Belgrade and Turnu Severin.
887
  
 At this point Scolari’s career in Hungarian royal service assumes a clear military 
dimension and within a few years his military responsibilities had grown to become quite 
significant.
888
 In 1407, for example, he commanded a Hungarian army tasked with 
conquering and subduing rebellious Bosnian lords and their Turkish allies on Hungary’s 
south-western flank. The land grants and praise which Scolari received would imply that this 
campaign was one of military success.
889
 Scolari’s achievements in this campaign resulted in 
more rewards from the Hungarian king.
890
 In 1407 Sigismund refers to Scolari as the 
‘excellent Pipo of Ozora, charged with the treasury and also count of Temesvár and of our 
salt chambers’ and the next year Scolari is listed as one of the founding members of the Order 
of the Dragon, a chivalric order founded by Sigismund and his wife in 1408.
891
 The addition 
of Zewreniensis (modern day Turnu Severin) to Scolari’s name in the statutes of the Order 
would also imply that Scolari was in charge of the strategically key Danubian fortress of the 
same name and held the title of Ban of Severin by 1408.
892
  
 Scolari’s responsibilities continued to increase. By the 1420s his posts and 
responsibilities had developed in such a way that most of the Hungarian defensive system on 
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the southern frontier was centralised around him. Scolari ruled all of the seven counties 
which comprised the Hungaro-Turkish frontier, held posts which meant that he was the 
dominant figure in Hungarian financial administration and held the lands and titles which 
made him directly responsible for the defence of the southern frontier. Thus, he was in charge 
of, or at least had the responsibility for, managing the Hungarian war machine at all levels.  
 Scolari’s posts in the mints, salt chambers and treasury meant that he oversaw the 
levying of the majority of crown finance. His role in the treasury meant that he was then 
responsible for allocating the funds and resources in line with the kingdom’s various military 
commitments. It is hard to ascertain what Scolari’s precise administrative responsibilities 
were, but the glimpses offered by the sources reveal that his mercantile background and 
linguistic skills would have certainly been in demand. Sigismund was grieved enough at 
Scolari’s death to write to his widow in 1428. In the letter, Scolari’s skills and importance to 
the financial administration is made evident as Sigismund describes his day to day activities 
in great detail. He reveals how Scolari was responsible for most of the treasury’s operation, 
stating that ‘count Pipo...for many past years held from us the duty of all of our royal salt 
chambers...and furthermore, he bore and secured yearly many of our royal issues and rents by 
our command in each of the aforesaid years’.893 The income from these various streams 
would then be allotted to ‘our various royal campaigns and arrangements’ by Scolari as well, 
a process that would have taken much financial skill.
894
 It would appear that Scolari’s means 
of accounting and of providing for military campaigns was a successful one, and that Jörg 
Hoensch’s rather pessimistic assessment of Scolari’s abilities to keep Sigismund’s coffers full 
is unwarranted.
895
 That Scolari’s methods of accounting were successful is implied by a 
clause in Sigismund’s military ordinance of 1432/3. In the ordinance Sigismund issued a 
series of military regulations and special attention is drawn to how the kingdom’s finances 
should continue to be administered ‘just as was done at one time by count Pipo and the 
Despot [of Serbia]’.896  
 Scolari did not just count the money in and then count it out. It is clear that he had 
other administrative responsibilities to oversee. These included not just allocating expenses 
                                                          
893
 Wenzel, ‘Ozorai Pipό’, p. 622. ‘Pipo...comes...pluribus retroactis annis officium omnium camerarum salium 
nostrarum Regalium a nobis tenedo... et eciam multos alios nostros regales proventus et redditus de nostro 
mandato in singulis predictorum annorum tulerit et perceperit annis.’ Hoensch, Kaiser Sigismund, pp. 135-6. 
894
 Wenzel, ‘Ozorai Pipό’, p. 622.  ‘ad nostras regias varios expediciones disposicionem’. 
895
 Hoensch, Kaiser Sigismund, p. 67. 
896
 DRMH, ii. 144. ‘sicut etiam fuit factum per quondam comites Piponem et Despoth’. The laws of medieval 
Hungary have been translated into English. The English translation is not my own and the translation from the 
above work is quoted here. The same case applies for any further references from the DRMH. 
174 
 
for campaigns, but also victualling and supplying armies, transporting vital royal supplies and 
stocks, such as salt, grain and timber, around the kingdom by river and by land.
897
 He also 
worked closely with figures such as Mark of Nuremberg, a German financier employed by 
Sigismund, to mint new currency and manage the kingdom’s coinage.898 Financial 
responsibilities aside, his status as the Count of Temesvár and as ruler of the other six 
counties which formed the Hungaro-Turkish border meant that he was responsible for 
maintaining and extending the system of Hungarian fortresses, a process which he actively 
took part in, personally appointing castle builders and raising new fortresses as early as 
1405.
899
 This commitment to reinforcing the system of Hungarian fortresses along the 
Danube never ceased, and he continued to renovate castles and build new ones throughout the 
1420s.
900
 Furthermore, Scolari led the majority of the campaigns on the southern frontier for 
roughly the decade between after his return from Constance in 1415 until his death in 1426. 
5.2 Sigismund, his need for administrative and fiscal expertise, and the Teutonic 
Knights 
 Scolari’s death in 1426 left a great gap both in his administration and in the defence of 
the Danube frontier. Sigismund’s solution was to call upon the Teutonic Knights for their aid. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, this call for aid, contained in OBA 4759, encompassed 
a range of military specialists. Requests for those with administrative and economic expertise 
feature highly. In this letter Sigismund expressed his desire for Rusdorf to dispatch two 
Teutonic Knights to him. The figure of two was the minimum which Sigismund wanted 
(czwen deutsche herren oder mer), noting that if they could send more then they should.
901
 
Furthermore, they should have a knowledge or Polish or Russian (ettliche polonish oder 
reüsisch künden), presumably so that they could be used in diplomatic missions. Sigismund 
was also very specific about the burghers which he required from the Order: 
Item, two appropriate burghers from Danzig and two from Thorn, who are wise and 
capable of such war on water and on land, and who are able to advise our lord with 
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the wisdom of the Order and also in trade, fishing and other acts, as one practices in 
Prussia, and to remain with his grace until he is satisfied.
 902
 
The fact that these requests come before any mention of military kit or skills attest to the high 
priority which Sigismund attached to securing Teutonic administrative expertise. Sigismund 
also requested that the Teutonic Knights send two fishermen, with their own nets and 
equipment (mit iren netzen und geczeug), and who were capable of fishing in both inland 
waters and in the sea (die uff seen und uff sussen wassern, do die in das mere fallen fischen 
künnen).
903
 The desire for fishermen can be seen in other items of correspondence and in a 
document that, although undated, was probably produced in either 1429 or 1430.
904
 This 
document, which requests the sending of several Teutonic Knights and a variety of people 
with skills relating to woodcutting and shipbuilding, asks for fishermen too.  
 The desire for fishermen is understandable. The Teutonic Knights were given the 
right to the fisheries of the Danube river, all ‘the fishing...and all other fish of Severin as far 
up as Rybess’ to be precise.905 It is clear that they took advantage of this right as in 1432, 
Claus Redwitz, the leader of the Teutonic Knights in Hungary, reports to Rusdorf from 
Severin that ‘the fisheries of the hawsenfanghes for the castles on the Danube’ were a part of 
their income.
906
 This would have both formed an important part of their income which 
supported the maintenance of their defences and garrisons in the region, but also as a possible 
source of food for their soldiers and retainers. One of the seven brothers who accompanied 
Redwitz is identified as the vischmeister tzu Morteck, so the Teutonic Knights took the 
appropriate expertise to Hungary.
907
 
 Sigismund expanded upon his desire for Teutonic expertise in a letter of October 
1428. When noting the numerous fortresses which he needed to defend against the Turks, he 
stated that ‘we have dearly wanted to deploy such order, organisational activity (ampter 
wirtschafft) and handling, as is practiced in your order in the houses, castles and courts and 
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other places’.908 In this letter Sigismund also revised his demands for Teutonic Knights 
upwards from two, and instead asked for five, six or more (fúnff, sechs oder mere), who were 
experienced in seeing to the Order’s administration and offices on a daily basis (die zu 
solichen sachen táglich und alle ampter, der mann dann uff des Ordens heusern gebruchet 
wissentlich und leuffig seyn).
909
 Sigismund emphasised to Rusdorf how his brothers were wol 
versucht und geubet in these matters, and hoped that they would soon arrive to serve him.
910
  
 It is worth emphasising here that this was not the first time Sigismund had drawn 
upon Teutonic expertise in order to carry out his economic and military plans. This point is 
made particularly clear in a letter of Sigismund in the Ordensbriefarchiv. The scale of 
Sigismund’s politics was ambitious and many of his policies were broad in their scope. 
Sigismund’s attempted economic blockade of Venice was no exception. In the later 1410s 
Sigismund experimented with an ambitious plan to cripple Venice by opening up a new trade 
route to the east, bypassing their trade routes through Constantinople and the Levant and 
depriving them of income. This trade route was to be routed through the Danube and through 
the Genoese colonies of Kyla and Caffa (modern day Kiliya and Feodosiya in modern day 
Ukraine and the Crimea respectively) in the Black Sea.
911
 This plan had a military facet too, 
and if successful it would have strengthened Sigismund’s hold on the Danube frontier and 
increased Genoese influence in the Black Sea region which could have helped counter 
Ottoman naval power. When it came to the specifics, however, Sigismund needed help from 
the Teutonic Order and specifically their building expertise.  
 On 25 August 1420 Sigismund sent a letter to the Grandmaster confirming that a 
brother of the Teutonic Order, a certain Wytichen von Phorten had arrived at his court.
912
 The 
document reveals the interesting detail that Sigismund had requested Wytichen in order to 
help build the roads which would support these new trade routes. The document states that 
Wytichen was requested precisely ‘on account of the road towards Kyla, which we had hoped 
to build and to open for the common merchant’.913 While not explicitly stated in the letter, 
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this planned road would have had military uses too as Sigismund had been considering 
attempting to install garrisons in key cities in Moldova, including the city of Kyla in the later 
1410s in order to strengthen his hold across the entirety of the Danube frontier.
914
 Sigismund 
had needed to improve the roads in western Hungary, for example, specifically to facilitate 
the transport of artillery for his Venetian campaigns in the early 1410s.
915
 The case of 
Wytichen von Phorten demonstrates once again how Sigismund was able to draw on 
expertise from the Teutonic Order in order to accomplish tasks that required specialised 
skills. That Wytichen was present at Sigismund’s court demonstrates also that his request to 
the Grandmaster was heeded. Unfortunately Wytichen’s skills were never put to use for 
Sigismund notes in the same letter that Kyla had been taken by the Turks. This fact provides 
the reason for the letter, as the letter acts as a letter of safe conduct for Wytichen to return to 
the Grandmaster for he was no longer required by Sigismund. 
 The Teutonic Knights which Sigismund first requested in 1427, however, enjoyed a 
longer career in his service than Wytichen’s. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the 
most important figure in the party of the Teutonic Knights who served Sigismund on the 
Danube frontier was Claus Redwitz. It is certain that Sigismund received the two or more 
Teutonic Knights and the burghers from Danzig and Thorn. In fact, Redwitz was 
accompanied by seven brothers, making 8 brothers overall.
916
 There may have been more 
brothers in Hungary than were listed in the inventory of Redwitz.
917
 For example, a brother of 
the order, Andras Schonald, travelled from Rome to Trnava in Slovakia within sixteen days 
in May 1430 (der zcog vor mir von rome xvi tags denselben habe ich gefunden czu Tirnow in 
Ungarn), where he bumped into a fellow brother, Baltazar.
918
 
 It would appear that Sigismund received the burghers from Danzig and Thorn sooner 
than he did the group of Teutonic Knights. The memorandum of the Pfleger von Ortelsberg, 
mentioned in the previous chapter, was drawn up in preparation for his visit to Sigismund’s 
court in 1427/1428. The fact that Ortelsburg notes that he has been sent mit dessen kauffman 
to answer the questions asked of the Grandmaster would imply that Sigismund received the 
burghers which he desired rather quickly.
919
 There were other burghers from Thorn and 
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Danzig present in the Kingdom of Hungary too, though whether they were there specifically 
to advise Sigismund is unclear. While in Trnava the aforementioned Schonald also met a 
burgher from Thorn known as Niclos Richenberg.
920
 That there were burghers from Thorn in 
Bratislava during these years is without doubt. Redwitz was in contact with Tilman Rewss 
Burger zü Thoren as he borrowed money of him while in Bratislava in October 1429.
921
 
Other burghers from the Ordenstaat, such as the Thorner Tylman Watczelrade, were not so 
fortunate. Tylman was in Hungary in 1427 though he was languishing in the captivity of a 
certain Herr Nimpsch.
922
 Nevertheless, there is ample evidence to suggest that Sigismund 
received the burghers whom he desired. 
 Redwitz was ultimately responsible for the defence against the Turks and for 
managing the seven brothers who accompanied him to Hungary. He was given numerous 
lands and titles to help facilitate the upkeep and maintenance of the Danube frontier. His titles 
are noted in a letter of his dated to 27 April 1431, where he signs as Cloß von Redewicz, 
bruder deutsches ordens, baenn zu severin, obrister graff der moncz und salz camern in 
Sybenburgen.
923
 A list of the major figures in the company of Sigismund, undated but 
probably produced in the early 1430s, provides clues as to his status in Sigismund’s court.924 
The list is rather mysterious as it is undated and its author and recipient are both unknown, 
but one gets the impression that it was written for either the Grandmaster or the King of 
Poland. As Redwitz is listed in the section which records the prelates and barons of 
Sigismund, it can be assumed that Redwitz enjoyed quite a high status in Sigismund’s 
court.
925
 
The paper trail which Redwitz has left in the Ordensbriefarchiv is an eclectic one, and 
attests to the variety of roles which he performed while in Sigismund’s service. This did not 
just include commanding and managing the Danube frontier and its military resources, but 
sourcing hunting dogs for Sigismund, arranging loans and looking for stolen sheep.
926
 As we 
have seen in a previous chapter, his attempt to procure a hunting dog upon Sigismund’s 
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request, which could be given as a gift to the Ottoman Sultan, failed miserably.
927
 Other items 
of evidence shed a more favourable light on his activity, such as a chance archaeological find 
in 1981. This takes the form of a ceramic pot unearthed in modern day Slovakia and which 
contained 122 coins bearing the mark of Claus Redwitz.
928
 The activities of his fellow 
knights while in Hungary are more difficult to ascertain, but it would appear that they were 
spread across the various fortresses of the Danube frontier with various military and 
bureaucratic roles. Alongside the named captains and lieutenants of the fortresses are the 
names of those with administrative responsibilities, such as Conrad Kaffensteyner, the 
kochenmeyster of Severin, Mathes Kyczka, the kelnermeister of Severin, and Albrecht von 
Ulmen, the fyschmeyster, based in the fortress of Pecs near Orsova.
929
 
5.3 The failure of Sigismund’s experiment with the Teutonic Order 
 The reasons given by historians as to why the Teutonic Knights failed to hold the 
Danube frontier against the Turks generally revolve around two factors. The first is that the 
Teutonic Knights were too weak to maintain such a distant post anyway.
930
 This is 
unconvincing. As we have seen in previous chapters, the Teutonic Knights were able to 
marshal the necessary resources in 1430 and 1431 from their lands and bring them to the 
Danube frontier, as suggested by Redwitz in his letter of August 1431.
931
 The second factor is 
that they simply did not receive the money which they were promised to defend the lands and 
castles given to them.
932
 This explanation is not entirely satisfactory either. After all, Redwitz 
had access to other sources of income. He was able to raise 870 gulden in October 1429 while 
in Bratislava by borrowing money from two men, one a burgher from Thorn.
933
 These men 
would be paid back from the treasury at Marienburg.
934
 He also had supplies of money from 
his superiors in Prussia and Marienburg.
935
 Nevertheless, in a letter of 7 March 1432, 
Redwitz emphasises lack of money and lack of support from both Sigismund and various 
Hungarian nobles.   
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Whatever the case, if we take Redwitz’ letters at face value as historians such as 
Hoensch have done, then money would appear to have been a problem.
936
 Sigismund, much 
like in the case of Scolari, concentrated a whole series of incomes and resources into the 
hands of the Teutonic Knights in order to enable them to defend the frontier against the 
Ottomans. Their accounts list in detail the sources which made up their 314,000 florin 
income. These included the rights to the mints of Hermannstadt and Kronstadt; the rights to 
the silver mines and to the tax on cattle in Siebenbürgen; a hundred tons of salt from each 
mine of Szeged, Lippa, Temesvár and Keve; the tax on the Cumans and Jasz; access to all of 
the millet around Szeged and Szolnok; the Archbishop of Kalocza’s wine tithe and the 
aforementioned fishing rights.
937
 However, it is clear from Redwitz’s letter that the status of 
these incomes could be arbitrarily changed by Sigismund. Redwitz lists a series of incomes 
and privileges, which ‘the most serene prince and lord Sigismund, Roman and Hungarian 
king... gives us...to hold the castles and land’ against the Turks or other enemies.938 Many of 
the above incomes and privileges are mentioned and Redwitz also refers to gold mints under 
his control. After listing the Order’s extensive privileges Redwitz offers his opinion to 
Rusdorf, stating that he should have enough (genwg haben) support, income and means in 
order to accomplish the task at hand (wir sulden von den bygelegen landen czu Hunghern und 
hirren hulfe stewher und rettunge genwg haben).
939
  
However, Redwitz went on to say that all was not as well as it seemed.
940
 Sigismund 
had withdrawn the income from the tax on the Cumans and Jasz from Redwitz. Bertrandon de 
la Broquière’s comment in 1433, that Sigismund had given the gold mines to both the 
Teutonic Knights and Matco Tallóci, implies that Redwitz may have been sharing some of 
his incomes with others.
941
 Furthermore, Redwitz alleged that the Hungarian lords had proved 
most unhelpful and were not supporting the Teutonic Knights against the Turks. How reliable 
this statement is remains unclear. In June 1432 Švitrigaila noted in a letter to Rusdorf that 
when the Turks attacked the area around Severin that summer that it was Hungarian lords 
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who bore the brunt of the casualties, very few of whom escaped with their life (die 
ungerischen hern tot slugen, das ir mit leben wenik entgangen sein).
942
  
 Ascertaining precisely what happened in 1432 and what made Sigismund relieve 
Redwitz of his command the following year is a difficult task, and a discussion of what 
occurred this year is included in chapter one. Nevertheless, it would appear that the pressure 
which the Ottomans placed on the Danube frontier in 1432 was particularly intense. In the 
previous three campaigning seasons the Ottomans had campaigned elsewhere in the Balkans 
and had respected the peace treaty which they had agreed with Sigismund after Golubac in 
1428. A letter of the Teutonic Order’s procurator in Rome to the Grandmaster in May 1430 
makes this point clear. In this letter the procurator reports that the Turks have refrained from 
attacking Hungary, and have instead attacked Venetian territory with a great force of 180,000 
men (dy turken gewest sein in der fenidier lande mit groser macht, als mit hundert tuss und 
achczig tuss man).
943
 He goes on to say that they have seized two Venetian towns in Slavonia 
(zwu stete in Sclavonie). In the summer of 1432 it would appear that the bulk of Ottoman 
campaigning was centred around the Iron Gates and Severin.
944
  
 The chronicle of Windecke is also difficult to use in this instance as he initially 
records that the Teutonic Knights fought with great success in 1432.
945
 According to 
Windecke, it was a joint force of Teutonic Knights (prüsseschen herrn), Hungarian lords and 
the Lithuanian Grand Duke Švitrigaila who defeated the Turks in 1432, with Ottoman 
casualties numbering sixty thousand.
946
 Though where this battle took place Windecke does 
not say. Later in his work and using as his chronological marker the vague term of uf die zit 
(‘at this time’), he notes how a Turkish defeat of the Teutonic Knights made Sigismund sere 
trurig (‘most sad’) and forced him to send an embassy to the prüssen herrn, which 
presumably relieved them off their command.
947
  
 Whatever the case, by December the Komptur von Osterode reported in a letter to 
Rusdorf that the Turks had entered Wallachia in a civil war between two rival voivodes.
948
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During the summer of 1432 the Turks invaded the territory which Sigismund had given the 
Order (die torken in de lande, das euwir gnode Orden ist gegeben) and had seized three 
fortresses from them (drey slosser haben vorbert).
949
 News of this deterioration on the 
frontier may have reached Sigismund, but it does not appear to feature in any of his 
correspondence. On 21 February Sigismund sent a letter to Rusdorf from Siena, and the only 
reference to the Order’s activities in Hungary comes in a zettel and little is revealed in the 
way of detail: sunderlich ouch so haben wir de procuratori befolhen ettlich sach als von des 
ordens sache wegen in hungern.
950
 
 Joachim notes that the fate of the Teutonic Knights in Hungary after 1434 is very 
difficult to ascertain on account of the scarce evidence.
 951
 What little evidence there is would 
suggest that Sigismund owed the Teutonic Order money and that Redwitz’s complaints in his 
letter of March 1432 had some grounding in reality. A letter of 6 November 1435 would not 
only support this, but also suggest that Redwitz and some of his order brothers were still in 
Sigismund’s service and travelling in his retinue, though no longer in command of the 
fortresses on the Danube frontier. In this letter Sigismund reports on the various events 
occurring in Basel and Prague to Rusdorf.
952
 Attached to this letter is a zettel, in which 
Sigismund asks for Rusdorf to send a representative to Bratislava to discuss the account (der 
rechenung), which he needed to attend to with Redwitz and the brothers (die wir mit dem 
ersamen Clausen Redwicz und den Brudern zu tun haben).
953
 
 Redwitz had been in Sigismund’s service since the early 1420s and this is the last 
reference to Redwitz being in Sigismund’s company. His correspondence throughout his 
career would suggest that Sigismund was difficult to work with. In the spring of 1425, for 
example, Redwitz penned a detailed report of the negotiations which were taking place before 
the Reichstag in Vienna which Sigismund had called.
954
 This werbung was meant to keep 
Rusdorf informed of the major events, but mainly serves to highlight the hectic nature of 
Sigismund’s court. Redwitz notes that he has met and spoken with Sigismund five times 
regarding the status of the Newmark but still cannot write anything for sure (ich wol funff mol 
mit dem konige geretth, ich kann nict von im dirfaren, das ich mochte vor worheit schreiben). 
Even if Redwitz did have concrete information he would not have been able to pass it on to 
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Rusdorf, as he reports that Duke Ludwig of Bavaria was vetting his letters and forbidding 
him to write anything which he had learnt from the king (ouch hat mir herczog lodwig 
verboten czu schreiben, was ich noch von dem konige vorneme).
955
 All that Redwitz could 
say for sure was that ‘the king has said to me that I am in his hands and that I am not going 
back’.956 In effect, Sigismund strung Redwitz along for the better part of a decade before 
confirming the Teutonic Order’s possession of the New Mark, and he continued to string him 
along while he was Ban of Severin.
957
 Perhaps much of the blame for Redwitz’s failure to 
hold the Danube frontier should be laid at Sigismund’s door.  
 Sigismund did not just string Redwitz along, but Rusdorf also. It would appear that 
Sigismund led Rusdorf into believing that the Teutonic Order was assuming control of the 
castles and lands in Hungary for a strictly limited period of time. A close examination of the 
source material in the Ordensbriefarchiv, and in particular the so called ‘Entwürfe’ which 
survive there, supports the idea that Sigismund took advantage of the Order and misled 
Rusdorf as to his real intentions. These ‘Entwürfe’, or draft copies of letters, give us an 
insight into the thinking of Grandmaster and his advisors as his correspondence was being 
drawn up. That being said though, there exist two issues which need to be taken into account 
when using them as sources. Firstly, they are scruffily written and often heavily damaged, 
which can make reconstructing their contents and their meaning difficult. Furthermore, in 
many cases where we have the draft copies of letters we do not have the final product which 
was eventually sent, which means we have no guarantee that the sentiments expressed in the 
draft made it into the final product. Nevertheless, one of Rusdorf’s rough letters composed in 
the spring of 1429 clearly demonstrate that the Teutonic Order’s transfer to the Danube 
frontier was seen as only temporary, at least by the Grandmaster. A time limit on the 
Teutonic Order’s tenure in Hungary is made explicit in April 1429, in a draft letter of 
Rusdorf’s to the Master of Livonia.958 Originally the scribe wrote that Rusdorf was recalling 
some men (etliche gebiethe) from Memel, a commandery of the Order, and sending them to 
Hungary to remain with the Roman King ein etwas jare. Admittedly, the phrase ein etwas 
jare does not make perfect sense, as etwas in this sort of instance is predominantly used as an 
adverb meaning somewhat or partly. The etwas was then crossed out and replaced with 
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obiche, so that the phrase now ran ein obiche jare, which could roughly be taken to mean ‘an 
entire year’.959  
 Sigismund also implied that he only desired the services of the Teutonic Order for a 
certain period of time. In September 1427 the brothers of the Order and the burgers from 
Danzig and Thorn were to remain with him until he was satisfied (bey sinen gnaden beliben 
biß uff sin wolgefallen).
960
 In October 1429 he stated how he wanted the brothers of the 
Order, including Claus Redwitz, to remain with him ‘for a time’ and to prepare all matters 
according to their manner of rule (eyn czeit bey uns bliben und alle sache nach irer ordnung 
anrichten).
961
 Perhaps Sigismund was telling Rusdorf what he wanted to hear, and only 
prolonged the Teutonic Order’s tenure in Hungary indefinitely once they had arrived. It was, 
after all, a difficult task to undertake, and one which was Rusdorf received some criticism for 
accepting. In February 1430 the procurator noted to Rusdorf the rumours which were 
circulating regarding Sigismund’s plan to send the Order to Hungary. He did so in rather 
disparaging terms, saying how he had heard that the Roman King was giving the Order waste 
land (wuste landt) in Hungary, of which the Order already had more than enough in Prussia 
(der her doch scwer gnuk hat in Prúßen).
962
 Rusdorf went on to say how difficult a decision it 
was to accept Sigismund’s offer, and ‘how sweet or how bitter’ the consequences could be.963 
In a rough letter to the Master of Livonia, produced in early May 1429, Rusdorf noted how 
difficult a task it was (so swer harter und groser irmanungen), to accept the castles and lands 
on the Danube between Hungary, Serbia and Wallachia and defend them against them the 
Turks.
964
 It was not that Rusdorf never gave the project any chance, as runs the argument of 
Hoensch, but that Rusdorf probably thought that the project was something much more short 
term than the one which Sigismund had in mind.
965
 If Sigismund was not forthcoming with 
the resources which the Teutonic Order needed to maintain their presence in Hungary, then 
Rusdorf, given the Order’s military commitments in Silesia, Poland and Samogitia, would not 
have had the ability to support Redwitz and his fellow brothers against the Turks on a long 
term basis from his own pocket.  
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The vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Teutonic Knights was filled by the Tallóci 
brothers, and, upon Sigismund’s death in 1437 and with Matco as the Count of Kevi, Ban of 
Slovenia, Dalmatia and Croatia, Frank, as the Captain of Belgrade and Ban of Severin and 
John, as the Prior of the Hospitallers, the Tallóci family dominated the frontier.
966
 The 
ultimate successor to Sigismund’s defensive system were not the Tallóci brothers, but John 
Hunyadi, whose military skills and battles against the Turks were later to win him great 
renown.  
5.4 John Hunyadi and his military education 
 It is worth noting that Hunyadi had Sigismund to thank for much of his military skill. 
The military and economic advisors which Sigismund requested from the Order in 1427 was 
merely one way in which he could gain access to military expertise outside the immediate 
base of his Hungarian subjects. Sigismund’s diplomatic travels as Roman King allowed many 
members of his Hungarian nobility to travel across Christendom too, an opportunity which 
Hunyadi took advantage of when Sigismund travelled to Italy to be crowned in Rome.
967
 
According to Antonio Bonfini (1434-1502), an Italian court historian and author of Rerum 
Hungaricum Decades, produced during Matthias Corvinus’ reign, ‘Hunyadi earned rewards 
in Italy for two years under Duke Philip of Milan (Filippo Visconti), for he stayed behind in 
Italy after following Sigismund.’968 Bonfini goes into even more detail later, stating that, 
Hunyadi travelled to Italy ‘in order to see the Roman ancestors and also the masters of 
[military] affairs. He learnt of military education first under Duke Phillip of Milan.’969 The 
reliability of Bonfini in this case has been questioned, but other sources would suggest that 
Hunyadi’s stay at the Duke of Milan’s court is not out of the question. While at Constance, 
for example, Sigismund addressed a letter to an unknown prince asking them if they could 
accept a certain Polish knight into his service. Sigismund noted that the knight had an interest 
in military matters and wished to serve him pro actuum militarium exercicio.
970
 Clearly then, 
the idea that members of Sigismund’s retinue would take advantage of their master’s travels 
to learn about military matters is a realistic prospect. 
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 In conclusion, this chapter has shown how Sigismund’s attitude to the defence of his 
southern frontier involved a conscious focus on economic development and the restructuring 
of his kingdom’s finances. The development of a fortified frontier, the need to maintain a 
permanent standing force and the commitment to regular (if not yearly) campaigns on the 
frontier was a tremendous task for a medieval state such as Hungary, and required logistical 
and financial expertise that was not present in the Hungarian court. While Sigismund’s 
solution to these challenges came first in the form of Scolari, and later in the form of the 
Tallóci brothers, his Roman Kingship did allow him to draw upon the expertise of the 
Teutonic Knights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored the response of Sigismund von Luxemburg to the Ottoman Turkish 
threat as Roman King and Holy Roman Emperor. It has hopefully shown how Sigismund 
consciously attempted to use the new found status and prestige that came with holding 
imperial office in order to counter the power of the Turks in south-eastern Europe. More 
importantly, it has hopefully shown that Sigismund’s response to the Ottomans as Roman 
King was not merely limited to speeches, letters and the airing of his good intentions, but that 
he was able to use his status as the holder of the imperial office to bring concrete military, 
political and economic support to his struggle. In doing so, it has demonstrated how 
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Sigismund’s accession as Roman King imbued him with additional options with which to 
combat the Ottoman Turkish threat. The historiographical focus on Sigismund’s relationship 
with Venice for naval aid or on his attempts to galvanise assistance from his fellow Christians 
through the institutions and ideology of crusading are perfectly valid, but, as this thesis has 
shown, his connections as the leader of the Reich cannot be discounted. His status as Roman 
King, and later as Holy Roman Emperor, should be seen as a factor which enhanced 
Sigismund’s ability to tackle the Turkish threat, not one which retarded it.  
 Sigismund made the fullest use possible of the ideological resources which came with 
the Imperial office, emphasising how his struggle against the Turks was a matter of 
importance for all of Christendom. He did not succeed in galvanising Christendom into a 
great crusading expedition aimed at the Turks during his reign as Roman King and Holy 
Roman Emperor, but he was still able to effect some response from his fellow princes. It was 
through Sigismund himself that Christendom’s response to the Turkish threat was actuated, 
and not necessarily through the crusading movement. The concrete military and political help 
which Sigismund could draw upon as Roman King came in many forms. Much of this aid 
Sigismund recruited himself during his often extensive travels abroad, necessitated as they 
were by his status as Roman King which made him the secular head of western Christendom. 
In other cases, Sigismund was able to convince his subjects in the Reich, notably the 
Teutonic Knights, to come and serve him against the Turks on his southern frontier. The fact 
that he was able to convince some of his subjects to aid him in the struggle against the Turks 
would suggest that the figure of Roman King was not so liminal and distant as historians, 
notably Moraw, have suggested. 
 As we have seen, Sigismund’s contemporaries and near contemporaries, such as 
Piccolomini and Thuróczy, did not always view Sigismund’s efforts against the Turks in the 
most sympathetic light. It has been alleged that the imperial office distracted him from 
battling the Turks effectively, and that he spent years wandering around all corners of 
Christendom while his kingdom dearly needed him. A far more flattering view of Sigismund 
emerges from the works of Vespasiano da Bisticci (1421-1498), who notes that during 
Cosimo de’Medici’s period of influence in Florence ‘reigned the Emperor Sigismund, who 
held, besides the imperial dominion, the kingdom of Hungary, a valiant foe of the impious 
Turks, as is plainly manifest, because in his reign they were kept within their own limits and 
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not suffered to express Christian people as in former days’.971 One of the factors behind 
Sigismund’s success in holding back the Turks was undoubtedly his ability to tap both the 
ideological and military resources which he could access as Roman King and then as Holy 
Roman Emperor. 
 Sigismund’s attempt to bring the resources of his various lands to bear against the 
Turks was arguably a policy which Albert II, Sigismund’s short-lived successor as King of 
Hungary and Roman King, attempted to continue. When requesting a contingent of soldiers 
from Augsburg on 20 April 1439, Albert stated simply that he required them for the krieg 
gegen die Böhmen, und Pohlen, nicht weniger gen Türken.
972
 These forces from a Bavarian 
imperial free city, had they been raised, could therefore have been sent to fight in defence of 
Albert’s Kingdom of Hungary, against the Turks. Unfortunately, Albert’s premature death in 
October 1439 meant that the crown of the Romans and the crown of St Stephen were no 
longer united in one person, and the ability of the Hungarian King to draw upon the resources 
present in the Reich came to an end. 
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